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This Ph.D. dissertation consists of three essays on the behavior of foreign banks in Brazil. 
The first chapter explores the Brazilian macro-prudential measures of the end of 2010 in order to 
unfold the lending behavior of foreign banks. The second chapter evaluates the extent to which the 
international financial crisis that started in August 2007 induced more affected banks to act in a 
more pessimistic way on the creditworthiness of their commercial borrowers. The third chapter 
analyses how the strengthening of creditor rights affected corporate debt structure and collateral 
agreements, following the 2005 bankruptcy law in Brazil. 
 
Chapter 1: The Cross-Market “Flight to Quality” Substitution Effect on Lending 
By operating in multiple countries, foreign banks can transmit negative economic shocks to 
local lending, aggravating the contagion from one market to another. However, foreign banks can 
increase local lending if an adverse outside shock reduces the expected profitability of lending in 
the markets that experienced the shock (Berrospide, Black and Keeton, 2013). In this case, foreign 
banks can reallocate capital due to their internal capital markets, helping to insulate local 
economies from outside loan supply shocks (Morgan, Rime and Strahan, 2004). 
In this chapter, we identify whether and how, during liquidity tensions in their country of 
origin, foreign banks substitute their investments with lending in Brazil. We focus our analysis on 
the rise of the sovereign crisis in Europe (outside adverse shock) and exploit the Brazilian macro-
prudential measures on the fourth quarter of 2010. In order to control the fast credit growth, the 
macro-prudential measures decreased the incentives for banks in Brazil to fund themselves locally 
and abroad, with the exemption of equity investments. Exploiting the macro-prudential measures 
in a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate its effects on the differences in credit supply, 
willingness to start (terminate) new (ongoing) bank–firm relationships, and the shift in risk-taking 
lending strategies over the transition from 2010 to 2011. 
Results show that foreign banks increased their supply of credit after the macroprudential 
measures when compared with the level of the private domestic banks. Despite the spillover effects 
that foreign banks could have received through their bank’s balance sheets, we find that the more 
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exposed a foreign bank was to the sovereign crisis, the more they substituted with lending in Brazil. 
We also investigate the extensive margin of the willingness of foreign banks to start new bank–
firm relationships and to terminate ongoing lending relationships over transition from 2010 to 
2011. Taken together, the results of “entry” and “exit” rates of firms suggest that foreign banks 
were more relationship intensive, whereas private domestic banks more concerned with extending 
relationships further. 
In order to formally test the “flight to quality” hypothesis, we distinguish groups of firms 
with opposing credit risk. In all tests, we find that foreign banks intensified credit supply to low-
risk firms to a greater degree than other bank groups. We also test whether foreign banks increased 
lending via the internal capital markets channel. Results suggest that changes in equity have a 
sizeable effect on lending. We interpret our findings as evidence that the substitution effect for 
Brazil operated through the capital channel. 
 
Chapter 2: The internal credit rating channel. 
Banks may have a competitive informational advantage over alternative lenders. Apart from 
having access to public information, banks also possess private information derived from the 
transaction accounts of borrowers. The purpose of the collection and process of information is to 
create a measure to assess and monitor the credit risk of a firm. This measure is embedded in a 
credit rating, and it represents an assessment of the likelihood that a firm will default on their debt 
obligations in a given period. 
However, there is skepticism about the capacity of foreign banks to collect and process 
information. It is possible that foreign banks are not well suited to collecting “soft” information 
about borrowers (Stein, 2002; Canales and Nanda, 2012). Difficulty in collecting soft information 
on the local market may be especially acute when foreign subsidiaries are far from bank 
headquarters (Berger and DeYoung, 2006; Mian, 2006). Moreover, foreign banks may revise their 
perceptions of an entire class of loans based on losses in only some of the countries in which they 
operate (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003). 
In this chapter, we test the hypothesis of whether an outside adverse shock affects banks in 
a heterogeneous way, inducing foreign banks in particular to become more pessimistic about the 
quality of local borrowers. If this is true, we should be able to capture such behavior through the 
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bank's internal credit ratings. Using a panel-data sample from the Brazilian credit registry with 
quarterly credit data for more than 500.000 firms from 2005 to 2009, we find that the international 
crisis of 2007-2008 did have an effect on the risk assessment of firms. On average, foreign banks 
were more aggressive in downgrading their borrowers in comparison to private domestic banks 
during the crisis. Additionally, our results suggest that the more banks were affected by the crisis, 
the more they became pessimistic about the creditworthiness of firms in Brazil. This is in line with 
the idea that a decrease in the quality of borrowers in other markets may cause foreign banks to 
become more pessimistic about the quality of local borrowers ( Berrospide, Black and Keeton, 
2013). 
One of the characteristics of the Brazilian credit registry is that banks do not have access to 
the credit rating assigned by other banks. Therefore, concerns about the potential triggering of a 
systemic downgrading of credit ratings are almost discarded. However, the question we raise in 
this paper could be particularly relevant for countries where credit ratings are shared among banks 
through public credit registries. If international risks can indeed be transmitted to a local market 
through the credit rating channel, then public credit ratings may exacerbate lenders’ coordination 
and increase the incidence of firm financial distress (Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini, 2011). 
 
Chapter 3: Collateral after the Brazilian Creditor Rights Reform 
“One of the key channels through which financial development operates is by lowering the 
demand for collateral” (Liberti and Mian, 2010). However, protecting creditor rights, which is also 
linked with financial development, is documented as increasing secured debt use (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Levine, 1998, and 1999; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 
2007). The reforms brought by the Brazilian bankruptcy law (Law 11,101/2005) significantly 
strengthened the rights of secured creditors by giving them a higher priority when it comes to 
accessing the assets of the bankrupt firm. It also allowed banks to bypass the lengthy judicial 
process for seizing and liquidating the certain types of collateralized assets of the defaulting firm. 
Exploiting the bankruptcy law in a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate its effects on 
three aspects of collateral. Namely, we focus on corporate debt structure (macro-level), on the use 
of collateral agreements with different liquidity levels, and on the amount of collateral pledged in 
order for a firm to access new credit (micro-level). Using a panel-data sample from the Brazilian 
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credit registry with quarterly credit data for more than 790,000 firms from 2004 to 2005, we find 
that secured debt increased after the reform. Moreover, we document that the law increased the 
use of all types of security interests. In particular, we find evidence that the law had a bigger effect 
on the use of more liquid collateral agreements. 
Additionally, we show that a reform that strengthens secured creditor rights has a mixed 
effect on borrowers, depending on their previous level of collateral pledged. Collateral pledge 
significantly decreases for those borrowers who previously had to pledge collateral in excess of 
the value of the loan; and it significantly increased for those borrowers with a lower level of 
collateral pledged before the reform. We show that firms negatively affected by the reform might 
be able to lighten the extra burden of having to pledge more collateral. Borrowers in a multiple 
banking setup could at least mitigate the effect of the reform by contracting with foreign-owned 
banks. Our findings are based on a careful classification of borrowers in order to disentangle the 
bank’s demand for security interests from the firm’s supply of collateralizable assets. Although 
the role of foreign banks is controversial, our paper documents foreign banks as promoters of 
financial development.  
 










Bernardus F. Nazar van Doornik 
Hans Degryse 
Vasso Ioannidou 




Coinciding with the rise of the sovereign crisis in Europe, we exploit the Brazilian macro-
prudential measures of the end of 2010 in a quasi-natural experiment to unfold the lending behavior 
of foreign banks in Brazil. Using a large dataset from the Credit Registry, we are able to isolate 
the credit supply channel and control for changes in borrower demand, quality, and other types of 
shocks to banks’ balance sheets. We find that foreign banks increased credit supply in Brazil by 
six percentage points above the level of private domestic banks. In our most conservative 
specifications, European banks and particularly banks from the GIIPS countries amplified local 
credit to a greater extent than other foreign banks did. Our findings are consistent with the view 
that adverse outside shocks induce those banks that are hit on their home markets to substitute with 
more profitable markets. The substitution effect is also observed as a “flight to quality” inside 
Brazil, given that foreign banks increased lending to low-risk firms to the detriment of high-risk 
firms to a greater extent than domestic banks did. Finally, we document that bank’s internal capital 
market appears to be one of the channels for the substitution effect. 
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1 – Introduction 
On one hand, foreign banks can increase local lending if an adverse outside shock reduces 
the expected profitability of lending in the markets that experienced the shock (Berrospide, Black 
and Keeton, 2013). In this case, foreign banks can reallocate capital due to their internal capital 
markets, helping to insulate local economies from outside loan supply shocks (Morgan, Rime and 
Strahan, 2004). We refer to the tendency of an adverse outside shock to cause foreign banks to 
increase local lending as the substitution effect. On the other hand, by operating in multiple 
countries, foreign banks can transmit negative economic shocks to local lending, aggravating the 
contagion from one market to another. We refer to the alternative possibility (i.e., that an adverse 
outside shock causes foreign banks to decrease local lending) as the spillover effect. 
In the light of these seemingly opposite effects, we address the questions of whether and 
how foreign banks substitute their investments during liquidity tensions in their country of origin 
by lending in another, supposedly more profitable, market. We focus our analysis on the rise of 
the sovereign crisis in Europe (outside adverse shock), and use Brazil as a potential local market 
for the substitution effect. Evidence shows that Brazil was being flooded with foreign resources in 
2009 and 2010, where excessive short-term capital inflows were exacerbating domestic credit 
growth (Silva and Harris, 2012). Indeed, local credit continued through a cycle of rapid expansion, 
with an approximately 20% increase in 2009 and 2010.  
However, in order to find strong evidence for the substitution effect using a differences-in-
differences approach, we should be able to observe foreign banks increasing credit supply to a 
greater extent than domestic banks. This was not the case before the fourth quarter of 2010. The 
lending dynamics of foreign and domestic banks had similar trends. This is not surprising, since 
on the liability side of their balance sheets foreign, private domestic, and government banks had 
at least three channels through which to increase credit supply: domestic funding (e.g., local 
deposits and interbank deposits), international funding (e.g., international interbank deposits, 
bonds issued abroad), and equity (e.g., new shares). 
In order to deal with the excessive speculative capital inflows that were exacerbating 
domestic credit growth, in December 2010 the Central Bank of Brazil enacted macro-prudential 
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measures increasing the reserve requirements for domestic1 and international funding2. In March 
2011, the Ministry of Finance raised taxes on international funding3. These measures represented 
a negative shock to local credit supply, because they made funding more expensive to banks in 
Brazil. However, since the requirements for foreign equity investments remained the same 
throughout the sample period, during this time banks could still operate in the credit supply market 
using this channel. We expect foreign banks to be particularly incentivized to use the equity 
channel because of the higher bonds between the foreign parent bank and its local subsidiaries. If 
it is true that foreign banks indeed had higher incentives to substitute with lending in Brazil, we 
should be able to capture this substitution effect more clearly after the macro-prudential measures. 
Hence, we exploit the Brazilian macro-prudential measures in the fourth quarter of 2010 in 
a quasi-natural experiment to unfold the substitution effect of foreign banks on lending. We focus 
on the differences of credit supply, willingness to start (end) new (ongoing) bank–firm 
relationships, and the shift in risk-taking lending strategies over the transition from 2010 to 2011. 
We apply a differences-in-differences methodology, comparing the dynamics of our variables 
among three different types of bank ownership – foreign, private domestic and government owned 
banks – operating in Brazil before and after the end of 2010. 
We have the appropriate data for testing the effects of the euro sovereign crisis on local 
lending after the macro-prudential measures. We use a panel data sample from the Brazilian credit 
registry, which consists of quarterly credit data for more than 960,000 firms from 2009:Q4 to 
2011:Q3, where firms are observed in the pre- and in the post-period. The data allow us to identify 
banks, firms, and loan information over time. Overall, there are more than 10 million firm–bank–
time observations. The unique quasi-natural experiment combined with the comprehensive dataset 
enables us to address the econometric identification challenges. 
We first test whether foreign banks were able to increase Lending in Brazil during the rise 
of the sovereign crisis and after the macroprudential measures. We find that foreign banks 
increased the supply of credit by six percent in the post-period. Despite the spillover effects that 
                                                 
1 Unremunerated reserve requirement on term deposits was raised from 15% to 20%; and additional remunerated 
reserve requirement on demand and term deposit was raised from 8% to 12%. 
2 Unremunerated reserve requirement on banks’ short positions in the foreign exchange spot market was raised from 
0% to 60%. 
3 Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF) of inflows related to direct external borrowing and debt securities issued with 
a maturity below 360 days (before the average tenor was below 90 days) was raised from 5.38% to 6%. 
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foreign banks could have received through their bank’s balance sheets, we find that the more 
exposed a foreign bank was to the sovereign crisis (European banks and banks from GIIPS 
countries in particular), the more they substituted with lending in Brazil. The identification strategy 
relies on a comparison between the behavior of foreign banks and other banks (private domestic 
and government owned). We select firms that borrow from at least one foreign bank and from one 
other bank (private domestic or government owned) in the pre- and in the post-period. We account 
for differences across types of banks (foreign, domestic and public), across settings of fixed effects 
(firm, time and bank FE, or firm−time and bank FE) and differences within bank’s balance sheet 
structure.  
In an extensive margin analysis, we also find that foreign banks were less willing to start 
new bank−firm relationships when compared with private domestic banks, and more willing to 
end ongoing lending relationships over the transition from 2010 to 2011. The result for both the 
“entry” and “exit” rates of firms suggest that foreign banks were more relationship intensive (i.e., 
concentrating on some relationships and less supporting of fragile borrowers), whereas domestic 
banks were more concerned with extending relationships. Results are in line with Bofondi et al. 
(2013), who interpret this finding as a “flight to quality” of foreign banks during the crisis. In order 
to formally test the “flight to quality” hypothesis, we distinguish groups of firms with opposing 
credit risk before 2010:Q4. In all tests we find that, to a greater extent than other bank groups, 
foreign banks intensified credit supply to low-risk firms to the detriment of high-risk firms. 
Finally, we test whether foreign banks increased lending through the channel of internal 
capital markets. Unfortunately, we are not able to measure internal capital markets directly through 
banks’ balance sheets. Similarly to what Berrospide, Black and Keeton (2013), and De Marco 
(2015) do, we use equity as a proxy for the use of internal capital markets. Results suggest that 
changes in equity have a sizeable effect on lending. We interpret our findings as evidence that the 
substitution effect for Brazil operated through the internal capital channel, even though equity is a 
relatively more costly source of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that empirically tests the substitution 
effect of foreign banks on local lending by using a double negative shock. We use the rise of the 
sovereign crisis as an outside shock that affected foreign banks in their country of origin, and we 
use the Brazilian macro-prudential measures as a domestic shock that affected local lending. Our 
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findings suggest that international banks perceive investment opportunities and hence channel 
capital flows to more profitable markets. Even with the macro-prudential measures that aimed at 
curtailing credit supply in the country, Brazil continued presenting itself as a profitable market for 
international banks. 
Our paper builds on a long literature that deals with the international transmission of liquidity 
shocks through the balance sheets of banks. Banks can transmit negative shocks to lending, both 
domestically (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jimenez et al., 2012; Bofondi et al., 2013) as well as 
across borders (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and van Horen, 
2012; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Popov and Udell, 2012; Schnabl, 2012; Popov and van Horen, 
2013). According to Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), emerging markets also experienced declines 
in lending from developed countries, with the greatest vulnerability to dollar-funding shocks in the 
period 2007-2009. Our paper documents findings that are opposite to the findings in this literature. 
During the rise of the sovereign crisis, with liquidity tensions in most developed countries, foreign 
banks substituted investments with lending in Brazil. Additionally, we document a “flight to 
quality” on the part of foreign banks during the crisis, where they focused lending on particular 
relationships and offered less support to fragile borrowers. 
Additionally, we add to the recent literature that focus on bank-level characteristics that 
affect shock transmission. Bank ownership matters. Domestic and international banks behave 
differently in terms of the use of internal capital markets to manage liquidity, and in terms of 
lending in domestic markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). Balance sheet strength also matters. 
Access to a stable funding base of domestic deposits and the strength of the foreign parent bank 
affect domestic lending. We add to this literature by documenting results that compare the lending 
behavior of foreign, private domestic, and public banks, controlling for time-varying balance sheet 
characteristics of the banks. 
We also add to the literature that discusses the significance of the structure of host country 
markets for the transmission of shocks. After the crisis, foreign banks were more committed to 
geographically close countries hosting an affiliated subsidiary that had developed relationships 
with local banks (De Haas and van Horen, 2012). The shock transmission to the domestic market 
through the foreign parent bank is weaker for locations considered as important investment 
opportunities (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012). We believe that our paper is unique in showing that 
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Brazil, although not geographically close to US nor to Europe, nor with developed interbank 
market connections, seems to have been an important market and a “safe haven” for foreign banks 
in 2010 and 2011. 
Finally, related literature also focuses on the benefits of internal capital markets in bank 
financial conglomerates. Financial frictions leading to differences in external and domestic cost of 
funding, and the use of internal capital markets, are important pre-conditions for expecting to find 
in foreign banks a substitution effect on cross-market lending. Previous findings indicate that 
parent banks use internal capital markets to manage the credit growth of their foreign subsidiaries 
(De Haas and van Lelyveld 2010). Moreover, foreign banks use internal capital markets to 
reallocate resources among their subsidiaries, offsetting declines in domestic and international 
funding at liquidity-constrained subsidiaries (Campello, 2001; Ashcraft, 2006). Similarly to 
Berrospide, Black and Keeton (2013) and De Marco (2015), we use equity as a proxy for the use 
of internal capital markets. We find that changes in equity for foreign banks have a sizeable effect 
on lending. This leads to the conclusion that the substitution effect for lending in Brazil operated 
through the capital channel. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional details of 
Brazil and the macro-prudential measures. Section 3 presents the dataset and the main descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and the model we propose to overcome these 
challenges. Section 5 contains the results of the baseline specifications, as well as a battery of 
robustness tests. Section 6 examines the extensive margin; section 7 formally tests the “flight to 
quality” hypothesis; and section 8 provides some evidence on the importance of the internal capital 
market channel for the transmission of cross-market foreign liquidity into lending. Finally, section 





2 – Institutional details 
2.1 – Before the Brazilian macro-prudential measures 
Regardless of the global economic state, Brazil4 sailed well through the first phase of the 
global financial crisis. In the second quarter of 2009, Brazil was already out of the recession5. In 
the year 2010, more than half of all the oil discoveries in the world was found in Brazil6 and the 
country was already growing at a rate closer to that of India and China. Benefitting from temporary 
factors such as the difference between international and local interest rates, and excessive global 
liquidity7, Brazil received large short-term foreign inflows8. Indeed, “global excessive liquidity is 
seen by many analysts as a major driving force behind recent capital flows into emerging markets 
in general, and Brazil in particular” (Silva and Harris, 2012).  
Therefore, one of the main policy issues in Brazil in the second semester of 2010 was to 
manage the effects of large capital inflows. Brazil managed these foreign inflows with aggregate 
demand contraction through fiscal and monetary policies9. However, Brazil’s credit market was 
being affected by multiple sources of foreign capital inflows (Silva and Harris, 2012), and a set of 
measures was consequently adopted, as discussed in the next section. 
 
                                                 
4 Brazilian authorities took immediate action in 2008. Bank reserve requirements were lowered, injecting around $50 
billion worth of liquidity (4% of GDP) into the banking system. Another $50 billion was provided for foreign 
exchange lines of credit in spot market auctions and swap contracts (22 % of total international reserves). The 
government calibrated other monetary and fiscal policy instruments to provide stimulus to economic activity and 
extended credit by public financial institutions with an additional $50 billion. 
5 BBC news published on September 11 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8251164.stm.  
6 Perry, Mark. “2010 Was A Very Good Year For New Oil Finds”, published on January 8, 2011, 
http://www.dailymarkets.com/economy/2011/01/08/2010-was-a-very-good-year-for-new-oil-finds/ 
7 Never in history, had government authorities needed to inject such amounts of liquidity into the banking system. The 
bailout of the U.S. financial system had budgets of up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets and supply cash 
directly to banks. The response to the deterioration of European sovereign debt brought almost €500 billion. 
Governments of other major economies followed the same path of providing high doses of liquidity to banks in order 
to reduce the impact of the banking crisis on the real economy. 
8 During 2010, net capital inflows (defined as non-residents’ net flow into portfolio investments, depositary receipts, 
direct investment, and external credits) amounted to US$125 billion, compared to close to US$80 billion in 2009. 
Brazil had a historically high amount of equity issuance, totaling R$146 billion, of which 26% were taken up by 
foreign investors. External debt issuance raised another US$ 48 billion, approximately. FDI net inflows amounted 
to US$ 38 billion (Silva and Harris, 2012). 
9 On the monetary policy front, between January and July 2011, the Central Bank took action and raised the policy 
rate by 175 bps in five consecutive monetary policy committee meetings. That followed the 200 bps increase of 
2010 and totaled an overall rate hike of 375 bps. On the fiscal front, in February 2011, the Government reaffirmed 
its commitment to a strong fiscal stance with a steady reduction of the public debt to GDP ratio and proposed a fiscal 
consolidation of R$ 50 billion of expenditure cuts (Silva and Harris, 2012). 
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2.2 – The Brazilian macro-prudential measures 
Excessive capital inflows contributed to the fast growth of domestic credit in Brazil. The 
diagnosis of Silva and Harris (2012) was that banks in Brazil were taking advantage of the ample 
liquidity in global markets to significantly increase their funding abroad, and then invest those 
resources in BRL-denominated domestic assets, including loans, thus capturing the interest rate 
differential. The concerns led the Central Bank of Brazil to implement the following macro-
prudential measures10: 
 Increased bank reserve requirements on deposits. In the beginning of December 2010, 
unremunerated reserve requirements were raised on term deposits from 15% to 20% 
(Circular 3513) and the additional remunerated reserve requirements on demand and term 
deposit were raised from 8% to 12% (Circular 3514). The new levels of reserve 
requirements worked as a countercyclical buffer set on deposits in order to smooth rapid 
credit growth.  
 New reserve requirements on banks’ short spot foreign exchange positions. In January 
2011, the Central Bank imposed a 60% unremunerated reserve requirement on banks’ short 
positions in the foreign exchange spot market exceeding either US$3 billion or Tier 1 
capital, whichever was lower (Circular 3520). The new levels of reserve requirements on 
banks’ short spot foreign exchange positions aimed at correcting imbalances in the foreign 
exchange market. 
 Increased taxation of external credit inflows11.  In March 2011, the authorities raised (from 
5.38% to 6%) the IOF tax rate on inflows related to direct external borrowing and debt 
securities issued with a maturity below 360 days (before the average tenor was below 90 
days) (Decree 7456). Higher taxes curtailed short-term speculative inflows, reducing the 
intensity and volatility of capital flows. 
                                                 
10 Central Bank also increased capital requirements for consumer loans aiming at correcting a deterioration in the quality of loan origination. These measures 
focused essentially on loans for individuals and not for firms. Hence, this measure is not key for our study. 
11 In October 2010, the Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF) for nonresidents’ portfolio investment in fixed income 
instruments was raised, first from 2% to 4%, and later in the same month to 6%. The IOF was also raised to 6% 
(from 0.38%) on incoming remittances destined to posting collateral on derivatives positions held at central 
counterparties for stocks, commodities or futures trading. The IOF rate increases were expected to curb excessive 
short-term and speculative capital inflows and lengthen flow composition, in particular by discouraging short term 




While the macro-prudential measures decreased the incentives for banks to tunnel resources 
for lending through the bank’s balance sheet, the measures maintained incentives for banks to use 
the capital channel. Equity remained as an open channel for lending in Brazil, with the same 2% 
IOF tax rate. Because equity is a relatively costly source of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984), we 
expect that the macro-prudential measures have given foreign banks greater incentives to substitute 
to Brazil compared to domestic banks, although foreign banks were being adversely affected with 
the rise of the sovereign crisis. 
Figure 1 summarizes the periods before and after the Brazilian macro-prudential measures, 
with the shocks, channels and effects we expect to find. 
 
– Insert Figure 1 here – 
 
 
3 – Data and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we use a rich dataset from the Central Bank of Brazil that contains specific 
information on bank–firm credit relationships. The credit register lists all outstanding loan amounts 
above a threshold of 5,000 Brazilian Real12 that each borrower has with banks operating in Brazil, 
including foreign banks. Data is required at a monthly frequency, and intermediaries use the credit 
registry as a screening and monitoring device for borrowers. It is also used by Central Bank to 
monitor and supervise the banking sector. Central Bank ensures the quality of the data and our 
dependent variable is considered to be of high quality, since total outstanding loan amount at the 
credit registry must match the accounting figures for credit loan.  
The samples we use from the credit registry include all non-financial and private firms with 
outstanding credit. We also obtained from Central Bank consolidated and unconsolidated balance 
sheet data with quarterly frequency from all the banks operating in Brazil. In addition, we have 
bank ownership and conglomerate information. After several examinations to ensure that the data 
is of high quality, we merge these different datasets using the public bank identification number. 
                                                 
12 Around 2,500 USD in December 2012. 
14 
 
The sample of banks includes commercial banks and universal banks with a commercial 
portfolio13. Furthermore, banks should appear in the pre- and in the post-period. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on information around the Brazilian macro-
prudential measures of the third quarter of 2010. These measures represent a negative shock to the 
growing Brazilian credit market. If the substitution effect is truly happening, we expect that foreign 
banks will be less respondent to the law change in comparison with private domestic banks. We 
select a sample period that runs from 2009:Q4 until 2011:Q3. The start of the period has the 
advantage that it excludes the unprecedented collapse in syndicated lending during the global 
financial crisis. Thus, it reduces the risk that the results are influenced by other events or 
developments occurring in the previous period. We chose 2011:Q3 as the end of the sample period 
in order not to have our main results contaminated by the ECB’s exceptional long-term refinancing 
operation introduced in December 201114. The quarter in which we split the sample is 2010:Q4. 
Therefore, we have four quarters before the exogenous event and four quarters after it. 
Choosing this specification instead of using five quarters before and after also alleviates concerns 
about lending seasonality (lending is stronger before Christmas, but weaker before Carnival). As 
a robustness check, we do the exercise using the period from 2009:Q2 to 2011:Q4, however results 
are quantitatively unchanged. The same applies when we test for the possibility that 2011:Q1 is 
the correct start of the post-period. 
We exclude default operations with more than 90 days, reducing the risk that results are 
influenced by the carry amount of non-paid debt in the dependent variable. Results are robust to 
the inclusion of default loans15. We keep firm–bank relationship if it appears in the pre-period for 
at least three out of the four possible quarters. The same applies for the post-period. Therefore, we 
keep the bank–firm relationship if there is a 75% minimum appearance throughout the sample 
period. This partially controls for mergers and acquisitions among banks. Results are also robust 
to the loosening of such restriction. We further control for M&A and rebalancing of the bank’s 
                                                 
13 The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is excluded from the sample given its particular objectives and 
operational differences, especially on its cost of funding and its long-term assets. 
14 On December 8, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) decided on additional enhanced credit 
support measures to bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market. Long Term Financing Operations 
(LTRO) summing almost €500 billion temporarily eased tensions in funding markets. 
15 In the case that a firm is in default for more than 90 days and continues in this situation, the outstanding loan amount 
stays the same throughout the sample period. By excluding these operations, we are able to follow the actual change 
in credit supply of banks in the post-period. 
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loan portfolio, by tracking whether each loan was initiated by the bank itself, or whether it is a new 
relationship with the acquirer bank. Results are robust to the exclusion of such loans.  
In the full sample, we track 963,299 firms and 98 banks that together result in 1,303,570 
bank–firm pairs. The data level is a triplet on the firm–bank–time dimensions. The dependent 
variable is Lending, defined as the natural logarithm of total outstanding loan amount of borrower 
i at bank b in quarter t. In order to limit extreme values in the statistical data and reduce the effect 
of possibly spurious outliers, we winsorize Lending on 98%/2% level. Results are robust when 
Lending is only winsorized in the pre-period. Results are also robust to the loose of this restriction.  
Table 1 shows the definitions of Lending and of all other variables used in our paper. 
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
We use dummy variables to indicate the bank’s ownership. Foreign takes the value one if 
ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign country, and zero otherwise. European banks 
take the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a European country (with the 
exception of UK and Switzerland), and zero otherwise. GIIPS banks take the value one if 
ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a GIIPS country (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain), and zero otherwise. Last, Government takes the value one if bank is public, and zero 
otherwise. Additionally, we have several bank-level characteristics, which include the size of the 
bank, the ratio of liquid assets, deposits and equity to total assets, return over assets, international 
funding, the cost of funding and the size of impaired loans. These controls enable one to check the 
robustness of our findings, in particular whether the inclusion of other covariates changes the 
impact estimated in the baseline models. 
Table 2 – Panel A shows summary statistics of the variables from the full sample. 
 




The median loan amount is approximately 30,000 USD. Foreign banks correspond to 11% 
of the observations on bank–firm relationships. From these firm–foreign bank relationships, 
around 65% are with European banks, of which almost all relationships are from the GIIPS 
countries. Government banks correspond to 39% and private domestic banks to 49% of the firm–
bank–time observations. Banks use on average 82% of their own resources to fund borrowers, 
while most of the other 18% comes from government sources, such as federal programs aimed at 
specific regions (e.g., to the North and Northeast region in Brazil) and certain types of activities 
(e.g., to the agri-business liquidity and investment needs). 
It is important to mention two points. On one hand, overall Lending increased even after the 
Brazilian macro-prudential measures. Lending in log amount using domestic currency was 11.05 
before the change in the law and it increased to 11.07 after that (0.02 in the “Diff.” column of 
Table 2). This is a statistically significant change, as we can observe from the p-value of the T-
Test column. On the other hand, one can notice that the risk of foreign banks, measured by the 
quarterly average Credit Default Swap (5 years bond), increased substantially (from 0.12 in the 
“Before” column to 0.18 in the “Diff.” column). The increase in foreign banks’ CDS spread is 
statistically significant and is interpreted as a decline in foreign economic conditions by the end of 
2010 onwards. 
In order to control for firm unobservable heterogeneity, we select only firms borrowing from 
at least two banks from the full sample. Since the identification strategy relies on a comparison 
between the behavior of foreign banks and other banks (private domestic and government owned) 
at the same time, we select firms that borrow from at least one foreign bank and from one other 
bank (private domestic or government owned) in the pre- and in the post-period. This is our 
restricted sample. 
The strategy of using our restricted sample permits a powerful identification within 
borrowers in order to disentangle credit supply from credit demand. Specifically, we investigate 
the impact on the intensive margin on the same firm at the same point in time for foreign banks 
and for non-foreign banks. In the analyses, we track 79,906 bank–firm pairs with foreign banks, 
51,033 with government banks, and 80,258 with private domestic banks. There are 74,117 firms 
in the sample. The data level is a triplet on the firm–bank–time dimensions. 
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Table 2 – Panel B shows summary statistics of all variables from the restricted sample. The 
median loan amount is approximately 85,000 USD. As in the full sample, Lending in the restricted 
sample increased in the post-period compared with the pre-period. It was 12.12 in log amount 
before the change in the law and it increased to 12.18 afterwards (0.06 in the “Diff.” column of 
Table 2). This is an economic and statistically significant change, as we can observe from the p-
value of the T-Test column. Moreover, 38% of the firm–bank–time observations are with foreign 
banks, 24% with government banks, and 38% with private domestic banks. Banks use on average 
86% of their own resources to fund borrowers.  
The median bank in the sample has a size of approximately 200 USD million, with a balance 
sheet structure of 37% of their total assets invested in liquid assets. The median bank has 47% of 
their obligations as deposits, 7% as equity and a small involvement of international sources of 
funding, around 1%. Even with the reasonable level of impaired loans and the high costs of funding 
compared to other economies, the median bank has a net positive income. However, there is 
extreme variance in the cross-section dimension of bank’s balance sheet structure and size. Such 
balance sheet differences can be correlated with credit supply, so we formally include these 
variables in the regressions analyses. It is important to cite that systematic differences across banks 
are controlled in the regressions by bank fixed effects. 
Table 3 shows the means of the variables for the group of foreign, private domestic, and 
public banks with their respective t-tests comparing the mean before and after the Brazilian macro-
prudential measures. The differences in means of Lending from foreign banks increased from 
11.53 to 11.59. The differences in means of Lending from government banks also increased (from 
11.08 to 11.13), whereas for private domestic banks it decreased (from 10.92 to 10.89). All changes 
are statistically significant, as we can observe from the p-value of the T-Test column. 
 
– Insert Table 3 here – 
 
The differences in means of Lending from foreign banks compared with government or with 
private domestic banks are statistically significant. Moreover, foreign banks in Brazil are smaller 
than other banks, have more liquid assets than private domestic banks, receive less deposits, are 
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less leveraged, make less profit than private domestic banks, have more access to international 
funding, with funding being more costly than government banks, and have a lower level of 
impaired loans. The difference in the means of balance sheet variables among foreign, private 
domestic, and government banks is also statistically significant. Once again, there is a need to 
include them as variables in the regressions analyses. 
We recognize that it is possible that the restricted sample is not representative of the 
population of firms in Brazil. As we do not know the public identity of the firm, their location, nor 
their industry, it is difficult for us to give an account of the importance and the direction of the 
selection bias. We test for the significance of the difference of coefficients of Lending between the 
full and the restricted sample, both in Table 2 and in Table 3. We find that the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Hence, as we select firms with multiple banking relationships, these firms 
are expected to be larger firms. To the extent that medium and large firms represent most of the 
Brazilian GDP, and that the non-exclusivity in banking relationship is most controversial in the 
literature, the selection bias may actually be beneficial for our analysis. These are the situations 
where the firm may have a better chance of accessing credit (if not from one bank, from another 
one), and this is exactly what we want to capture in terms of credit supply. 
 Appendix Table 1 provides a list of all the foreign investors that own and control banks in 
Brazil and that are present in our sample16. Additionally, we present their country and their average 
total assets for the pre- and the post-period17. In total, we have 27 foreign investors. The majority 
of institutions are owned by American parent banks and institutions, although the biggest player 
is Santander from Spain, followed by HSBC from UK. Banks that increased their size to a greater 
extent during the sample period were Deutsche Bank with 61% increase in total assets, followed 
by Portuguese Caixa Geral de Depositos with 57%, and American Cargil, with 33%. On the other 
                                                 
16 Using information from December 2010, we find that six foreign investors had involvement in Brazil through 
branches only. A foreign branch provides investors with a structure that has more highly centralized decision making 
and a lower restriction in terms of intra-group transfers (Fiechter et al., 2011).  
17 With the exception of the Swiss BP Empreendimentos (authorized to invest in the Bank Bracce in 2007), all other 
foreign investors have been present in Brazil at least since 2002. 
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hand, German Commerzbank18 decreased its size by 28%, followed by ING19 with a 27% lower 
figures, and Credit Suisse20 decreasing by 20%. Foreign banks increased their size by 13% in one 
year, even though, by the end of 2010 the participation of foreign banks was still small compared 
to neighboring countries, with 17% participation in the overall Brazilian market (IMF, 2012).  
 
– Insert Appendix Table 1 here – 
 
 
4 – Empirical strategy 
4.1 – Empirical issues  
The goal of this paper is to identify whether and how foreign banks substitute their 
investments during liquidity tensions in their country of origin to Lending in Brazil. However, 
identifying the substitution effect of foreign banks on credit supply poses important challenges.  
First, the flood of money that Brazil was receiving in 2010 came through private domestic, 
government, and foreign banks. Banks had at least three channels on the liability side of their 
balance sheets through which to increase credit supply in the country: domestic funding (e.g., local 
deposits and interbank deposits), international funding (e.g., international interbank deposits, 
bonds issued abroad), and equity increases (e.g., new shares)21. All banks were increasing Lending 
in a similar trend until the third quarter in Brazil, as we can see in Figure 2. 
 
                                                 
18 After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Commerzbank faced difficulties and had to be bailed out by the German 
government with a cash injection of €18.2 billion. On September 2010, the Bank of Nova Scotia, the biggest 
Canadian bank, agreed to the purchase of Dresdner Bank Brasil SA from its parent, Commerzbank AG. 
19 ING also faced difficulties in the end of 2008 and received capital injection of €10 billion from the Dutch 
Government. The help came in the exchange for securities and veto rights on major operational and investment 
decisions of the bank. As a condition of approving the state aid, the European Commission also required the bank 
to sell its insurance and investment management operations. 
20 Following the crisis, Credit Suisse had to cut more than €1 trillion in assets internationally. In Brazil, investigations 
took place in 2008 and 2009 regarding the use of Credit Suisse accounts for tax evasion. The investigation led to 
arrests that year and in 2009, and were part of a larger crackdown in Brazil on illegal money transfers over the years, 
probing international banks about whether they helped Brazilians to evade taxes. 
21 In the pre-period, government banks had a higher deposit ratio (0.49) compared with other banks (0.37 for both 
foreign and government banks). Government banks also had a higher international funding ratio (0.03) compared 
with other banks (0.01 and 0.02 for foreign and private domestic banks, respectively). Foreign banks had a much 




– Insert Figure 2 here – 
 
Because the Lending dynamics of foreign and domestic banks were in similar trends before 
the fourth quarter of 2010, it was a challenge to capture the substitution effect of foreign banks in 
the pre-period (2009:Q4 to 2010:Q3). We also plot Lending for the three groups of banks using 
our restricted sample in Figure 3. As one can note, we continue observing a similar trend among 
these groups of banks in the pre-period. 
 
– Insert Figure 3 here – 
 
With the Brazilian macro-prudential measures at the end of 2010, the government decreased 
bank incentives for banks to channel deposits or international funding to into lending. However, 
banks could still operate in the credit supply market through the capital channel. We expect foreign 
banks to be particularly incentivized to use this channel, given the higher bonds between the 
foreign parent bank and its local subsidiaries. Hence, equity is a natural proxy for the use of internal 
capital markets22. If it is true that foreign banks indeed had higher incentives to substitute to Brazil, 
we should be able to capture the substitution effect on lending more clearly after the Brazilian 
macro-prudential measures. Hence, we use 2010:Q4 to separate the pre-period from the post-
period. 
Another challenge is to identify banks, otherwise comparable, that have been differently 
affected by the rise of the sovereign crisis in Europe. Since private domestic and government 
owned banks are within Brazil, with limited foreign exposures, we consider foreign banks as the 
treatment group, or in other words, the group we aim to further investigate. Furthermore, we 
consider European banks and particularly banks from the GIIPS countries to be the banks most 
exposed to the sovereign crisis. 
Third, the Brazilian GDP should be exogenous with respect to the conditions of foreign 
banks. Foreign banks are already present in Brazil, so this is not the case. However, foreign banks 
                                                 
22 This is similar to what Berrospide, Black and Keeton (2013), and De Marco (2015) do. 
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have a lesser involvement in the Brazilian Financial System than peer countries. Moreover, when 
compared with domestic banks, foreign banks did not increase their involvement in lending after 
the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and before the end of 2009. Since foreign banks 
cannot be considered as fully insulated by the growth of the Brazilian economy, the effect we 
identify in the paper should be interpreted as an upper bound to the full causal impact of the surge 
of the Brazilian growth in lending. 
A fourth issue is to properly control for firm-level demand for credit. The dataset allows us 
to do so. The methodology for estimating the credit supply channel focuses on firms borrowing 
from multiple lenders, where the banks differ in their exposure to the rise of the sovereign crisis. 
Thus, our methodology relies on the assumption that the subsample of firms trading with multiple 
banks is random and that demand for credit on the firms’ side remain constant during the crisis. In 
fact, using firm fixed effects, we compare how the same firm’s outstanding loan amount - Lending 
- from a foreign bank changes relative to another bank (private domestic or government owned). 
The within-firm comparison fully absorbs firm-specific changes in credit demand, enabling us to 
argue that the estimated difference in Lending for foreign banks can be attributed to the substitution 
or spillover effect.  
We go one step further by including firm–time fixed effects in the regressions, similar to 
what is done by Khwaja and Mian (2008), Jimenez et al. (2012), Bofondi et al. (2013), and Popov 
and Van Horen (2013). The firm–time fixed effects enable us to control for all firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity that affects the dynamics of credit granted in each period, making the 
comparison of foreign banks with other banks even stricter. 
In principle, foreign, private domestic, and government banks may be different on several 
dimensions, and comparing them to assess the effect of the rise of the sovereign crisis in Europe 
and the Brazilian macro-prudential measures on credit supply may not warrant identification of 
the substitution or the spillover effect. Our identification strategy based on comparing lending by 
different banks to the same firm, allows us to fully control for possible differences in the 
composition of borrowers across different types of banks. Moreover, we include bank fixed effects 
in the regressions, so that we can control for all unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among 
lenders, including differences in the composition of loan portfolios, lending policies, managerial 
risk appetite, etc. 
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Furthermore, we include bank-level characteristics in the regressions where we also apply 
firm–time and bank fixed effects, similarly to Bofondi et al. (2013), and Popov and Van Horen 
(2013). These variables include the size of the bank, the ratio of liquid assets, deposits and equity 
to total assets, return over assets, international funding, the cost of funding, and the size of impaired 
loans. These bank-level variables enable one to check the robustness of the findings, in particular 
whether the inclusion of other covariates changes the impact estimated in the baseline model.  
Table 4 is the one that best captures the main identification strategies. We collapse the data 
into a single data point (based on averages) both before and after the reform. This results in two 
data points per unit of observation, one data point for the pre-reform regime and one point for the 
post-reform regime. This time-collapsing of the data ensures that the standard errors are robust to 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique23. 
 
– Insert Table 4 here – 
 
In Panel A, we report the before–after results of the variable Lending for groups of banks 
using the full sample. As can be seen, Lending increased six percentage points after the reform 
(0.0638 in the Difference column) for foreign banks, whereas government banks increased 0.045 
and private domestic decreased 0.0242. Lending for firms with multiple banking relationships 
increased more after the reform for foreign banks, with plus six percentage points, in comparison 
with domestic banks (0.0574 in the Difference column for “Difference (Foreign–Domestic)”). In 
Panel B, we use information from our restricted sample. Results for the “Difference (Foreign– 
Domestic)” is similar to the one from the full sample. In Panel C, we report the before–after results 
of the variable Lending for European banks. It is interesting to note the difference in Lending from 
European banks and all other banks (other foreign, government and private domestic), which is 
still high, around five percentage points. 
                                                 
23 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique relates to serial correlation - the tendency for one observation to 
be correlated with those that have gone before – especially in differences-in-differences models. The simplest and 
most widely applied approach is simply to time-collapse the data. We believe that our number of bank clusters does 
not cause biased standard errors or misleading estimates. 
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Because of computational limitations, we run the regressions using our restricted sample 
only. 
 
4.2 – The model 
We use credit registry data on firm–bank–quarter level. We use the following specification 
to investigate whether foreign banks differ with respect to the lending volume in the post-period 
compared with other banks. We start with a specification with firm, bank, and time fixed effects. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 equals the log of outstanding loan amount of borrower i at bank b in quarter t, 
winsorized on 98%/2% level. 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 is a dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership 
control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3, and zero otherwise. The sample period starts 
in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. We also include a full set of firm, bank, and time fixed effects, 
respectively 𝛼𝑖, 𝛼𝑏 and 𝛼𝑡, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at each of the triplet 
dimensions. 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Since the residuals may be correlated across banks 
and across time (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004), we cluster standard errors at the bank 
level. 
The main challenge is the simultaneous nature of the bank lending channel (credit supply) 
and the firm borrowing channel (credit demand). We completely capture any demand shocks at 
the firm level by using firm–time fixed effects controls 𝛼𝑖,𝑡. This comes at the cost that one needs 
to restrict our analysis to those firms with multiple bank relationships at the same time. In our case, 
we restrict the firm to having a relationship with one foreign and with one other bank (private 
domestic or public) in the pre and in the post-period. Our most conservative specification is: 
 




where vector 𝑋𝑏,𝑡 controls for a set of observable characteristics of bank b at time t, including the 
size of the bank, ratio of liquid assets, deposits and equity to total assets, return over assets, 
international funding, cost of funding, and size of impaired loans. Therefore, we are able to control 
for further bank-specific determinants of credit supply not captured by the bank fixed effects 𝛼𝑏. 
In order to check whether the inclusion of other bank covariates changes the impact estimated in 
the baseline model, we also show estimates of equation (2) without vector 𝑋𝑏,𝑡. 
As we know that government banks had a countercyclical behavior during the financial crisis 
(Coleman and Feler, 2014), we also estimate our equations incorporating their differential impact. 
One example is equation (2), which is then estimated in the following manner: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑏,𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑏,𝑡            (3) 
 
where 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 is a dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the comparison becomes the change in lending, from the pre- to the post- 
period, for foreign banks relative to the control group, private domestic banks in the case above.  
In the previous cases, our coefficient of interest is 𝛽1. Using a difference-in-differences 
approach, 𝛽1 captures the change in lending, from the pre-treatment to the post-treatment period, 
for the treatment group (foreign banks) relative to the control group (private domestic and 
government banks in equation (1) and (2) and private domestic banks in equation (3)). A positive 
coefficient 𝛽1 would imply that all else being equal, lending increased more (decreased less) for 
the group of foreign banks. The numerical estimate of 𝛽1 captures the difference on the change in 
lending between the pre- and the post-period induced by switching from the control group to the 
treatment group. 
Foreign banks operating in Brazil are very heterogeneous in terms of their countries of origin 
and their risk levels. Since we analyze the substitution effect in the rise of the sovereign crisis, we 
want to select banks that are more affected abroad. To this end, we focus the analysis on a specific 




𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡       (4) 
 
European is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the ownership control of the bank 
in Brazil is from a European country (with the exception of UK and Switzerland), and zero 
otherwise. We also interchange European for GIIPS banks, which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a GIIPS country (Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain), and zero otherwise. Moreover, we use the quarterly average Credit Default 
Swap (CDS spread of 5 years contract). This is as a continuous exposure variable of foreign banks 
to the crisis. In specification (4), our coefficient of interest is 𝛿1. In a difference-in-differences 
approach, 𝛿1 captures the change in lending, from the pre-treatment to the post-treatment period, 
for the treatment group (European banks, GIIPS banks, or foreign banks*CDS spread) relative to 
the control group (private domestic banks). 
A key assumption underlying the validity of the identification strategy is that Lending from 
foreign banks and other banks has a similar trend in the pre-period, conditional on all controls. 
Because all the regressions include bank fixed effects, we are already controlling for bank-specific 
time-invariant differences. Therefore, the requirement for a common trend then only applies to 
how much foreign banks, private domestic banks, and government banks depart from their time-
invariant component in the pre- to the post-period.  
We conduct two tests to address this issue. In the first one, we test the credit supply of foreign 
banks relative to private domestic banks, after tensions in the European interbank market in August 
200724. We observe that the initial crisis that hit Europe had on average an economically and 
statistically insignificant impact on credit supply from foreign banks operating in Brazil. It is true, 
however, that there could be a lagged effect of the European interbank market tensions on credit 
supply in Brazil. In this case, this lagged effect would be picked up by our next exercise, where 
                                                 
24 We choose this setting, following Iyer et al. (2014), who argue that the crisis in Europe started with the interbank 
loan spreads going significantly up, pushing the European Central Bank to inject large amounts of liquidity. On 
August 9 2007, the ECB injected €95 billion in order to provide sufficient liquidity to banks, and on the following 




we test the credit supply of foreign banks relative to private domestic banks, after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. We observe that the impact of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers had a negative but not statistically significant impact on Lending for foreign banks 
compared with private domestic banks. This is an indication that the effect of the financial crisis 
of 2008 was asymmetric for foreign banks. Nonetheless, results point to the validity of the main 
findings of the paper. 
 
 
5 – Empirical evidence 
5.1 – Baseline model 
Table 5 provides the first results of the paper. We regress Lending on foreign bank ownership 
in the post-period in a differences-in-differences approach. Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of 
the dummy foreign on the amount of credit supplied in the period from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3. In 
column (1), we include bank, firm, and time fixed effects, but do not control for time-varying bank 
characteristics. The estimate of coefficient 𝛽1 is not statistically significant, although positive and 
economically meaningful, suggesting that foreign banks did not decrease lending more than other 
banks operating in the country. In order to address the possibility that there are time-varying 
differences in borrower demand and/or quality, in column (2) we include firm–time fixed effects. 
In this setting, results become statistically significant25. Results are robust when we also control 
for time-varying bank characteristics, as one can observe in column (3). 
 
– Insert Table 5 here – 
 
Brazilian government banks displayed countercyclical behavior during the global financial 
crisis (IMF, 2012). They provided more credit, offsetting declines in lending by private banks 
(Coleman and Feler, 2014). With this argument, we regress Lending on foreign and government 
bank ownership in the post-period. In equations (4) to (6), the interest is on foreign banks versus 
                                                 
25 We take this as evidence that there is considerable time-series variance within firm–bank outstanding debt (e.g., 
new loans appearing and old loans disappearing from the credit registry). This variance is mitigated by the use of 
firm–time fixed effects. 
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private domestic banks in 2010:Q4 and after. In column (4), one can observe the increase in 
economic significance of foreign ownership on Lending, when compared to the results in column 
(1). Column (6) in Table 5 presents the preferred estimation providing an unbiased estimate of the 
bank-lending channel. Ceteris paribus, foreign banks increased six percentage points of the 
outstanding loan amount, compared with private domestic banks. Because specification (6) include 
a set of fixed effects and time-varying bank controls, it is unlikely that the results are driven by 
unobservable time-varying differences in borrower demand and quality, nor by time-invariant 
bank heterogeneity, nor by time-varying differences in the bank’s structure, behavior, or risk 
appetite. 
 
5.2 – Exposure measures 
We address the heterogeneity issue in relation to the markets where the parent banks in our 
sample are domiciled. Here, we test whether different groups of foreign banks, namely European 
banks, and banks from GIIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) behaved 
differently during the baseline sample period. Table 6 reports the core results of the paper. 
 
– Insert Table 6 here – 
 
In column (1) to (3), we use a dummy variable to define European banks (except for banks 
from UK and from Switzerland). Our argument is that the sovereign crisis increased the incentives 
for banks domiciled in the Euro area to divest domestically and invest abroad26. The estimates 
from column (1) and (2) imply that European banks did not increase Lending in Brazil any more 
than other foreign banks. However, results change completely when we include time-varying bank 
characteristics, as one can observe in column (3). In this case, European banks increased Lending 
by nine percentage points above private domestic banks in the post-period. Results are also 
                                                 
26 It is important to take into account the “fragmentation event” that occurred after the crisis, mainly within the 
European banking industry. Although foreign banks channeled resources into Brazilian assets, including sovereign 
securities, to earn currency risk-free arbitrage profit (carry trade), there was a structural limitation. In order to 
strengthen their capital, some European banks had to diminish their exposures abroad in order to better comply with 
Basel requirements on a consolidated basis. 
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statistically different from the estimates of other foreign banks. We interpret these results as 
evidence for spillover effects on European banks. By formally controlling for the negative balance-
sheet externalities, we continue finding strong evidence for the substitution effect. 
We go a step further. In column (4) to (6), we consider banks from GIIPS countries. This is 
relevant since the market share of Spanish and Portuguese banks is the highest among foreign 
banks in Brazil. The estimates from column (4) and (5) imply that GIIPS banks did not increase 
Lending in Brazil to any greater extent than other foreign banks. Once again, results change 
completely when we include time-varying bank characteristics, as one can observe in column (6). 
GIIPS banks increased Lending by nine percentage points above other foreign banks in the post-
period. Thus, by formally controlling for the negative balance-sheet externalities of GIIPS banks, 
we continue to find strong evidence for the substitution effect. 
One disadvantage of using groups of foreign banks is that it does not allow us to calculate 
the effect of a marginal increase in sovereign debt exposure on lending at the bank level. Therefore, 
we report estimates from a regression where the binary variable for group of foreign banks has 
been replaced with a continuous variable. In column (7) to (9), we use the quarterly average Credit 
Default Swap (CDS spread of five years contract) as a continuous exposure variable of foreign 
banks to the crisis. Private domestic and government banks are defined as having CDS equal to 
zero throughout the sample period. The estimates from column (7) and (8) shows a weak evidence 
that higher CDS spreads are associated with higher credit supply. Results change completely when 
we include time-varying bank characteristics, as one can observe in column (9). Higher levels of 
CDS spread are interconnected with an increase in the bank–firm lending relationship. This shows 
that a marginal increase in the exposure of a foreign bank leads to an intensified substitution effect 
on Lending. 
 
5.3 – Robustness 
There are several possible concerns regarding the estimates. We consider a number of 
robustness tests and alternative explanations that may fully or partially account for the results 





5.3.1 – Other sample periods 
Our findings document Brazil as a substitute market for foreign banks for the period of 2010-
2011. However, our argument would be weakened if foreign banks and other banks did not show 
a similar trend in the pre-period, conditional on all controls. Because all the regressions include 
bank fixed effects, we are already controlling for bank-specific time-invariant characteristics. 
Therefore, the requirement for a common trend only applies to how much foreign banks, private 
domestic banks and government banks depart from their time-invariant component in the pre- and 
post-period. 
We conduct two tests with previous sample periods to better understand the credit supply of 
foreign banks in the country. Estimates are found in Table 7. In column (1) to (3), the sample 
period goes from 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2, where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
starting from 2007:Q3, after tensions in the European interbank market in August 2007. We choose 
this setting, following Iyer et al. (2014), who argue that the crisis in Europe started with the 
interbank loan spreads going significantly up, pushing the European Central Bank to inject large 
amounts of liquidity27. Throughout columns (1) to (3), one can observe that the initial crisis that 
hit Europe had on average an economically and statistically insignificant impact for credit supply 
of foreign banks operating in Brazil. 
 
– Insert Table 7 here – 
 
In columns (4) to (6), the sample period goes from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2, where Post is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one, starting from 2008:Q3, after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. Throughout columns (4) to (6), one can observe that the impact of 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers had a negative but not statistically significant impact on Lending 
for foreign banks compared with private domestic banks. Results are robust to applying the set of 
                                                 
27 On August 9 2007, the ECB injected €95 billion in order to provide sufficient liquidity to banks, and on the following 




fixed effects and time-varying bank characteristics. This may be an indication that the effect of the 
financial crisis of 2008 was asymmetric for foreign banks. Nonetheless, results point to the validity 
of the main findings of the paper. 
Additionally, we also address concerns about the sample period selection and the criterion 
used to split sample periods. Concerning the sample period selection, one argument could be that 
the sample period of four quarters in the pre-period and other four quarter in the post-period is not 
wide enough. We extend the sample period from 2009:Q3 to 2011:Q4, instead of 2009:Q4 to 
2011:Q3. Post continues as a dummy variable taking the value one starting from 2010:Q4. The 
results suggest that a bigger sample also captures the foreign bank behavior regarding Lending in 
the post-period. 
Concerning the criterion used to split sample periods, we also test our equations for the 
sample period from 2010:Q1 to 2011:Q4, instead of 2009:Q4 to 2011:Q3. Post is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one starting from 2011:Q1, instead of 2010:Q4. In this manner, the 
test is closer to the outburst of the sovereign crisis in Europe. Results are robust to the raising of 
sovereign debt concerns in the old continent. 
 
5.3.2 – Alternative explanations 
Results may be driven by direct resources coming from government to attend certain regions 
of the country or specific sectors of the economy. Examples of resources to attend certain regions 
of the country include constitutional funds for the financing of the North, Northeast, and Central-
West regions of Brazil. In a broader perspective, there are also resources coming from the Brazilian 
Development Bank–BNDES–to help firms in investment projects, assist in acquisition of new 
machinery and equipment, export of machinery, acquisition of goods and production inputs, in 
addition to special financing programs focused on specific economic segments28. 
We address this issue by re-running the main specification, this time controlling for the 
origin of the money. To that end, we construct a new variable, Other resources, which is a ratio of 
the debt of borrower i at bank b in quarter t issued with resources others than the bank’s one to the 
                                                 
28 These resources are transferred to foreign, private domestic, and government banks that participate and share the 




total quarterly debt of the borrower with the bank29. In order to properly control for the importance 
of Other resources in the regressions, we interact Other resources to three other variables, namely 
to Post, to Foreign * Post and to Government *Post. 
We expect that the estimate for Foreign * Post continues positive and with economic and 
statistical significance. This would suggest that the substitution effect is indeed in play. Results 
are reported in Table 8, columns (1) to (3). Evidence strongly suggests that the results of Foreign 
* Post are not contaminated by direct resources from the government. 
 
– Insert Table 8 here – 
 
Furthermore, the coefficient for Foreign * Other resources * Post, if negative, indicates the 
presence of another type of substitution effect. We explain this substitution effect as follows: the 
more foreign banks rely on direct resources from the government, the lower is the credit supply 
from their own resource to the specific set of firms we consider. This ‘frees up’ resources at the 
bank to provide credit to borrowers that did not rely, or relied less on loans with Other resources. 
Indeed, the estimates of this triple interaction term is negative and statistically significant. Our 
interpretation of these findings is that the positive impact of foreign banks on credit supply is 
mitigated if the bank uses more direct resources from the government.  
At first glance, evidence suggests that Lending was organically increasing to a greater extent 
in foreign banks compared with private domestic banks. In order to search for further evidence in 
this direction, we take into account the possibility that results may be driven by portfolio re-
allocations, including the partial or full divestment of credit portfolios by smaller and weaker banks 
to bigger and stronger institutions30. To that end, we construct a new variable, Loan acquisition, 
which is a ratio of the amount of debt of borrower i at bank b in quarter t acquired but not initiated 
by the bank itself to the total quarterly debt of the borrower with the bank. Therefore, we are able 
                                                 
29 Conceptually, we are looking at the share of debt of borrower i with bank b that is funded with other resources. 
However, we acknowledge the importance to further control for the total share of ‘other resources’ loans at the bank 
level. We believe that by using the several bank controls that we do, we are indirectly controlling for how much use 
a bank makes of other resources from the government.  
30 These transactions do not include securitization of credit operations. 
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to control for mergers and acquisitions among banks, including rebalancing of a bank’s loan 
portfolio.  
We explicitly control for the importance of Loan acquisition in the regressions by interacting 
Loan acquisition with three variables, namely to Post, to Foreign * Post and to Government *Post. 
We expect that the estimate for Foreign * Post continues positive and with economic and statistical 
significance. Results are reported in columns (4) to (6), suggesting that the substitution effect is 
indeed in play. In addition, we consider the coefficient for Foreign * Loan acquisition * Post, if 
positive, as an indication that the impact of foreign banks on credit supply is intensified for firms 
that had loans acquired by these banks. The estimates of this triple interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant, as reported in columns (4) to (6). Credit supply in the post-period is larger 
for foreign banks, and even larger for borrowers for which a larger share of the bank–firm 
relationship is acquired (not initiated by the bank). 
Another possible concern regarding the results is that foreign banks may have increased 
Lending because the relationship with their customers was weaker in the pre-period (De Haas and 
Van Horen, 2013). Moreover, there might be a borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders (i.e., 
borrowers who borrow from a historically weak bank try to compensate with a stronger one). In 
order to reduce these possibilities, we keep firm–bank relationship if it appears in the pre-period 
for at least three out of the four possible quarters. The same applies for the post-period. Therefore, 
regressions include bank–firm relationship if there is a 75% minimum appearance throughout the 
sample period. 
However, in order to test it in a stricter sense, we account for firms with three or more bank 
relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with one foreign, with a private domestic 
bank and with a public bank in the pre- and in the post-period. Even in such a setting, column (7) 
to (9), the results continue to hold, suggesting that the main finding is not driven by the possibility 
of borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders. 
There are other alternative explanations that one could come up with. These include concerns 
related to potential systematic differences across groups of banks in the currency denomination of 
the loans (Van Horen and Popov, 2014). This is not a concern in our case, as all loans in Brazil, 
including those related to importation and exportation credits are issued in the local currency. 
Another issue relates to banks that received government support during the financial crisis. This 
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support may have come in different forms, ranging from the acquisition of equity shares to 
recapitalization or other implicit guarantees that one might not be able to perceive (Van Horen and 
Popov, 2014). For further research, one could try to collect data from a number of publicly 
available sources on government programs decreed during the sample period and further 
investigate the effect of such international and domestic supports on Lending. We partially control 
for government support since we use time-varying bank characteristics additionally with bank 
fixed effects. 
 
6 – Extensive margin 
In this section, we first test whether foreign banks were able to amplify the intake of new 
firms in the post-period. Next, we test whether foreign banks had to end ongoing lending 
relationships. Our sample selection accounts for all the banking relationships of the 74,117 firms 
from the restricted sample. This is a less strict sample selection, with a larger number of 
observations (almost 2 million observations on the triplet of firm–bank–time). This sample allows 
us to detect when a firm started a new banking relationship or ended an ongoing one. We include 
all possible commercial and universal banks with a commercial portfolio that might appear in 
and/or disappear from the sample.  
In order to test whether the “entry rate” of firms is higher for foreign banks compared with 
private domestic banks in the post-period, we create the dummy variable Entry, which takes the 
value one when bank-firm relationship enters the dataset (with the exception of the first quarter – 
2009:Q4), and zero otherwise. Unlike previously, in this case we start our specifications with no 
fixed effects. This translates into estimating the following specification: 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 + 𝛿3𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +




Our more conservative regressions will use firm, bank and time fixed effects without and 
with time-varying bank controls31. We test whether firms are more likely to start a new relationship 
with another foreign bank in the post-period. This translates into estimating the following 
specification: 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑏,𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑏,𝑡           (6) 
 
𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest. 
Column (1) in Table 9 shows that, although not statistically significant, foreign ownership 
had almost five percentage points effect on the willingness of the bank and a firm to start a new 
relationship in the post-period. Columns (2) and (3) also show statistically insignificant estimates 
by adding firm, bank and time fixed effects and by further including time-varying bank controls, 
respectively. 
 
– Insert Table 9 here – 
 
We next create a variable Exit, which is one when bank–firm relationship appears for the 
last time in the dataset (with the exception of the last quarter–2011:Q3), and zero otherwise. Using 
Exit as the left side variable in equation (5) and (6), we show the results in Column (4) to (6). 
Foreign banks are more likely to end ongoing relationships, although results are statistically 
significant only in column (4). Together, the results of entry and exit rates weakly suggest that 
foreign banks were more relationship intensive, whereas private domestic banks were more 
concerned with widening relationships. Results are partially in line with Bofondi et al. (2013), who 
                                                 
31 It is true that firm–time fixed effects are well appropriate for the intensive margin analysis but it may not be 
appropriate for the extensive analysis. The use of firm–time fixed effects diminish firm–time heterogeneity, which, 
in fact, is part of what we want to capture. Results in such specification are not quantitatively different from those 
where we apply firm, bank and time fixed effects. 
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interpret this as a “flight to quality” of foreign banks during the crisis, by concentrating on some 
relationships and offering less support to fragile borrowers. 
 
7 – Effect of bank ownership on firms with different risk levels  
 
In order to formally test the “flight to quality” hypothesis (i.e., banks concentrate on some 
relationships and become less supportive of fragile borrowers), we distinguish two groups of firms, 
depending on their credit risk before 2010:Q4. We separate Low-risk firms from High-risk firms 
using a dummy variable that takes the value one if firm rating before the law is equal or above the 
sample median rating, and zero otherwise32.  We then interact the dummy variable Low-risk firms 
with Foreign * Post and with Government * Post, using equations (3) and (4). 
The “flight to quality” argument is valid for Brazil if the coefficient for Foreign * Low risk 
* Post is positive, preferably with economic and statistical significance. Table 10 reports our 
findings. Throughout columns (1) to (3), foreign banks appear as increasing their credit supply to 
Low-risk firms to a higher degree than other banks. Results are economic and statistically 
significant and reinforce the “flight to quality” behavior of foreign banks during crises. 
 
– Insert Table 10 here – 
 
In order to confirm our findings, in columns (4) to (6) we distinguish Low-risk firms from 
High-risk firms by using, respectively, the 25th and the 75th percentiles of firm rating before the 
law reform. We only keep those firms that are present in the tails bounded by both percentiles. By 
focusing on the coefficients for Foreign * Low risk * Post, we not only confirm our findings but 
also document an intensified flight-to-quality behavior. Foreign banks decrease lending to the 
highest risk firms and intensify it at a higher degree to the lowest risk firms compared to other 
bank groups. 
                                                 
32 Ratings vary from 10 (lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk) and are actually assigned to each loan. By aggregating all loan 
ratings of a firm with all the banks from 2009:Q4 to 2010:Q3, we create the firm rating. Using firm rating for all the 




8 – Capital channel 
We investigate whether the substitution effect for Brazil operates through the internal capital 
markets channel. Unfortunately, we are not able to measure internal capital markets directly 
through bank’s balance sheets. Therefore, we use Equity, defined as the ratio of equity to total 
assets, as a proxy for the use of internal capital markets. 
As in Europe, the regulatory capital target in Brazil is the Tier 1 capital ratio, which is the 
ratio of a bank's core equity capital to its total risk-weighted assets (RWA)33. The target of Tier 1 
capital ratio can be achieved by banks either raising equity or by reducing risky assets, especially 
in the loan portfolio. We find that foreign banks increased lending to a higher degree than private 
domestic banks did in the post-period. Additionally, we find that compared with domestic banks 
in the post-period, foreign banks reduced their exposure to risky assets by increasing credit supply 
to low-risk firms to the detriment of high-risk firms. 
We then test whether foreign banks did so also by increasing Equity. Even though equity is 
a relatively costly source of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984), it is possible that the cost of funding 
in Brazil was higher than the cost of equity in Europe34 for the time period we consider. If this is 
true, foreign banks, indeed, had incentives to substitute to Brazil by changing their equity levels. 
The capital channel specifications are the same as equations (3) with additional variables for 
analyzing the channel through which the changes in economic conditions in Europe and the 
Brazilian macro-prudential measures affect Lending. The estimated equation is: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝜏1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜏3𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡         (7) 
 
                                                 
33 Risk-weighted assets are the total of all assets held by the bank weighted by credit risk according to a formula 
determined by the Central Bank of Brazil. 
34 The Selic target rate in Brazil varied from 10.75 to 12.25 during the post-period. Banks need to pay Selic + premium 
in order to be able to fund themselves locally. According to a survey from KPMG, the cost of equity was estimated 





The coefficient 𝜏1 on the interaction of Equity with Foreign and Post provides a test of 
whether the substitution effect operates through the capital channel. A given increase in the bank’s 
equity should have a higher impact on the credit supply of foreign banks. Thus, if bank capital is 
a channel through which outside economic shocks are transmitted to lending in the Brazilian 
market, 𝜏1 should be positive and statistically significant. Results are found in Table 11. 
 
– Insert Table 11 here – 
 
In columns (1) to (3), one can observe that the relationship of Equity to Lending in the post-
period for foreign banks (Foreign * Equity * Post) is strong and statistically significant. Results 
are robust in columns (4) to (6), where we use one quarter lagged channel and further time-varying 
bank characteristics. Time-varying bank characteristics include the size of the bank, the ratio of 
liquid assets, deposits, return over assets, international funding, cost of funding, and the size of 
impaired loans in equations (3) and (6). Results suggest that changes in equity have a sizeable 
effect on Lending. We interpret our findings as evidence that the substitution effect for Brazil 
operates through the capital channel. 
 
9 – Concluding remarks 
International banks are in the core discussions on the causes and effects of financial crises. 
Since the collapse of the syndicated loan markets in US, we have learned more about the actual 
transmission of balance sheet shocks, the vulnerability of banks, and about the effectiveness of 
government interventions in domestic and international contexts. Nonetheless, the risks and 
benefits of cross-border capital flows continue to pose a challenge to policymakers, in special to 
central banks, on how to manage capital flows in times of global liquidity shocks. 
In this paper, we identify whether and how, during liquidity tensions in their country of 
origin, foreign banks substitute their investments with Lending in Brazil. To this aim, we apply a 
differences-in-differences analysis, comparing the following dependent variables for different 
types of bank ownership (foreign, private domestic and government-owned banks) operating in 
Brazil. We focus on the differences in credit supply, willingness to start (terminate) new (ongoing) 
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bank–firm relationships, and the shift in risk-taking lending strategies over the transition from 
2010 to 2011. 
We exploit the Brazilian macro-prudential measures on the fourth quarter of 2010 in a quasi-
natural experiment to unfold the substitution effect of foreign banks on Lending. In order to control 
the fast credit growth, the macro-prudential measures decreased the incentives for banks in Brazil 
to fund themselves locally and abroad (with the exemption of equity investments). Results show 
that foreign banks increased their supply of credit by six percent after the fourth quarter of 2010, 
when compared with the level of the private domestic banks. Despite the spillover effects that 
foreign banks could have received through their bank’s balance sheets, we find that the more 
exposed a foreign bank was to the sovereign crisis, the more they substituted by Lending in Brazil. 
Our estimates fully control for firm unobserved heterogeneity, for all firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity that affects the dynamics of credit granted in each period, and for all unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity among lenders, including differences in the composition of loan 
portfolios, lending policies and managerial risk appetite. 
We also investigate the extensive margin of the willingness of foreign banks to start new 
bank–firm relationships and to terminate ongoing lending relationships over transition from 2010 
to 2011. Taken together, the results of “entry” and “exit” rates of firms suggest that foreign banks 
were more relationship intensive, whereas private domestic banks more concerned with extending 
relationships further. Results are in line with findings of Bofondi et al. (2013), who interpret this 
finding as a “flight to quality” of foreign banks during the crisis, by concentrating on some 
relationships and offering less support to fragile borrowers. In order to formally test the “flight to 
quality” hypothesis, we distinguish groups of firms with opposing credit risk before 2010:Q4. In 
all tests, we find that foreign banks intensified credit supply to Low-risk firms to a greater degree 
than other bank groups.  
We also test whether foreign banks increased Lending via the internal capital markets 
channel. Unfortunately, we are not able to measure internal capital markets directly through the 
banks’ balance sheets. Similarly to Berrospide, Black and Keeton (2013), and De Marco (2015), 
we use Equity, defined as the ratio of equity to total assets, as a proxy for the use of internal capital 
markets. Even though equity is a relatively costly source of finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
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results suggest that changes in equity have a sizeable effect on Lending. We interpret our findings 
as evidence that the substitution effect for Brazil operated through the capital channel. 
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The table presents the definition of variables used in the paper. We use credit registry data, bank ownership data and 
quarterly accounting information provided by Central Bank of Brazil. CDS spreads come from Datastream. 
Variable name Definition 
Lending Log of outstanding loan amount of borrower i at bank b in quarter t, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Foreign 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign 
country, and zero otherwise 
European banks 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a European 
country (with the exception of UK and Switzerland), and zero otherwise 
GIIPS banks 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a GIIPS country  
(Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), and zero otherwise 
Government Dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero otherwise 
Post Dummy variable that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3 and zero otherwise 
Other resources 
Ratio of the debt of borrower i at bank b in quarter t issued with resources from other sources than the 
bank’s one to the total quarterly debt of the borrower with the bank 
Loan acquisition 
Ratio variable of the amount of debt of borrower i at bank b in quarter t acquired but not initiated by 
the bank itself to the total quarterly debt of the borrower with the bank 
CDS spread 
Quarterly average Credit Default Swap (5 years bond) of each of the foreign banks divided by 100. 
CDS spread equals to zero for all domestic and public banks 
Size Log of total assets of the bank, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Liquid assets Ratio of liquid assets to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Deposits Ratio of domestic deposits to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Equity Ratio of equity to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Roa Quarterly return over assets * 100, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
International funding Ratio of international funding (deposits and transfers) to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Cost of funding Cost of funding in local currency to current and long term liabilities, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Impaired loans Non-performing loans divided by total loans of the bank, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Entry 
Dummy variable that takes the value one when bank–firm relationship enters the dataset (with the 
exception of the first quarter), and zero otherwise 
Exit 
Dummy variable that takes the value one when bank–firm relationship appears for the last time in the 
dataset (with the exception of the last quarter), and zero otherwise 
Low-risk firms 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if firm rating before the law reform is equal or above the 
sample median rating, and zero otherwise. Rating varies from 10 (lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk) 
High-risk firms 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if firm rating before the law reform is below the sample median 








This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper for the full and the restrictive sample of 
firms. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period (Post=0) is the same as the mean of the post-period 
(Post=1). 
  Mean 
Variable name N Mean Median 
St. 
dev. 
Min Max Before Diff. 
T-Test 
(p-value) 
Panel A: Full sample 
Lending   10,080,886    11.06    10.96    1.41  8.53       14.72  11.05 0.02 0.00 
Foreign   10,080,886      0.11  0   0.31  0          1  0.11 −0.00 0.21 
European banks   10,080,886      0.07  0   0.25  0          1  0.07 −0.00 0.05 
GIIPS banks   10,080,886      0.07  0   0.25  0          1  0.07 −0.00 0.05 
Government   10,080,886      0.39  0   0.49  0          1  0.40 −0.00 0.00 
Post   10,080,886      0.50  1   0.50  0          1  - - - 
Other resources   10,080,886      0.18  0.00   0.32  0.00     1.00  0.17 0.02 0.00 
Loan acquisition   10,080,886      0.02  0.00   0.13  0.00     1.00  0.02 −0.00 0.00 
CDS spread   10,080,886      0.15  0.00   0.50  0.00     3.33  0.12 0.07 0.00 
High-risk firms   10,080,886      0.50  0   0.50  0          1  - - - 
Low-risk firms   10,080,886      0.50  1   0.50  0          1  - - - 
Panel B: Restricted sample 
Lending   1,641,444  12.15 12.04 1.55 9.19 16.16 12.12 0.06 0.00 
Foreign   1,641,444  0.38 0 0.48 0 1 0.37 0.00 0.80 
European banks   1,641,444  0.26 0 0.44 0 1 0.26 −0.00 0.62 
GIIPS banks   1,641,444  0.25 0 0.44 0 1 0.25 −0.00 0.62 
Government   1,641,444  0.24 0 0.43 0 1 0.24 −0.00 0.53 
Post   1,641,444  0.50 1 0.50 0 1 - - - 
Other resources   1,641,444  0.14 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.01 0.00 
Loan acquisition   1,641,444  0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.02 −0.00 0.07 
CDS spread   1,641,444  0.56 0.00 0.84 0.00 3.33 0.43 0.26 0.00 
Size   1,641,444  26.53 26.82 1.17 18.65 27.27 26.50 0.08 0.00 
Liquid assets   1,641,444  0.39 0.37 0.08 0.06 0.80 0.41 −0.03 0.00 
Deposits   1,641,444  0.46 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.80 0.46 −0.01 0.00 
Equity   1,641,444  0.10 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.80 0.11 −0.01 0.00 
Roa   1,641,444  0.24 0.21 0.27 −2.67 2.86 0.25 −0.02 0.00 
International 
funding 
  1,641,444  0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Cost of funding   1,641,444  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Impaired loans   1,641,444  0.06 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.06 −0.01 0.00 
Entry 1,974,179 0.04 0.00 0.2 0 1 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Exit 1,974,179 0.03 0.00 0.2 0 1 0.02 0.01 0.00 
High-risk firms   1,641,444  0.50 0 0.50 0 1 - - - 





This table presents the variables used for each group of banks. We show the mean in the pre-period and the additional 
difference after the macro-prudential measures. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period (Post=0) 
is the same as the mean of the post-period (Post=1). 
 Foreign banks Government banks Domestic banks 









Panel A: Full sample 
Lending 11.53 0.06 0.00 11.08 0.05 0.00 10.92 −0.03 0.00 
Other resources 0.08 0.00 0.42 0.34 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Loan acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.19 0.03 −0.00 0.00 
CDS spread 1.11 0.64 0.00 - - - - - - 
Size 26.21 0.10 0.00 26.93 0.03 0.00 26.72 0.12 0.00 
Liquid assets 0.37 −0.04 0.00 0.37 −0.05 0.00 0.46 −0.02 0.00 
Deposits 0.47 −0.03 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.46 −0.01 0.00 
Equity 0.14 −0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 −0.01 0.00 
Roa 0.14 −0.02 0.00 0.34 −0.11 0.00 0.31 −0.01 0.00 
International funding 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Cost of funding 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Impaired loans 0.06 −0.01 0.00 0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.06 −0.00 0.00 
N. of observations 1,080,170 3,976,217 5,024,499 
Panel B: Restricted sample 
Lending 12.04 0.08 0.00 11.99 0.09 0.00 12.29 0.00 0.39 
Other resources 0.08 0.00 0.70 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 
Loan acquisition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.00 0.01 0.04 −0.00 0.00 
CDS spread 1.15 0.68 0.00 - - - - - - 
Size 26.24 0.09 0.00 26.94 0.03 0.00 26.46 0.09 0.00 
Liquid assets 0.37 −0.04 0.00 0.37 −0.05 0.00 0.46 −0.02 0.00 
Deposits 0.46 −0.03 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.45 −0.00 0.00 
Equity 0.14 −0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.11 −0.01 0.00 
Roa 0.14 −0.02 0.00 0.34 −0.01 0.00 0.31 −0.03 0.00 
International funding 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 
Cost of funding 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Impaired loans 0.06 −0.00 0.00 0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.06 −0.00 0.00 
Entry* 0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 
Exit* 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
N. of observations 615,857 399,124 626,463 
* N. of observations equals 651,661 for firm relationships with foreign banks; 458,764 with government banks, and; 863,754 with 






This table introduces the basic empirical strategy. “Before” refers to quarters from 2009:Q4 to 2010:Q3 and “after” 
refers to quarter from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3. We next collapse the data into single data point (based on averages) both 
before and after. This results in two data points per unit of observation, one data point for the pre-reform regime and 
one point for the post-reform regime. “Difference” column stands for the difference between “Before” and “After”. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * implies significance at 99% level, 95% level, and 90% level, 











Panel A: Lending - Full sample 
          Foreign banks 11.5116 11.5753 0.0638*** 281,652 
 (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0053)  
          Government banks 11.0530 11.0980 0.0450*** 1,027,822 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0023)  
          Private domestic banks 10.9080 10.8834 −0.0242*** 1,297,616 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0026)  
          Difference (Foreign – Domestic)   0.0574***  
   (0.0017)  
Panel B: Lending - Restricted sample     
          Foreign banks 12.0161 12.0979 0.0818*** 159,812 
 (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0005)  
          Government banks 11.9700 12.0612 0.0911*** 102,066 
 (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0091)  
          Private domestic banks 12.2795 12.2781 −0.0014 160,516 
 (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0083)  
          Difference (Foreign – Domestic)   0.0472***  
   (0.0028)  
Panel C: Lending for specific groups of Foreign - Restricted sample 
          European banks 12.0654 12.1556 0.0902*** 108,568 
 (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0082)  
          Other foreign banks 11.9119 11.9757 0.0639*** 51,244 
 (0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0128)  
          Government banks 11.9700 12.0612 0.0911*** 102,066 
 (0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0091)  
          Private domestic banks 12.2795 12.2781 −0.0014 160,516 
 (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0083)  
          Difference (European – all others banks)   0.0509***  




Effect of bank ownership on bank lending 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on credit supply. The dependent variable is Lending which is the natural logarithm of outstanding loan amount 
of borrower i at bank b in quarter t, winsorized on 98%/2% level. Foreign is a dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is 
from a foreign country, and zero otherwise. Government is a dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3, and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. Specifications (1) to 
(6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) 
in the pre- and in the post-period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other 
columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank 
level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post 0.0480 0.0472** 0.0399** 0.0835** 0.0775*** 0.0632*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0217) (0.0197) (0.0365) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
Government * Post    0.0911 0.0754 0.0846* 
     (0.0614) (0.0482) (0.0431) 
Size   −0.1111   −0.1015 
                            (0.1313)   (0.1291) 
Liquid assets   −0.1351   −0.0765 
    (0.2884)   (0.2909) 
Deposits   −0.0816   -0.1113 
                            (0.1622)   (0.1827) 
Equity   −1.0757   −1.7306*** 
   (0.8125)   (0.6491) 
Roa   −0.0225   -0.0246 
   (0.0280)   (0.0278) 
International funding   0.7025   0.8727 
   (0.7225)   (0.8004) 
Cost of funding   2.2237   3.3787 
   (2.2947)   (2.3278) 
Impaired loans   −4.6065***   −4.6025*** 
   (1.1554)   (1.0786) 
        
Fixed effects           
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
            
Observations              1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 




Measures of exposure 
This table shows three tests on the impact of different groups of Foreign on bank lending. The dependent variable is Lending. Post is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3, and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. In column (1) to (3), we distinguish 
European banks (excluding banks from UK and from Switzerland) from other foreign banks using the dummy variable European. In column (4) to (6), we focus 
on banks from GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) countries by using the dummy variable GIIPS. In column (7) to (9), we use the quarterly average 
Credit Default Swap (spread over bonds of 5years contract) as a continuous exposure variable of foreign banks to the crisis. In this case, we use the interaction 
Foreign * CDS. Specifications (1) to (9) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with 
another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and in the post-period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1), (4) and (7) include 
time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and 
standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. See 
table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
                          
 
European banks (excluding UK and 
Switzerland) 
Banks from GIIPS countries Quarterly CDS spread as the 
continuous explanatory variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
European * Post 0.0254 0.0086 0.0909***       
 (0.0164) (0.0129) (0.0266)       
GIIPS * Post    0.0281 0.0111 0.0947***    
    (0.0175) (0.0133) (0.0271)    
Foreign * CDS * Post       0.0173 0.0031 0.0479*** 
       (0.0118) (0.0105) (0.0158) 
Foreign * Post 0.0662* 0.0715*** 0.0079 0.0645 0.0698*** 0.0061 0.0518 0.0718** −0.0162 
 (0.0392) (0.0230) (0.0271) (0.0397) (0.0233) (0.0272) (0.0459) (0.0302) (0.0395) 
Government * Post 0.0911 0.0752 0.0744* 0.0911 0.0751 0.0739* 0.0912 0.0753 0.0741 
 (0.0614) (0.0483) (0.0444) (0.0614) (0.0483) (0.0444) (0.0614) (0.0484) (0.0456) 
          
Bank level controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
          
Fixed effects                
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
               
Observations              1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 





Other sample periods 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on bank lending when conducting two tests with sample periods before the end of 2009. The dependent variable 
is Lending. In column (1) to (3), the sample period goes from 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2, where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one starting from 2007:Q3 
(after tensions in the European interbank market in August 2007). In column (4) to (6) the sample period goes from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2, where Post is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one starting from 2008:Q3 (after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008). Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with 
two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and in the 
post-period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime 
fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. See table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
                          
 
Sample period from 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2 
(Event August 2007 – Post starts in 2007:Q3) 
 
Sample period from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2 
(Event September 2008 – Post starts in 2008:Q3) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.0019  −0.0099 0.0136 −0.0452 −0.0512 −0.0688 
 (0.0670) (0.0492) (0.0371) (0.0792) (0.0506) (0.0492) 
Government * Post 0.0299 0.0171 0.0645 0.0543 0.0443 0.0251 
  (0.0837) (0.0584) (0.0545) (0.0785) (0.0545) (0.0608) 
       
Bank-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects           
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
            
Observations              945,110 945,110 945,110 1,346,473 1,346,473 1,346,473 





This table shows three robustness tests on the impact of foreign ownership on bank lending. The dependent variable is Lending. Post is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3 and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. Other resources is a ratio of the debt of 
borrower i at bank b in quarter t issued with resources from other sources than the bank’s to the total quarterly debt of the borrower with the bank. Loan acquisition 
is a ratio variable of the amount of debt of borrower i at bank b in quarter t acquired but not initiated by the bank itself to the total quarterly debt of the borrower 
with the bank. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with one foreign and with 
one other bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and in the post-period. Specifications (7) to (9) account for firms with three or more bank relationships, 
where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign, with a private domestic bank and with a public bank in the pre- and in the post-period. All regressions 
include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1), (4) and (7) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and 
***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. See table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
                          
Control for the resource of the money Control for loan acquisition Firms with ≥3 relationships  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Foreign * Post 0.1135** 0.1107*** 0.0956*** 0.0599** 0.0567*** 0.0525*** 0.0721* 0.0648** 0.0519* 
 (0.0463) (0.0246) (0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0166) (0.0172) (0.0370) (0.0261) (0.0287) 
Government * Post 0.1518** 0.1418** 0.1484** 0.0640 0.0508 0.0636 0.0969 0.0893* 0.0964** 
  (0.0756) (0.0679) (0.0616) (0.0585) (0.0489) (0.0463) (0.0659) (0.0527) (0.0453) 
Other resources * Post 0.1619 0.2676* 0.2543*       
 (0.1206) (0.1377) (0.1358)       
Foreign * Other resources * Post −0.2878** −0.2860** −0.2762**       
                          (0.1265) (0.1222) (0.1209)       
Government * Other resources * Post −0.2997** −0.3837*** −0.3692**       
  (0.1228) (0.1423) (0.1424)       
Loan acquisition * Post    −0.6617*** −0.6798*** −0.5842***    
    (0.0739) (0.0967) (0.1650)    
Foreign * Loan acquisition * Post    0.3481*** 0.4062*** 0.3229**    
                             (0.0916) (0.1052) (0.1511)    
Government * Loan acquisition * Post    1.0097*** 1.1035*** 1.0216***    
    (0.1042) (0.1120) (0.1666)    
          
Bank level controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
          
Fixed effects                
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
               
Observations              1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 734,486 734,486 734,486 





This table shows two robustness tests on the extensive margin impact of Foreign on bank lending. Our sample selection accounts for all banking relationships of 
the 74,117 firms from the restricted sample. This is a less strict sample selection compared with the restricted sample. The larger number of observations allows 
us to detect when a firm started a new banking relationship or ended an ongoing one. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 to 2011:Q3, 
and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. In column (1) to (3), the dependent variable is Entry, where it takes the value one 
when bank–firm relationship enters the dataset (with the exception of 2009:Q4), and zero otherwise. In column (4) to (6), the dependent variable is Exit, where it 
takes the value one when bank–firm relationship appears for the last time in the dataset (with the exception of 2011:Q3), and zero otherwise. Column (2), (3), (5) 
and (6) include firm, bank and time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on 
bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. See table 1 for variable definitions 
and sources. 
                          
 
Entry – start of relationship 
 
Exit – end of relationship 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 0.0272   0.0040   
 (0.0342)   (0.0054)   
Foreign −0.0191   −0.0215**   
 (0.0128)   (0.0090)   
Government −0.0192   −0.0112   
 (0.0158)   (0.0091)   
Foreign * Post −0.0466 −0.0026 −0.0069 0.0160*** 0.0080 0.0052 
 (0.0342) (0.0069) (0.0162) (0.0057) (0.0052) (0.0046) 
Government * Post −0.0374 0.0050 0.0013 0.0049 −0.0014 0.0010 
  (0.0343) (0.0076) (0.0160) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0051) 
       
Bank-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects           
         Firm No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
         Bank No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 Time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
          
Observations              1,974,179 1,974,179 1,974,179 1,974,179 1,974,179 1,974,179 




Effect of bank ownership on firms with different risk levels  
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on the credit supply for Low-risk firms. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 to 
2011:Q3, and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. Specifications (1) to (3) distinguish Low-risk firms from High-risk firms 
using a dummy variable that takes the value one if firm rating before the law is equal or above the sample median rating, and zero otherwise. Ratings vary from 10 
(lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk). Specifications (4) to (6) distinguish Low-risk firms from High-risk firms respectively by using the 25th and the 75th percentiles of 
firm rating before the law reform. We only keep those firms present in the tails bounded by both percentiles. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or 
more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and in the post-
period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime 
fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in 
parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          
 
Low-risk firms vs. High-risk firms 
(defined by the median risk) 
 
Low-risk firms vs. High-risk firms 
 (defined by the 25th and 75th percentiles of risk) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Low risk * Post 0.2711*** 0.3111*** 0.3176*** 0.4004*** 0.4310*** 0.4466*** 
 (0.0595) (0.0773) (0.0746) (0.0752) (0.1094) (0.1058) 
Government * Low risk * Post 0.1361*** 0.2068** 0.2148*** 0.1916*** 0.2559** 0.2723** 
  (0.0460) (0.0788) (0.0767) (0.0694) (0.1164) (0.1119) 
Foreign * Post −0.0616 −0.0707* −0.0916** −0.1434** −0.1374** −0.1687*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0423) (0.0445) (0.0704) (0.0552) (0.0578) 
Government * Post 0.0179 −0.0132 −0.0069 −0.0115 −0.0166 −0.0203 
 (0.0726) (0.0629) (0.0584) (0.0778) (0.0681) (0.0608) 
       
Bank-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects           
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
            
Observations              1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 820,729 820,729 820,729 





This table tests the capital channel of transmission of liquidity tensions to bank lending in Brazil. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2010:Q4 
to 2011:Q3, and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2009:Q4 and ends in 2011:Q3. In column (1) to (3), we test the capital channel with all variables in 
level. In column (4) to (6), we test the capital channel with lagged accounting variables. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank 
relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with one a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre and in the post-period. Other 
bank level controls include all the accounting variables. All regressions include bank fixed effects and firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using 
OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, 
five and ten percent level of significance. See table 1 for variable definitions and sources. 
 
 
Variables in level 
 
Variables lagged 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Equity * Post     1.2147*** 1.1021*** 1.3806*** 1.2175*** 1.1081*** 1.2130*** 
                          (0.1965) (0.1362) (0.1774) (0.1872) (0.1336) (0.2597) 
Government * Equity * Post         3.4509 3.8789** 3.3993** 3.1972 3.6039** 3.0501* 
                          (2.1405) (1.6882) (1.6437) (2.2531) (1.7742) (1.6753) 
Equity * Post −1.0038*** −0.9757*** −0.7833*** −1.0099*** −0.9819*** −0.7115*** 
 (0.1248) (0.0723) (0.1978) (0.1219) (0.0705) (0.2069) 
Foreign * Post −0.0440 −0.0322 −0.0742*** −0.0461* −0.0342* −0.0581* 
 (0.0266) (0.0205) (0.0256) (0.0262) (0.0206) (0.0310) 
Government * Post −0.1639 −0.2028* −0.1698 −0.1502 −0.1877 −0.1388 
                          (0.1490) (0.1183) (0.1180) (0.1608) (0.1278) (0.1230) 
       
Other bank-level controls No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects           
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
Observations              1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 1,641,444 
R-squared                 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 
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Appendix Table 1 
List of foreign banks 
This table shows all the foreign investors present in the sample, their country and their average total assets for the pre 
and the post-period. We also show whether the foreign investor is included in the group of Foreign, European banks, 
after excluding foreign investors from UK and Switzerland, GIIPS banks and those for which we find CDS spread. 
Foreign investor 
















B. Nacion Argentina* Argentina 92 111 0.21 1 0 0 0 
B. Provincia de Buenos 
Aires* 
Argentina 155 159 0.03 1 0 0 0 
Marsau Uruguay Holdings Bahrain 8,720 9,620 0.10 1 0 0 0 
Bnp Paribas France 11,800 12,900 0.09 1 1 0 1 
Credit Agricole France 1,870 2,010 0.07 1 1 0 1 
Societe Generale France 5,680 7,290 0.28 1 1 0 1 
Commerzbank Germany 680 492 −0.28 1 1 0 1 
Deutsche Bank Germany 18,000 29,000 0.61 1 1 0 1 
WestLB Germany 3,250 3,030 −0.07 1 1 0 1 
Sumitomo Mitsui Japan 1,370 2,010 0.47 1 0 0 1 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Japan 1,920 5,210 1.71 1 0 0 1 
ING* Netherlands 2,490 1,810 −0.27 1 1 0 1 
Rabobank Netherlands 8,180 9,640 0.18 1 1 0 0 
Banif Portugal 2,030 2,250 0.11 1 1 1 0 
Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal 559 876 0.57 1 1 1 0 
PAR Participadas Portugal 437 371 −0.15 1 1 1 0 
Korea Exchange Bank South 
Korea 
151 181 0.20 1 0 0 1 
Santander Spain 393,000 430,000 0.09 1 1 1 1 
BP Empreendimentos Switzerland 265 221 −0.17 1 0 0 0 
Credit Suisse Switzerland 1,850 1,480 −0.20 1 0 0 1 
HSBC UK 125,000 140,000 0.12 1 0 0 1 
Nuevo Banco Comercial Uruguay 256 270 0.05 1 0 0 0 
Brascan US 779 712 −0.09 1 0 0 0 
Cargil US 802 1,070 0.33 1 0 0 1 
Citibank* US 25,300 27,100 0.07 1 0 0 1 
Deere & Company US 2,170 2,460 0.13 1 0 0 1 
JP Morgan* US 13,100 18,500 0.41 1 0 0 1 
Total assets  629,906 708,773 0.13     



















In this paper, we hypothesize that the international financial crisis that started in August 2007 
increased uncertainty across financial institutions, inducing more affected banks to act in a more 
pessimistic way on the creditworthiness of their commercial borrowers. Using data from the 
Brazilian credit registry, we compare the credit rating behavior of foreign banks with that of 
domestic banks during the crisis period, in relation to a common sample of firms. We find that 
foreign banks gave ratings that were 26 basis points lower in the post-period compared with private 
domestic banks. Using the definitions of Laeven and Valencia (2012), we select foreign banks 
directly affected by the financial crisis and find that they gave their borrowers even lower ratings 
compared with all other types of banks in the post-period. Additionally, using the Laeven and 
Valencia bank failure dataset, we find that the most fragile banks (i.e., those that received 
assistance in their home countries), although they did not substantially downgrade their ratings, 
significantly increased risk provisions in the post-period. We interpret the results as evidence that 
internal credit ratings can be a channel for the transmission of cross-market risks. 
 
JEL Classification: D81, F34, G18, G21, G24. 
 




1 – Introduction 
Banks have a competitive advantage in screening and monitoring a firm (Diamond, 1984; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985). A continuous and stable bank-firm relationship 
allows the bank to acquire information about the borrowing firm. If banks have public and private 
information about a firm, it follows that banks are uniquely suited to assess the risks of their 
borrowers and hence, banks’ internal credit ratings are the best available measure of the risk on 
the bank’s loan portfolio (Mester, Nakamura and Renault, 2007; Nakamura and Roszbach, 2010).  
However, it is possible that foreign banks are not well suited to collecting “soft” information 
about borrowers (Stein, 2002; Canales and Nanda, 2012). Difficulty in collecting soft information 
on the local market may be especially acute when foreign subsidiaries are far from bank 
headquarters (Berger and DeYoung, 2006; Mian, 2006). Moreover, foreign banks may revise their 
perceptions of an entire class of loans based on losses in only some of the countries in which they 
operate (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003). Thus, a decrease in the quality of borrowers in other 
markets may cause foreign bank to become more pessimistic about the quality of local borrowers 
(Berrospide, Black and Keeton, 2013). 
In this paper, we test the hypothesis of whether an outside adverse shock affects banks in a 
heterogeneous way, inducing foreign banks in particular to become more pessimistic about the 
quality of local borrowers. If this is true, we should be able to capture such behavior through 
internal credit ratings. Such a finding would be consistent with the idea that foreign banks put more 
weight on developments in other markets when they have less information about the local markets. 
The question we raise in this paper could be particularly relevant for countries where credit ratings 
are shared among banks through public credit registries. If international risks can be transmitted 
to a local market through the credit rating channel, then the public credit ratings may exacerbate 
lenders’ coordination and increase the incidence of firm financial distress (Hertzberg, Liberti and 
Paravisini, 2011). 
In order to test the potential transmission of risk through internal credit ratings, we use a 
panel-data sample from the Brazilian credit registry. It consists of quarterly credit data for more 
than 500,000 firms from 2005 to 2009, where each loan has a credit rating assigned by the bank. 
All loans to the same borrower are aggregated at bank-firm-quarter level. Overall, there are almost 
10 million bank–firm–time observations. From this sample, we select firms that have two or more 
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bank relationships in the pre- and post-period, allowing us to empirically test risk transmission in 
a comparative setting (foreign versus domestic banks), using a differences-in-differences 
methodology. 
The two credit rating measures we use as dependent variables are Risk assessment and Risk 
provision. Risk assessment is defined as the weighted credit rating of all loans assigned by a bank 
to a borrower at a given quarter. Risk provision is defined as the ratio of total due amount 
provisioned by a bank to a borrower at a given quarter. Risk assessment will help us in 
understanding the dynamics of credit ratings, but it can only be interpreted in an ordinal fashion. 
Risk provision, however, has a cardinal interpretation, which helps us in assessing the average 
economic magnitude of the results. For example, a downgrade on our scale from “A” to “B” leads 
to a 0.5% increase in provision, whereas an equally sized downgrade from “C” to “D” leads to a 
7% increase in provision. These two one-notch downgrades imply completely different economic 
effects. 
Next, we use the financial crisis as our exogenous event. With the liquidity tensions that 
spread fast to the Eurozone after August 2007 and with the effects of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, the world entered into the worst global financial crisis since the Great 
depression. As crises inject uncertainty1 into agents’ decision calculus (Widmaier, Blyth and 
Seabrooke, 2007), parameters become too unstable to quantify the prospects for events that may 
or may not happen in the future (Keynes, 1937; Lawson, 1985). As Figure 1 illustrates, banks 
responded to uncertainty with a raised level of mean provision and with an increasing 
disagreement, measured in terms of standard deviation, of the provision from different lenders to 
a pull of common borrowers in Brazil. 
Using the start of the financial crisis in a quasi-natural experiment, we test whether foreign 
banks operating in Brazil became more pessimistic about the creditworthiness of a common sample 
of borrowers compared with domestic banks (private domestic and government banks). Figure 2 
and Figure 3 show the dynamics for Risk assessment and Risk provision by bank ownership from 
2005:Q3 to 2009:Q2, respectively. We find empirically that the crisis had an effect on the risk 
assessment of firms. On average, foreign banks were more aggressive in downgrading their 
                                                 
1 Knight (1921) was the first to establish the important distinction between risk and uncertainty. Uncertainty must be 
taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk. It represents the lack of certainty. A state of having 
limited knowledge where it is impossible to exactly describe the existing state or future outcomes. 
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borrowers in comparison with private domestic banks during the crisis. In particular, compared 
with private domestic banks, foreign banks gave ratings to the same borrower that were 26 basis 
points lower in the post-period. On the other side, government banks displayed the most 
conservative behavior in the post-period, giving ratings that were 21 basis points higher than those 
of private domestic banks. However, when we use risk provision in order to capture the economic 
significance of the more severe downgrade of foreign banks, we lose statistical and economical 
significance. 
In order to further investigate whether credit ratings can be a possible channel for the 
transmission of cross-market risks, we select banks that were affected by the financial turmoil by 
using Laeven and Valencia (2012). The authors identify countries in which the financial crisis had 
started by 2007 and 2008. We find that affected banks gave their borrowers lower ratings compared 
with all other groups of banks in the post-period. One disadvantage of using the country where the 
foreign investor is domiciled is that it does not allow one to pinpoint the exact banks that ran into 
liquidity issues and that indeed needed assistance from their home countries. 
Using information from Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset, we distinguish more 
“fragile” banks (i.e., those that received assistance in its home countries) and find that their 
behavior had an economic impact in the post-period. On average, the affected and assisted banks 
raised risk provision by three percentage points in the post-period compared with private domestic 
banks. Our findings are evidence that the more banks were affected by the crisis, the more they 
became pessimistic about the creditworthiness of firms in Brazil. Our findings reinforce the 
hypothesis that credit ratings can be an important channel for the cross-market transmission of 
risk. 
We use firm fixed effects to compare how the risk for the same firm from a foreign bank 
changes relative to another bank type (private domestic and government). This within-firm 
comparison, similar to that of Khwaja and Mian (2008), fully absorbs firm-specific characteristics 
in credit repayment behavior. Thus, the difference in risk is attributed to differences in bank risk 
behavior. For robustness, we also test firm–time fixed effects in the regressions, similarly to Popov 
and Van Horen (2013). The firm–time fixed effects enable one to control for all firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity that affects the dynamics of risk assigned in each period, making the 
comparison of foreign banks with other banks even stricter. 
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Furthermore, we include bank fixed effects in the regressions so that we can control for all 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among lenders, including differences in the composition 
of loan portfolios, lending policies, managerial risk appetite, etc. We further include bank and 
bank–firm level controls in the regressions including controls for the type of loans. The bank and 
bank–firm level controls enable one to check whether the inclusion of other covariates changes the 
impact estimated in the baseline models. Since the residuals may be correlated across banks and 
across time (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004), we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
We test whether results are driven by several possibilities. First, foreign banks and other 
banks should have a similar trend in the pre-period, conditional on all controls. By running a 
placebo experiment, we find that risk assessment and risk provision of foreign banks were not 
economically and statistically different from other banks. Another possibility is that a bank’s belief 
that a borrower’s creditworthiness has fallen or will fall may cause the lender to reduce the 
borrower’s access to credit, thereby raising the likelihood of default (Carey and Hrycay, 2001). 
We do not find evidence that foreign banks’ negative beliefs on a borrower’s creditworthiness 
caused foreign lenders to reduce the borrower’s access to credit. Consequently, we do not find 
evidence that foreign banks had a direct impact on the likelihood of default of borrowers in Brazil. 
We also test for the possibility that foreign banks may have downgraded credit ratings because the 
relationship to their customers was weaker in the pre-period, and of borrower-induced choice of 
multiple lenders. Results are robust after several tests and in different sample periods. 
The finance literature has extensively explored the role of banks in screening and monitoring 
borrowers. Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) were the first to hypothesize that banks were more 
efficient than alternative lenders. One explanation of the superior ability of banks relies on the 
collection and process of information (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Diamond, 1991; Norden 
and Weber, 2010). In addition to collecting public information, which is available to all lenders, 
banks possess private information. This private information is derived from the transaction 
accounts of borrowers, which provides banks with ongoing data on borrowers’ activities. 
We consider that the goal in collecting and processing information is to produce a measure 
to assess and monitor the credit risk of a firm. This measure is the credit rating and it represents 
an evaluation of the creditworthiness of an entity, or more specifically, an assessment of the 
likelihood that a firm will default on their debt obligations in a given period. Banks had been 
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assigning credit ratings to their borrowers before, but after the Basel II2 agreement, in 2004, 
internal credit ratings became crucial. Basel II encouraged lenders to use public and private 
information in their own models. Thus, by having access to private and soft information (i.e., 
transaction account information that provides ongoing data on borrowers’ activities, the ability of 
the manager, their honesty, the way they react under pressure), banks are considered to be uniquely 
suited to measure the risk of their borrowers. Consequently, bank examiners have been encouraged 
to use banks’ internal credit ratings as the best available measure of the risk of the bank loan 
portfolio (Nakamura and Roszbach, 2010).  
However, few papers analyze the quality of banks’ credit ratings. To our knowledge, 
Nakamura and Roszbach (2010) are the first to empirically test the informational superiority of 
bank credit ratings over public alternatives. Their findings from two large Swedish banks and a 
local credit bureau reveal that the internal credit ratings indeed include valuable private 
information from monitoring, as theory suggests. However, there is evidence that publicly 
available information from a credit bureau is not efficiently impounded in bank ratings. Their 
tentative conclusion is that it has proven difficult for these banks to aggregate soft and hard 
information, and hence risk analyses by banks should be improved. Carey (2002) also presents 
evidence on the consistency of rating assignments across lenders. His results imply that rating 
system inconsistencies are a source of material adverse selection and risk for lenders. Additionally, 
it implies that a lender with a reliable rating system, having confidence in its own system, may 
have a significant competitive advantage in the long run. 
Moreover, banks may have different incentives for assessing the credit risk of borrowers. 
Recent theories for example have argued that banks screen and monitor more if they have more 
capital (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Dell-Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). In contrast, Stein (2002) 
argues that large banks are expected to be less efficient at making relationship loans, because 
information in a large bank is potentially collected by one individual or group and a decision made 
by another. In addition to this discussion, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) find that distance erodes 
a lender’s ability to collect private information. Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010) show that 
career concerns may cause loan officer credit ratings to be biased optimistically. 
                                                 
2 The implementation of the Basel II, adapted to the conditions, peculiarities and stage of development of the Brazilian 
market, follows the directives and timelines published in the central bank of Brazil’s official Circular Letters 
12.746/2004 and 16.137/2007. 
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We add to this literature by analyzing the repercussions that an exogenous event might have 
on the ability of banks (in this case foreign banks) to encompass the informational conditions of a 
local market when assessing the creditworthiness of a given borrower. Our findings are consistent 
with the view that greater difficulty in collecting soft information on the local market may be 
especially acute when foreign subsidiaries are far from bank headquarters (Berger and DeYoung, 
2006; Mian, 2006). Additionally, foreign banks may revise their perceptions of an entire class of 
loans based on losses in only some of the countries in which they operate (Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder, 2003). Hence, a decrease in the quality of borrowers in other markets may cause foreign 
bank to become more pessimistic about the quality of local borrowers (Berrospide, Black and 
Keeton, 2013). 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that empirically tests for internal 
credit ratings as a possible channel for the cross-market transmission of risk. We use the financial 
crisis as an outside shock that affects foreign banks in their country of origin, and we use a sample 
of Brazilian firms in order to test whether foreign banks became more pessimistic about the quality 
of local borrowers compared with domestic banks. From a methodological perspective, our paper 
uses important methodological contributions that include the control of firm-level unobserved 
characteristics comprising firm fixed effects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012), and the 
control of firm–time unobserved heterogeneity by using firm–time fixed effects (Jimenez et. al., 
2011; Bofondi et. al, 2013; Popov and van Horen, 2013). Therefore, our approach goes towards 
an identification through heterogeneity (Buch and Goldberg, 2014) and applies what is state-of-
the-art in methodological terms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the credit ratings in Brazil 
as a possible channel for the cross-market transmission of risks. Section 3 presents the dataset and 
the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and the model we propose 
to overcome the present challenges. Section 5 contains the results of the baseline specifications, as 







2 – Credit ratings in Brazil 
Regarding the Brazilian case, resolution 2,682/1999 of the Central Bank established that all 
financial institutions should classify their credit exposures into nine levels of risk, varying from 
“AA” and “A” to “H”. Rating “AA” represents the best rating a loan can achieve (lowest credit 
risk) and “H” represents the worst rating a loan can be assigned (highest credit risk). All banks 
have to maintain an internal credit rating scheme based on the guidelines set by the Central Bank. 
According to Schechtman et al. (2004), the rating process in Brazil must be based on: 
(i) analysis of the borrower, including: creditworthiness, indebtedness, capacity to 
generate cash to repay its debts, quality of earnings, quality of management and 
internal controls, punctuality, economic activity, commitments; and 
(ii) analysis of the credit transaction: the type of loan, the collateral provided, the amount 
of debt. 
Table 1 shows the credit rating scheme used by all banks authorized to operate in the country. 
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
All banks employ the same definition of default, namely: 
(i) a bank official has to make a judgment and reach the conclusion that any such 
payment is unlikely to occur in the future, and 
(ii) the principal or interest payments are X days overdue with the bank. 
In case of days overdue, the credit rating must be reviewed monthly by the bank and there 
will be an upper bound for this loan operation. For example, a loan with 92 days overdue will be 
classified at most at rating “E”. According to the same resolution, each rating level is associated 
with a percentage provision. As a common rule, ratings must be revised at least annually. Finally, 
all documentation related to the credit risk policy and rating process of a bank must be available 
for Central Bank analyses. 
For the purpose of the research, we use two measures related to the credit ratings. First, in 
order to facilitate the understanding of the dynamics of credit ratings, we use a numerical 
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correspondent value for each rating level. Rating “AA” corresponds to a score of 10, rating “A” to 
a score of nine, rating “B” to a score of eight, until rating “H”, which corresponds to a score of 
two. With these numerical correspondent values, we construct our variable Risk assessment, which 
is defined as the weighted credit rating of all loans assigned by bank b to borrower i at quarter t. 
Risk assessment, however, should only be interpreted in an ordinal fashion. The disadvantage of 
Risk assessment is that it is makes it difficult to assess the average economic magnitude of the 
results. A downgrade from rating “A” to “B” will have the same importance as a downgrade from 
“C” to “D”. 
Each rating level is associated to a percentage provision of the total due amount of the loan. 
We use this information to construct our second dependent variable, called Risk provision, which 
is defined as the ratio of total due amount provisioned by bank b to borrower i at quarter t. In this 
case, we use a non-linear correspondent provision for each rating level. Rating “AA” corresponds 
to a provision of zero percent of total outstanding amount, rating “A” to a provision of 0.5%, rating 
“B” to a provision of 1%, until rating “H”, which corresponds to a provision of 100%. This gives 
Risk provision a cardinal interpretation. 
However, the disadvantage of Risk provision is that a downgrade of two or more notches on 
high-quality credit ratings will be less economically meaningful than a one-notch downgrade of 
low-quality credit ratings. A downgrade from rating “AA” to “D” (four-notches reduction) leads 
to an increase of 10 percentage points in the provision of total due amount, while a downgrade 
from “D” to “E” leads to an increase of 20 percentage points. This is relevant, since most of our 
observations are of high-quality credit ratings. 
 
3 – Data and descriptive statistics 
We use credit registry data from the Central Bank of Brazil, which contains specific 
information on bank–firm credit relationships. The Brazilian credit registry lists all outstanding 
loan amounts above a threshold of 5,000 Brazilian Real (around 2,500 USD in December 2012) 
that each borrower has with banks operating in Brazil, including foreign banks. The samples we 
use from the credit registry include all non-financial and private firms with outstanding credit. We 
also obtained from the Central Bank consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data with 
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quarterly frequency from all the banks operating in Brazil. Additionally, we have bank ownership 
and conglomerate information.  
We are able to follow the same loans, firms and banks over time. The dataset covers the 
period starting 2005:Q3, ending in 2009:Q2. Data is available at quarterly frequency and 
intermediaries use the credit registry as a screening and monitoring device for borrowers. The 
Central Bank ensures the quality of the data guaranteeing that total outstanding loan amount at the 
credit registry must match the quarterly accounting figures for credit loan. Moreover, loan-ratings 
assigned by banks, although not public, are monitored by the Central Bank in order to ensure 
compliance to the Basel II capital accord3. 
Furthermore, we use Laeven and Valencia (2012) in order to identify the countries that were 
hit by the financial crisis in 2007 and 20084. Finally, we use the Laeven and Valencia bank failure 
dataset in order to select parent banks that were more affected by the crisis and had to receive 
assistance in their home countries. After several examinations to ensure that the data is of high 
quality, we merge these different datasets using the public bank identification number. The sample 
of banks includes commercial banks and universal banks with a commercial portfolio5. Moreover, 
banks should appear in the pre- and in the post-period. 
In order to test for the possibility of the credit rating channel, we focus on information around 
the first stage of the international financial crisis, more precisely, after tensions in the European 
interbank market in August 2007. However, we recognize that the Lehman Brothers’ collapse 
might also be relevant for the credit rating channel. Therefore, we ensure our sample encompasses 
both events. The sample period goes from 2005:Q3 until 2009:Q2. If credit ratings are indeed a 
channel of transmission of risks from one market to another, we expect that foreign banks, 
compared with private domestic banks in the post-period will: (i) downgrade their firms by a more 
severe degree; and/or (ii) make a bigger increase in the provision of total due amount for their 
borrowers .  
                                                 
3 According to BCBS (2013), Brazil is compliant to the Basel II capital accord. The Central Bank monitors the quality 
of each bank’s rating system and supervise the weighting of credit ratings on the computation of bank’s total capital 
requirements for the coverage of credit risk. 
4 The starting date for the recent crises is defined by the domestic banking system showing significant signs of distress 
followed by government intervention during the starting year of the crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). 
5 The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is excluded from the sample given its particular objectives and 
operational differences, especially on its cost of funding and its long-term assets. 
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We analyze eight quarters before the exogenous event and eight quarters after it. Choosing 
this specification, instead of using five, six or seven quarters before and after, also alleviates 
concerns with lending seasonality (lending is stronger before Christmas, but weaker before 
Carnival). As a robustness check, we do the exercise using the period from 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2, 
however results are qualitatively unchanged. The same applies when we use the period from 
2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2, allowing for the possibility that Lehman Brothers’ collapse is the start of the 
post-period. 
We exclude operations in which the origin of the resources is not from the bank itself, 
reducing the risk that transfers from the Brazilian government or from the National Development 
Bank may influence our results. Results are robust to the inclusion of other resources. We keep 
bank–firm relationship if it appears in the pre-period for at least five out of the eight possible 
quarters; the same applies for the post-period. Therefore, we keep the bank–firm relationship if 
there is a 62.5% minimum appearance throughout the sample period. However, results are robust 
to the loosening of such restriction6.  
In the full sample, we track 508,394 firms and 105 banks that together result in 665,362 
bank–firm pairs. The data level is a triplet on the firm–bank–time dimensions. Our two dependent 
variables are Risk assessment and Risk provision. Table 2 shows the definitions of all variables 
used in our paper. 
 
– Insert Table 2 here – 
 
We use dummy variables to indicate a bank’s ownership. Foreign takes the value one if 
ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign country and zero otherwise. Affected takes 
the value one if the parent of the foreign bank in Brazil is from any country where the financial 
crisis started in 2007 or 2008 (using Laeven and Valencia (2012)), and zero otherwise. Affected & 
assisted takes the value one if the parent of the foreign bank in Brazil received assistance in its 
                                                 
6 This partially controls for mergers and acquisitions among banks. We further control for M&A and rebalancing of a 
bank’s loan portfolio by tracking whether each loan was initiated by the bank itself, or whether it is a new relationship 




home country (using Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset), and zero otherwise. Last, 
Government takes the value one if bank is public and zero otherwise. Additionally, we use bank 
level characteristics, which include the size of the bank, the ratio of credit assets, equity to total 
assets and return over assets. We also have information on loan amount, collateral, the start date 
of the relationship between the bank and the firm, and loan type. The controls for loan type are the 
percentages of loans that are classified as overdraft, factoring, term loan, leasing and export loans 
(Schnabl, 2012). The omitted category is regular loan. 
Table 3 – Panel A shows summary statistics of the variables from the full sample. 
 
– Insert Table 3 here – 
 
The median Risk assessment of the firms in our full sample is 8.16, which corresponds 
approximately to a “B” rating. The median Risk provision is 0.01, which corresponds to 1% 
provision of total due amount. Foreign banks respond for 11% of the observations on bank–firm 
relationships. Government banks respond for 43% and private domestic banks for 46% of the firm–
bank–time observations. It is important to mention two points. On one hand, the mean Risk 
assessment decreased after the first event of the international crisis in 2007:Q3. Before the crisis, 
it was 8.10 and it decreased to 7.57 afterwards (−0.53 in the “Diff.” column of Table 3). This is a 
statistically significant change, as we can observe from the p-value of the T-Test column. On the 
other hand, one can notice that the mean Risk provision increased substantially (from 0.07 in the 
“Before” column to 0.14 after adding the amount from the “Diff.” column). The increase in Risk 
provision is statistically significant and we interpret it as a first sign of the cross-market 
transmission of risk. 
In order to control for firm unobservable heterogeneity, we select firms with outstanding 
loan amount from at least two banks from the full sample. Since the identification strategy relies 
on a comparison between the behavior of foreign banks and other banks (private domestic and 
government owned) at the same time, we select firms that borrow from at least a foreign bank and 
from another bank (private domestic or government owned) in the pre- and in the post-period. This 
brings us to our restricted sample. 
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The restricted sample permits a powerful identification within borrowers in order to 
disentangle a bank’s belief on the borrower creditworthiness from a firm’s overall behavior 
towards payment obligations. Specifically, we investigate the transmission of risk on the intensive 
margin on the same firm at the same point in time for foreign banks versus non-foreign banks. In 
the analyses, we track 40,141 bank–firm pairs with foreign banks, 28,454 with government banks 
and 33,844 with private domestic banks. There are 37,392 firms in the sample. The data level is a 
triplet on the firm–bank–time dimensions. 
Table 3 – Panel B shows summary statistics of all variables from the restricted sample. The 
median Risk assessment is 8.88, which corresponds approximately to “A” rating. The median Risk 
provision is 0.01, which corresponds to 1% provision of total due amount. The mean Risk 
assessment decreased after 2007:Q3 (−0.69 in the “Diff.” column of Table 3 Panel B). This is a 
statistically significant change, as we can observe from the p-value of the T-Test column. The 
mean Risk provision increased substantially (from 0.02 in the “Before” column to 0.09 after adding 
the amount from the “Diff.” column). The increase in Risk provision is also statistically significant. 
In our restricted sample, 38% of the observations are of foreign banks. Of these firm–foreign 
bank relationships, around 98% are with Affected banks, and around 50% are with Affected & 
assisted banks. Government banks correspond to 29% and private domestic banks to 33% of the 
firm–bank–time observations. The median bank in the sample has a size of approximately 222 
USD million, with a balance sheet structure of 29% of their total assets invested in credit assets 
and 7% of total liabilities in the form of equity. The median bank has a net positive income. 
Moreover, the median relationship loan amount is approximately of 25,000 USD, from which 27% 
are collateralized. However, there is extreme variance in the cross-section dimension of the banks’ 
balance sheet structure and size. Such balance sheet differences may be correlated with our credit 
rating measures, so we formally include these variables in the regressions analyses. It is important 
to cite that systematic differences across banks are controlled in the regressions by bank fixed 
effects. 
Table 4 shows the means of the variables for the group of foreign, public and private 
domestic banks with their respective t-tests, comparing the mean before and after the crisis event. 
Regarding foreign banks, the mean of Risk assessment from the pre-period to the post-period 
decreased from 9.11 to 8.30 (−0.81 in the “Diff.” column of Foreign banks). Regarding 
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government banks, it decreased from 8.14 to 7.87, whereas for private domestic banks it decreased 
from 7.81 to 7.12. In terms of Risk provision, the mean for foreign banks from the pre-period to 
the post-period increased from 0.02 to 0.08 (0.06 in the “Diff.” column of Foreign banks). 
Regarding government banks, it increased from 0.03 to 0.07, whereas for private domestic banks 
it increased from 0.11 to 0.20. All changes are statistically significant, as we can observe from the 
p-value of the T-Test column. 
 
– Insert Table 4 here – 
 
The differences in means of Risk assessment from foreign banks compared with government 
or with private domestic banks are statistically significant. In terms of Risk provision, the 
differences in means from foreign banks compared to government are not statistically significant 
(however, the differences in means from foreign banks compared with private domestic banks are 
significant). Moreover, foreign banks in Brazil were smaller than other banks, had more credit 
assets, and made less profit than other banks. The differences in means of balance sheet variables 
among foreign, private domestic and government banks are also statistically significant, hence the 
need to include them as variables in the regressions analyses. For the sample of firms we consider, 
foreign banks have on average greater amounts of outstanding debt amount and more collateralized 
loans compared with public banks7. The differences in means of relationship controls and type of 
loans among foreign, private domestic and government banks are statistically significant, hence, 
once again, the need to include them as controls in the regressions analysis. 
We recognize that it is possible that our restricted sample is not representative of the 
population of firms in Brazil. As we do not know the public identity of the firm, their location, nor 
their industry, it is difficult for us to give an account of the importance and the direction of the 
selection bias. We test for the significance of the difference of coefficients of our measures 
between the full and the restricted sample, both in Table 3 and in Table 4. We find that the 
                                                 
7 The information that foreign banks had on average greater amounts of outstanding debt amount is not consistent with 
the numbers of total loan volumes from the Brazilian financial stability reports. According to BCB (2008), foreign 
banks had a 21.3% market share on the total local credit volume in mid-June 2008, whereas public banks had 30.1% 
and private domestic banks corresponded to 48.6%. 
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coefficients are not economically significant. However, as we select firms with multiple banking 
relationships, these firms are expected to be larger firms. 
Appendix Table 1 provides a list of all the foreign investors that own and control banks in 
Brazil, and that are present in our sample. We additionally present their country and their average 
total assets for the pre- and post-period. In total, there are 28 foreign investors. The majority of 
banks are owned by American parent banks and institutions, although the biggest player at the 
time was the Dutch ABN Amro Bank (acquired in 2008 by Santander), followed by Santander 
from Spain and HSBC from UK. Banks that increased the extent of their participation the most 
during the sample period were Barclays with 131% increase in total assets, followed by the Korea 
Exchange Bank with 95%, and the Korea Development Bank, with 90%. On the other hand, UBS 
decreased its size by 19%, followed by Brascan with a 10% lower figure, and Citibank by 4%8. 
Foreign banks increased their size by 27% in two years, even though, by the end of 2008, the 
participation of foreign banks was still small compared to neighboring countries, with 22% 
participation on the overall Brazilian market (IMF, 2012). 
 
– Insert Appendix Table 1 here – 
 
Additionally, Appendix Table 2 lists the foreign banks that received assistance in their country of 
origin with further details on the type and main features of the intervention/resolution. Data is from 
Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset. 
 




                                                 
8 These average figures would correspond to a comparison of total assets of the banks from September 2006 to 
September 2008. The overall effect of the financial crisis on some foreign banks is more severe. Appendix Table 2 
describes the interventions suffered by some of the foreign parent investors of banks in Brazil (Laeven and Valencia 
bank failure dataset). 
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4 – Empirical strategy 
4.1 – Empirical Issues  
The goal of this paper is to identify whether international financial shocks can be transmitted 
to a local market through the credit rating channel. However, identifying a causal effect of the 
transmission of risk poses important challenges. 
First, if it is true that a bank may become more pessimistic about the quality of local 
borrowers because of an outside adverse shock, we should be able to capture such behavior through 
the credit ratings measures. However, there is a lack of a common identification system for loans 
and borrowers, making development of large samples difficult, as the matching of observations 
across lenders is a laborious task (Carey, 2002). We overcome this difficulty given the richness of 
the dataset that allows us to identify banks, firms, and loans over time. Given the several loan 
characteristics the dataset possesses, we are able to observe the dynamics of ratings for each loan 
and the date of origination, among several other variables. 
Second, differences in the granularity of internal rating scales and in the timing of rating 
assignments and reviews complicate the interpretation of results (Carey, 2002). The granularity of 
internal ratings is not an issue in the present study, since all banks in Brazil employ the same 
guidelines for the definition of default, given by the Resolution 2.682/1999 of the Central Bank. 
The Brazilian regulations do not employ external credit ratings, and instead use the Basel national 
discretions (BCBS, 2013). The same rules apply for all institutions authorized to operate in the 
country, regardless of ownership control. Timing of rating assignments is not a major concern as 
the rating for each loan is sent monthly to the same credit registry. Finally, by using a sample of 
eight quarters before and after the tensions in the European interbank market in August 2007, we 
believe we are able to capture the rating reviews that could have taken place because of the crisis 
events. 
Next, a potential difficulty with ratings is that they may be endogenous. A bank’s belief that 
a borrower’s creditworthiness has fallen or will fall may cause the lender to reduce the borrower’s 
access to credit, thereby raising the likelihood of default (Carey and Hrycay, 2001). We believe 
endogeneity is not a major issue in the present study for the following reasons. First, because we 
account for firms with two or more bank relationships where the firm must have a relationship 
with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public). If a bank’s belief that a 
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borrower’s creditworthiness has fallen or will fall were to induce the bank to reduce the borrower’s 
access to credit, the firm could still try to access credit with the other lenders. Multiple bank 
relationship helps to mitigate the credit rationing effect that we believe would be more prominent 
in firms with a single-lender relationship. 
Second, given the Brazilian credit registry characteristics (i.e., a bank does not have access 
to the credit rating assigned by another bank), even in the case that a bank does decide to 
downgrade a firm based on its own belief, this bank’s decision would not induce other banks to 
downgrade the firm. Moreover, since we control for firm time-varying unobserved heterogeneity 
(e.g., using firm–time fixed effects), we are also controlling for the effect of the borrower’s access 
to credit on the overall change in the borrower’s creditworthiness. Even in a setting where the 
likelihood of default is raised by a lack of credit, we control for the time-varying outstanding loan 
amount between the bank and the borrower in some of our specifications. Finally, we run 
regressions for the restricted sample of firms using credit supply as our dependent variable. The 
results from this specific exercise show that lending from foreign banks is not different from 
private domestic banks in the post-period. Therefore, ratings downgrades from foreign banks did 
not come with a more severe credit rationing. 
Moreover, one should be able to identify banks, otherwise comparable, that have been 
differently affected by the financial crisis. Since private domestic and government owned banks 
are located within Brazil, with limited foreign exposure, we consider foreign banks as the more 
"affected" group, or in other words, the group we aim to further investigate. In principle, foreign, 
private domestic and government banks may differ along several dimensions, and comparing them 
to assess the effect of the financial crisis on local credit rating measures may not be warranted. 
Our identification strategy, based on comparing credit rating measures applied by different banks 
to the same firm, allows us to fully control for possible differences in the composition of borrowers 
across different types of banks.  
We take Risk assessment and Risk provision as different measures of credit risk that may 
complement each other. As we focus our analyses in a differences-in-differences approach, by 
comparing the behavior of foreign banks to other banks after the crisis, ideally we expect to find: 
(i) negative and statistically significant estimates for Risk assessment from foreign 
banks in the post-period; and 
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(ii) positive and statistically significant estimates for Risk provision from foreign banks 
in the post-period. 
If it is true that a bank may become more pessimistic about the quality of local borrowers 
because of an outside adverse shock, preferably, we should be able to capture such behavior 
through both credit ratings measures (Risk assessment and Risk provision). We would interpret 
this as strong evidence for the transmission of risk through the credit rating channel. However, 
given the characteristics of each of our credit rating measures for each of the bank groups, we 
expect to find results for either Risk assessment or Risk provision. We would interpret this as weak 
evidence for the transmission of risk through the credit rating channel. 
In order to better illustrate our main identification strategy, we show Table 5 where we 
collapse the data into single data point (based on averages), both before and after the reform. This 
results in two data points per unit of observation, one data point for the pre-period and one point 
for the post-period. This time-collapsing of the data ensures that the standard errors are robust to 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique9. 
 
– Insert Table 5 here – 
 
In Panel A1, we report the before–after results of the variable Risk assessment for the three 
groups of banks using the full sample. Risk assessment for foreign banks decreased by 0.88 basis 
points after the reform (−0.8765 in the Difference column), whereas government banks decreased 
by 0.31 and private domestic decreased by 0.69. Risk assessment for firms with multiple banking 
relationships after the reform decreased more for foreign banks, with a minus 0.37 basis points in 
comparison to domestic banks (-0.3660 in the Difference column for “Difference (Foreign– 
Domestic)”). We also test the difference in the mean figure for Risk provision before and after 
2007:Q3 for the three groups of banks. Results can be found in Table 5, Panel A2. As one can see 
in the column “Difference (Foreign–Domestic)”, the difference in foreign banks compared with 
                                                 
9 Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique relates to serial correlation - the tendency for one observation to 
be correlated with those that have gone before – especially in differences-in-differences models. The simplest and 
most widely applied approach is simply to time-collapse the data. We believe that our number of bank clusters does 
not cause biased standard errors or misleading estimates. 
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other banks in relation to the mean in the pre-period to the post-period is economically and 
statistically insignificant. In Panel B1 and B2, we use information from our restricted sample. 
Results for the “Difference (Foreign–Domestic)” are similar to the results from the full sample. 
In summary, we identify the impact of the financial crisis on credit rating measures by 
comparing the pre- and the post-patterns of Risk applied to the same firm by two or more banks, 
where the firm must have a relationship with one foreign and with another bank (private domestic 
or public). We believe that our specific sample around the economic conditions of the aftermath 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis makes the appropriate setting for the present study. Given the 
considerably large number of bank–firm relationships we trace, inferences are robust enough to 
enlighten our knowledge regarding the cross-market transmission of risk through the credit rating 
channel. 
 
4.2 – The model 
We use credit registry data on the firm–bank–quarter level. We use the following 
specification to investigate whether foreign banks differ with respect to the Risk assessment and 
Risk provision in the post-period compared with other banks. We start with a specification with 
firm, bank and time fixed effects. 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡    (1) 
 
where Risk equals Risk assessment or Risk provision, depending on our regressions. Foreign is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign 
country, and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2007:Q3 to 
2009:Q2 and zero otherwise. The sample period starts in 2005:Q3 and ends in 2009:Q2. As stated 
before, we include a full set of firm, bank and time fixed effects, respectively 𝛼𝑖, 𝛼𝑏 and 𝛼𝑡, 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at each of the triplet dimensions. 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 is 
an idiosyncratic error term. Since the residuals may be correlated across banks and across time 
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004), we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
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One challenge is the simultaneous nature of the bank and the firm behavior regarding credit 
ratings, since it is hard to disentangle a bank’s belief on the borrower creditworthiness from the 
firm’s overall behavior towards payment obligations. We completely capture any risk shocks at 
the firm level by using firm–time fixed effects controls, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡. This comes at the cost of needing to 
restrict our analysis to those firms with multiple bank relationships at the same time. In our case, 
we restrict the firms to those having a relationship with one foreign and with another bank (private 
domestic or public) in the pre- and post-period. The most saturated specification is: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 
            (2) 
 
where vector 𝑋𝑏,𝑡 controls for a set of observable characteristics of bank b at time t, including size 
of the bank, ratio of credit assets, equity to total assets and Roa. Vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 controls for a set of 
observable relationship characteristics of bank b with borrower i at time t, including outstanding 
amount of debt, presence of collateral, and the importance of the oldest bank for the firm. Vector 
𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 controls for loan type as percentages of loans that are classified as overdraft, factoring, term 
loans, leasing, and export loans (Schnabl, 2012). The omitted category is regular loan. Therefore, 
we are able to control for further bank-specific and bank–firm-specific determinants of Risk not 
captured by the specified fixed effects. In order to check whether the inclusion of other bank and 
bank–firm covariates change the impact estimated in the baseline model, we also show estimates 
of equation (2) without vector 𝑋𝑏,𝑡, vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡, nor with vector 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡. 
 We know that government banks were countercyclical during the financial crisis (Coleman 
and Feler, 2014). One hypothesis is that government banks have assessed the risk of their 
borrowers in a more detached way, compared with private banks. Therefore, we also estimate the 
following: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑏,𝑡 +




where Government is a dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, the comparison becomes the change in Risk, from the pre to the post period, 
for foreign banks relative to the control group, which is private domestic banks in the case above.  
The coefficient of interest in all equations above is 𝛽1. In a difference-in-differences 
approach, 𝛽1 captures the change in the risk assessment, from the pre-treatment to the post-
treatment period, for the treatment group (foreign banks) relative to the control group (private 
domestic and government banks in equation (1) and (2) and private domestic banks in equation 
(3)). The numerical estimate of 𝛽1 captures the difference in the change of the bank–firm risk 
relationship between the pre- and the post-period induced by moving from the control group to the 
treatment group. 
As stated above, we control our regressions for bank-specific time-invariant characteristics, 
since we include bank fixed effects in the regressions. We also control for bank-firm relationship 
features by using bank-firm variables such as the outstanding amount of debt, presence of 
collateral, and the importance of the oldest bank for the firm. Furthermore, we control for the 
composition of bank–firm relationship (i.e., the use of different banks for different purposes), by 
aggregating loans in types as Schnabl (2012) does. However, the validity of the identification 
strategy depends on a similar trend in the pre-period of the variable Risk from foreign banks and 
other banks, conditional on all controls. The requirement for a similar trend only applies to how 
much foreign banks, private domestic banks and government banks depart from their time-
invariant component in the pre- and post-period. Results in a previous placebo test are not 
significant throughout all specifications, pointing to the validity of the main results of the paper.  
 
5 – Empirical evidence 
5.1 – Baseline model 
Tables 6 and 7 provide the first results of the paper. In Table 6, we regress Risk assessment 
on foreign bank ownership in the post-period in a differences-in-differences approach. Columns 
(1) to (3) show the effect of the dummy foreign on risk assessment in the period from 2007:Q3 to 
2009:Q2. In column (1), we present the results of equation (1). The estimate of coefficient 𝛽1 (for 
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the interaction term of interest  𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) is negative, statistically significant, and 
economically meaningful. Results show that in response to the crisis, foreign banks are giving a 
rating which is 35 basis points lower vis-à-vis that of domestic banks (to the same borrower). Here, 
we include bank, firm, and time fixed effects, but do not control for time-varying bank and bank–
firm characteristics. In order to address for the possibility that there are time-varying differences 
in borrower behavior, in column (2) we include firm–time fixed effects. In this setting, results 
remain statistically significant. Results are also robust when we control for time-varying bank, 
bank–firm characteristics and loan type variables, as one can observe in column (3), which are the 
results of equation (2). 
 
– Insert Table 6 here – 
 
Brazilian government banks were countercyclically active during the global financial crisis 
(IMF, 2012). They provided more credit, offsetting declines in lending by private banks (Coleman 
and Feler, 2014). With this argument, we regress Risk assessment on foreign and government bank 
ownership in the post-period. In equations (4) to (6), the comparison of interest is foreign banks 
versus private domestic banks in 2007:Q3 and after. In column (4), one can observe the 
conservative behavior of government banks in the post-period compared with private domestic 
banks. While foreign banks seem to have been the most aggressive group of banks in downgrading 
credit ratings, government banks were the most conservative group, with ratings at 23 basis points 
above ratings of private domestic banks. 
Column (6) of Table 6 tests equation (3) and presents the preferred estimation providing an 
unbiased estimate on risk assessment. Ceteris paribus, risk assessment of foreign banks suffered a 
higher level of deterioration compared with private domestic banks. In response to the crisis, 
foreign banks are giving a rating which is 26 basis points lower vis-à-vis that of private domestic 
banks (to the same borrower). Because specification (6) includes saturated fixed effects and time-
varying bank and bank-firm controls, it is unlikely that the results are driven by unobservable time-
varying differences in borrower demand and quality. Neither are results driven by time-invariant 
bank heterogeneity, time-varying differences in bank’s structure, behavior or risk appetite; nor by 
time-varying differences in firm behavior. 
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In Table 7, we regress Risk provision on foreign bank ownership in the post-period using the 
same differences-in-differences approach. Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of the dummy 
foreign on risk provision in the period from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2 in comparison to domestic banks. 
In equations (4) to (6), the comparison of interest is foreign banks versus private domestic banks. 
In all columns, the estimate of coefficient 𝛽1 is statistically and economically not significant. 
 
– Insert Table 7 here – 
 
Table 6 shows that the difference in Risk assessment between foreign and other banks is 
relevant in the post-period. However, Table 7 shows that we lose significance when we test Risk 
provision for foreign banks in the post-period. Taken together, the results of Tables 6 and 7 present 
weak evidence of the cross-market transmission of risk through the credit rating channel. 
 
5.2 – Exposure measures 
One question that remains is whether different groups of foreign banks, depending on their 
exposure to the international financial crisis, behaved differently during the baseline sample 
period. 
In order to select banks that were more affected by the financial turmoil, we first use Laeven 
and Valencia (2012), who show the markets affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis. According 
to the authors, the starting date for the recent crises is defined by banking system showing 
significant signs of distress followed by government intervention during the starting year of the 
crisis. Using Laeven and Valencia (2012), we create Affected, which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the parent of the foreign bank in Brazil is from any country where the 
financial crisis started in 2007 or 2008, and zero otherwise10. The hypothesis we raise is that the 
financial crisis may have increased the incentives for more affected banks to downgrade their 
borrowers in an even more severe way in the post-period. In Table 8, columns (1) to (3) we report 
estimates of the impact of Affected on risk assessment. 
                                                 




– Insert Table 8 here – 
 
In column (1), one can note that Affected indeed gave their borrowers lower ratings compared 
with private domestic banks. On average, Affected are giving ratings that are 93 basis points lower 
in the post-period than the comparison group. When we move to column (2), where we include 
firm–time fixed effects, the estimated impact for foreign affected in the post-period is 50 basis 
points lower than that of the comparison group. The difference between the estimates of column 1 
and 2 is evidence of considerable time–series variance within firm–bank risk relationship (e.g., 
new loans appearing and old loans disappearing from the credit registry). This variance is therefore 
mitigated by the use of firm–time fixed effects. Results are also robust when we control for time-
varying bank, bank–firm characteristics and loan type variables, as one can observe in column (3). 
In Table 8, columns (4) to (6) we report estimates of the impact of Affected on risk provision. 
In column (4), Affected increased risk provision compared with private domestic banks. On 
average, Affected raised provision by five basis points in the post-period compared with private 
domestic banks. When we move to column (5), where we include firm–time fixed effects, the 
estimated impact for foreign affected is still positive, but with no statistical significance. Results 
continue to be not significant when we control for time-varying bank, bank–firm characteristics 
and loan type variables, as one can observe in column (6). 
Interesting to note that less-affected foreign banks (Foreign * Post), corresponding to 
approximately 2% of the observations of foreign banks, increased (decreased) Risk assessment 
(Risk provision) above (below) the level of government banks in the post-period. In a similar 
argument as in Kempf, Manconi and Spalt (2014), an alternative explanation for the behavior of 
less-affected foreign banks can be the distraction of parent banks, in which an unrelated shock 
shifts their attention, leading to a temporary loosening in the behavior of their foreign subsidiaries. 
In any case, one disadvantage of using the country where the foreign investor is domiciled 
is that it does not allow one to pinpoint the precise banks that ran into liquidity issues and that 
indeed needed assistance from their home countries. Using Laeven and Valencia bank failure 
dataset, we create Affected & assisted, which is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the 
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parent of the foreign bank in Brazil received assistance in its home country, and zero otherwise11. 
We raise the hypothesis that the behavior for the most affected banks could have been different 
from the Affected group. 
In Table 9, columns (1) to (3) we report estimates of the impact of Affected & assisted on 
risk assessment. 
 
– Insert Table 9 here – 
 
Estimates are not statistically significant, pointing to a heterogeneous behavior of foreign 
banks that received assistance in the post-period. However, results for risk provision in columns 
(4) to (6) show that even though Affected & assisted did not downgrade ratings more than private 
domestic banks, their movement had an economic impact in the post-period. On average Affected 
& assisted raised risk provision by three percentage points in the post-period compared with 
private domestic banks. Our findings are evidence that more affected banks became more 
pessimistic about the creditworthiness of firms in Brazil during the crisis and this reinforces our 
hypothesis that credit ratings can be an important channel for the cross-market transmission of 
risk. 
 
5.3 – Robustness 
There are several possible concerns regarding the estimates. We consider a number of 
robustness tests and alternative explanations that may fully or partially account for the results 




                                                 
11 See Appendix Table 1 for specific banks that received assistance. See Appendix Table 2 for the list of foreign banks 




5.3.1 – Placebo experiments 
The first possibility we address is that foreign banks and other banks did not have a similar 
trend in the pre-period, conditional on all controls. Because all the regressions include bank fixed 
effects, we are already controlling for bank-specific time-invariant characteristics. Therefore, the 
requirement for a common trend would only apply to how much foreign banks, private domestic 
banks, and government banks depart from their time-invariant component in the pre and post-
period. 
We conduct a placebo test to address this issue in Table 10. In column (1) to (6), the sample 
period goes from 2003:Q4 to 2007:Q2, where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
starting from 2005:Q3. Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of the dummy foreign on risk assessment 
in the post-period. Columns (4) to (6) show the effect of the dummy foreign on risk provision in 
the post-period. In columns (1) and (4), one can observe that a placebo event in August-September 
2005 had, on average, an economically and statistically significant impact on risk assessment and 
on risk provision of foreign banks operating in Brazil. Specifications (1) and (4) include bank, firm 
and time fixed effects.   
 
– Insert Table 10 here – 
 
However, when we replace firm and time fixed effects for firm–time fixed effects 
(specifications (2) and (5)), results lose statistical significance. Again, this is evidence that there is 
considerable time–series variance within firm–bank risk relationship (e.g., new loans appearing 
and old loans disappearing from the credit registry). This variance is mitigated by the use of firm–
time fixed effects. Columns (3) and (6) include time-varying bank, bank-firm controls and loan 
type variables, and are our preferred estimations, providing an unbiased estimate on the behavior 
of foreign banks during the placebo period. Ceteris paribus, risk assessment and risk provision of 





5.3.2 – Effect of bank ownership on Lending 
One concern regarding the results is that a bank’s belief that a borrower’s creditworthiness 
has fallen or will fall may cause the lender to reduce the borrower’s access to credit, thereby raising 
the likelihood of default (Carey and Hrycay, 2001). Indeed, we find that foreign banks were more 
aggressive in downgrading credit ratings compared with other bank groups in Brazil. However, in 
order to find evidence that credit rationing was more severe from foreign banks in the post-period, 
we run the same exercise we did in section 5.1, but now using the dependent variable Amount, 
instead of our previous credit rating measures. 
Amount is defined as the log outstanding loan amount of borrower i at bank b in quarter t, 
winsorized on 98%/2% level. In fact, it is a measure to test the credit supply of foreign banks in 
Brazil. The results of the effect of bank ownership on lending can be found in Table 11. 
 
– Insert Table 11 here – 
 
As we can observe, credit supply of foreign banks in the post-period is not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications. With no further developments, we do not find evidence 
that foreign banks’ negative beliefs on a borrower’s creditworthiness caused foreign lenders to 
reduce the borrower’s access to credit. Consequently, we do not find evidence that foreign banks 
have a direct impact on likelihood of default of borrowers in Brazil.  
 
5.3.3 – Composition effect hypothesis 
Another possible concern regarding the results is that foreign banks may have downgraded 
credit ratings because the relationship to their customers was weaker in the pre-period (following 
same reasoning of De Haas and Van Horen (2013) regarding lending). Moreover, there might be 
a borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders (i.e., borrowers who borrow from a historically 
weak domestic bank, try to compensate with a stronger foreign bank). In order to reduce these 
possibilities, we keep firm–bank relationship if it appears in the pre-period for at least five out of 
the eight possible quarters; the same applies for the post-period. Therefore, regressions include 
bank–firm relationship if there is a 62.5% minimum appearance throughout the sample period. 
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However, in order to control for the composition effect hypothesis in a stricter sense, we 
account for firms with three or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship 
with one foreign, with a private domestic bank, and with a public bank in the pre- and post-period. 
Since results for Risk provision are not significant for our baseline results, we focus the analysis 
in the variable Risk assessment. Results can be found in Table 12. 
 
– Insert Table 12 here – 
 
Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of the dummy foreign on risk assessment in the post-
period compared with domestic banks (government and private domestic banks). In equations (4) 
to (6), the comparison of interest is foreign banks versus private domestic banks. Even in a setting 
where we include saturated fixed effects and time-varying bank and bank–firm controls (columns 
(3) and (6)), results continue to hold. The main findings of the paper are not driven by the 
possibility of borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders nor by the possible different purposes 
that different banks might have for a given firm. 
 
5.3.4 – Sample periods 
Table 13 reports results on the criterion used to split sample periods. One argument could be 
that the sample period of eight quarters in the pre-period and other eight quarters in the post-period 
is too wide. To address this concern, in column (1) to (3), we keep the sample period from 2006:Q3 
to 2008:Q2, instead of 2005:Q3 to 2009:Q2. Post continues as a dummy variable taking the value 
one starting from 2007:Q3. Since results for Risk provision are not significant for our baseline 
results, we focus the analysis in the variable Risk assessment. The results suggest that a smaller 
sample that excludes the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September of 2008 also captures the foreign 
bank behavior regarding Risk in the post-period. 
 




The next concern we address regards the extent to which a sample period closer to the 
collapse in syndicated lending during the global financial crisis affected foreign banks. In column 
(4) to (6), we therefore extend the sample period back from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2, instead of 
2005:Q3 to 2009:Q2. Here we split the sample using Post as a dummy variable that takes the value 
one starting from 2008:Q3, instead of 2007:Q3. In this specific setting, evidence is also negative 
and economically significant, suggesting the bank-firm risk relationship continued being more 
downgraded by foreign banks after the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
6 – Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we hypothesize that the international financial crisis that started in August 
2007 increased uncertainty across financial institutions, inducing more affected banks to act in a 
more pessimistic way on the credit rating of commercial borrowers (compared with domestic 
banks). Thus, we empirically test for internal credit ratings as a possible channel for the cross-
market transmission of risk. 
We find evidence that foreign banks, especially those whose parent banks were most 
challenged by the turmoil of the crisis, revised ratings downward in a more severe manner than 
other banks did after the crisis. Our results suggest that risks can be transmitted from one market 
to another through the internal credit rating channel. Our approach goes towards an identification 
through heterogeneity (Buch and Goldberg, 2014) by using important methodological 
contributions that include the control of firm-level unobserved characteristics comprising firm 
fixed effects (Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Schnabl, 2012), and the control of firm–time unobserved 
heterogeneity by using firm–time fixed effects (Jimenez et. al., 2011; Bofondi et. al, 2013; Popov 
and van Horen, 2013). 
Finally, the results of this paper raise important concerns about the potential triggering of a 
systemic downgrading of credit ratings given certain local conditions. Thanks to the characteristics 
of the Brazilian credit registry (i.e., a bank does not have access to the credit rating assigned by 
another bank), the downgrade of credit ratings is not apt to become systemic. In other words, Brazil 
may have a comparative advantage over those economies in which information on credit ratings is 
publicly available. An increase of pessimism (in this case from foreign banks) towards the 
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creditworthiness of a particular borrower will not directly cause other lenders to add to the financial 
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Credit rating scheme 
All banks employ the same definition of default, given by the Resolution 2.682/1999 of Central Bank of Brazil. Ratings go from “AA” (highest quality), “A” (low 
probability of default) to “H” (very high probability of loss). Each rating level is associated with a percentage provision of the total due amount of the loan. In the 
case of days overdue, the rating in the column represents the upper bound for each loan operation (e.g.: a loan with 92 days overdue will be classified at most at 
rating “E”). Credit ratings must be reviewed monthly in case of late payments. 
Credit rating AA  A B C D E F G H 
Numerical correspondent value for Risk assessment 10  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 
Provision (%) of total due amount 0  0.5 1 3 10 30 50 70 100 






The table presents the definition of variables used in the paper. We use credit registry data, bank ownership data and 
quarterly accounting information provided by Central Bank of Brazil. Additionally, we use data from Laeven and 
Valencia (2012) and Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset. 
Variable name Definition 
Risk assessment 
Weighted credit rating of all loans assigned by bank b to borrower i at quarter t, according to Resolution 
2.682/1999 of the Central Bank of Brazil 
Risk provision 
Ratio of total due amount provisioned by bank b to borrower i at quarter t, according to Resolution 
2.682/1999 of the Central Bank of Brazil 
Foreign 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign country, 
and zero otherwise 
Affected 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the parent of the foreign bank in Brazil is from any country 
where the financial crisis started in 2007 or 2008 (using Laeven and Valencia (2012)), and zero otherwise 
Affected & assisted 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if the parent of the foreign bank in Brazil received assistance in 
its home country (using Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset), and zero otherwise 
Government Dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero otherwise 
Post Dummy variable that takes the value one from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2, and zero otherwise 
Amount Log of outstanding loan amount of borrower i at bank b in quarter t, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Collateral Ratio of total loan amount guaranteed by any type of collateral to Amount 
Oldest 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank is the one with whom the firm has the longest 
relationship 
Overdraft Ratio of amount that is classified as overdraft 
Factoring Ratio of amount that is classified as factoring 
Term loans Ratio of amount that is classified as term loans 
Leasing Ratio of amount that is classified as leasing 
Export loan Ratio of amount that is classified as export loans 
Size Log of total assets of the bank, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Credit assets Ratio of credit assets to Size, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Equity Ratio of equity to Size, winsorized on 98%/2% level 







This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper for the full and for the restrictive sample of 
firms. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period is the same as the mean of the post-period. 
  Mean 
Variable name N Mean Median St. dev. Min Max Before Diff. 
T-Test 
(p-value) 
Panel A: Full sample 
Risk assessment    9,708,695  7.83 8.16 2.00 2.00 10.00 8.10 −0.53 0.00 
Risk provision    9,708,695  0.10 0.01 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 
Foreign    9,708,695  0.11 0 0.32 0 1 0.12 −0.00 0.00 
Government    9,708,695  0.43 0 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.01 0.00 
Post    9,708,695  0.51 1 0.50 0 1 - - - 
Size    9,708,695  26.04 26.50 0.97 17.63 26.50 25.93 0.21 0.00 
Credit assets    9,708,695  0.28 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.81 0.29 −0.01 0.00 
Equity    9,708,695  0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.97 0.08 −0.01 0.00 
Roa    9,708,695  0.33 0.32 0.30 −4.06 4.75 0.37 −0.08 0.00 
Amount    9,708,695  10.66 10.55 1.51 7.17 14.47 10.51 0.29 0.00 
Collateral    9,708,695  0.22 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.01 0.00 
Oldest    9,708,695  0.67 1 0.46 0 1 0.67 0.02 0.00 
Overdraft    9,708,695  0.46 0.37 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.52 −0.12 0.00 
Factoring    9,708,695  0.13 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.15 −0.05 0.00 
Term loans    9,708,695  0.05 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.05 −0.00 0.00 
Leasing    9,708,695  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export loan    9,708,695  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 
Panel B: Restricted sample 
Risk assessment    1,497,217  8.27 8.88 1.66 2.00 10.00 8.61 −0.69 0.00 
Risk provision    1,497,217  0.06 0.01 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Foreign    1,497,217  0.38 0 0.49 0 1 0.38 −0.00 0.00 
Affected 1,497,217 0.37 0 0.49 0 1 0.37 −0.00 0.00 
Assisted 1,497,217 0.19 0 0.39 0 1 0.20 −0.01 0.00 
Government    1,497,217  0.29 0 0.45 0 1 0.28 0.01 0.00 
Post    1,497,217  0.50 0 0.50 0 1 - - - 
Size    1,497,217  25.75 26.12 1.06 17.63 26.50 25.59 0.33 0.00 
Credit assets    1,497,217  0.29 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.81 0.30 −0.02 0.00 
Equity    1,497,217  0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.97 0.08 −0.01 0.00 
Roa    1,497,217  0.29 0.28 0.31 −4.06 4.75 0.32 −0.06 0.00 
Amount    1,497,217  11.69 11.58 1.58 8.75 15.75 11.57 0.24 0.00 
Collateral    1,497,217  0.24 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.26 −0.04 0.00 
Oldest    1,497,217  0.34 0 0.47 0 1 0.34 0.00 0.09 
Overdraft    1,497,217  0.40 0.30 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.44 −0.09 0.00 
Factoring    1,497,217  0.12 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.14 −0.05 0.00 
Term loans    1,497,217  0.06 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.06 −0.01 0.00 
Leasing    1,497,217  0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 






This table presents the variables used for each group of banks. We show the mean in the pre-period and the 
additional difference after the crisis. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period (Post=0) is the 
same as the mean of the post-period (Post=1). 
 Foreign banks Government banks Domestic banks 









Panel A: Full sample 
Risk assessment 9.11 −0.81 0.00 8.14 −0.27 0.00 7.81 −0.69 0.00 
Risk provision 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.00 
Size 25.20 0.53 0.00 26.18 0.06 0.00 25.92 0.27 0.00 
Credit assets 0.33 −0.06 0.00 0.31 0.04 0.00 0.26 −0.04 0.00 
Equity 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.07 −0.00 0.00 0.09 −0.01 0.00 
Roa 0.25 −0.03 0.00 0.37 −0.04 0.00 0.41 −0.13 0.00 
Amount 11.26 0.13 0.00 10.06 0.48 0.00 10.74 0.16 0.00 
Collateral 0.25 −0.10 0.00 0.09 −0.05 0.00 0.32 0.10 0.00 
Oldest 0.57 0.01 0.00 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.67 0.03 0.00 
Overdraft 0.41 −0.06 0.00 0.53 −0.24 0.00 0.55 −0.03 0.00 
Factoring 0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.20 −0.06 0.00 0.13 −0.04 0.00 
Term loans 0.07 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 −0.02 0.00 
Leasing 0.01 −0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export loan 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 
N. of observations 1,113,509 4,128,327 4,466,859 
Panel B: Restricted sample 
Risk assessment 9.13 −0.87 0.00 8.27 −0.44 0.00 8.31 −0.69 0.00 
Risk provision 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 
Size 25.18 0.55 0.00 26.13 0.07 0.00 25.61 0.29 0.00 
Credit assets 0.34 −0.06 0.00 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.27 −0.03 0.00 
Equity 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.06 −0.00 0.00 0.09 −0.01 0.00 
Roa 0.24 −0.03 0.00 0.36 −0.05 0.00 0.39 −0.13 0.00 
Amount 11.65 0.19 0.00 11.10 0.36 0.00 11.89 0.20 0.00 
Collateral 0.27 −0.11 0.00 0.12 −0.05 0.00 0.37 0.05 0.00 
Oldest 0.34 −0.00 0.25 0.35 −0.01 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.00 
Overdraft 0.39 −0.05 0.00 0.47 −0.19 0.00 0.48 −0.05 0.00 
Factoring 0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.24 −0.07 0.00 0.17 −0.05 0.00 
Term loans 0.08 −0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 −0.01 0.00 
Leasing 0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export loan 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.01 0.08 0.02 −0.00 0.00 






This table introduces the basic empirical strategy. “Before” refers to quarters from 2005:Q3 to 2007:Q2 and “after” 
refers to quarters from 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2. We next collapse the data into single data point (based on averages) 
both before and after. This results in two data points per unit of observation, one data point for the pre-period and 
one point for the post-period. “Difference” column stands for the difference between “Before” and “After”. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * implies significance at 99% level, 95% level, and 90% 











Panel A1: Risk assessment - Full sample 
          Foreign banks 9.1221 8.2456 −0.8765*** 158,006 
 (0.0030) (0.0062) (0.0069)  
          Government banks 8.1320 7.8228 −0.3092*** 565,032 
 (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0033)  
          Private domestic banks 7.8525 7.1622 −0.6902*** 607,686 
 (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0056)  
          Difference (Foreign–Domestic)   −0.3660***  
   (0.0057)  
Panel A2: Risk provision - Full sample     
          Foreign banks 0.0188 0.0886 0.0699*** 158,006 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0007)  
          Government banks 0.0326 0.0830 0.0504*** 565,032 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)  
          Private domestic banks 0.1046 0.1902 0.0857*** 607,686 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008)  
          Difference (Foreign–Domestic)   0.0008  
   (0.0007)  
Panel B1: Risk assessment - Restricted sample 
          Foreign banks 9.1343 8.2104 −0.9239*** 80,144 
 (0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0092)  
          Government banks 8.2575 7.7775 −0.4800*** 56,908 
 (0.0056) (0.0090) (0.0106)  
          Private domestic banks 8.3301 7.6422 −0.6879*** 67,595 
 (0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0111)  
          Difference (Foreign–Domestic)   −0.3300***  
   (0.0091)  
Panel B2: Risk provision - Restricted sample     
          Foreign banks 0.0138 0.08461 0.0709*** 80,144 
 (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0010)  
          Government banks 0.0275 0.0911 0.0636*** 56,908 
 (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0012)  
          Private domestic banks 0.0291 0.1078 0.0787*** 67,595 
 (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0013)  
          Difference (Foreign–Domestic)   0.0009  




Effect of bank ownership on Risk assessment 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on bank–firm risk relationship. The dependent variable is Risk assessment. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, 
column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a 
constant, and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.3532*** −0.3442*** −0.3330*** −0.2457** −0.2470*** −0.2606*** 
 (0.0877) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.1148) (0.0585) (0.0557) 
Government * Post    0.2332* 0.2040*** 0.2164*** 
    (0.1177) (0.0583) (0.0545) 
Bank controls       
          Size           −0.0988*   −0.0872 
    (0.0590)   (0.0532) 
          Credit assets   0.6600**   0.1903 
                            (0.2511)   (0.2274) 
          Equity   −1.6352**   −1.6003*** 
    (0.6276)   (0.5790) 
          Roa   0.0119   0.0053 
                            (0.0196)   (0.0206) 
Relationship controls       
          Amount   0.0568**   0.0560** 
   (0.0231)   (0.0227) 
          Collateral   −0.0172   −0.0052 
   (0.0306)   (0.0305) 
          Oldest   −0.0218   −0.0216 
   (0.0220)   (0.0218) 
Type of loan       
          Overdraft   0.1433*   0.1553* 
   (0.0799)   (0.0812) 
          Factoring   0.7732***   0.7853*** 
   (0.0768)   (0.0775) 
          Term loans   −0.0340   −0.0340 
   (0.2029)   (0.2052) 
          Leasing   0.1148   0.1203 
   (0.1022)   (0.1030) 
          Export loans   −0.1606   −0.1554 
   (0.1050)   (0.1045) 
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 




Effect of bank ownership on Risk provision 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on bank−firm risk relationship. The dependent variable is Risk provision. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, 
column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a 
constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post 0.0020 0.0008 −0.0047 −0.0069 −0.0057 −0.0088 
 (0.0153) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0197) (0.0112) (0.0116) 
Government * Post    -0.0195 −0.0136 −0.0123 
    (0.0203) (0.0094) (0.0085) 
Bank controls       
          Size   0.0148**   0.0142** 
    (0.0061)   (0.0058) 
          Credit assets   −0.0494**   −0.0227 
                            (0.0242)   (0.0197) 
          Equity   0.1100**   0.1081** 
    (0.0437)   (0.0411) 
          Roa   −0.0026   −0.0022 
                            (0.0019)   (0.0019) 
Relationship controls       
          Amount   0.0018   0.0018 
   (0.0028)   (0.0028) 
          Collateral   −0.0075*   −0.0082* 
   (0.0041)   (0.0042) 
          Oldest   0.0037   0.0037 
   (0.0027)   (0.0027) 
Type of loan       
          Overdraft   −0.0013   −0.0020 
   (0.0087)   (0.0089) 
          Factoring   −0.0240***   −0.0247*** 
   (0.0046)   (0.0049) 
          Term loans   0.0306   0.0306 
   (0.0263)   (0.0264) 
          Leasing   0.0032   0.0029 
   (0.0126)   (0.0127) 
          Export loans   −0.0006   −0.0009 
   (0.0062)   (0.0063) 
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 




Exposure measure – Affected countries 
This table shows two tests on the impact of a group of foreign banks on credit rating measures. Using Laeven and Valencia (2012), we distinguish foreign banks 
where the parent is from any country where the financial crisis started in 2007 or 2008 (variable Affected). In columns (1) to (3), our dependent variable is Risk 
assessment. In columns (4) to (6), our dependent variable is Risk provision. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where 
the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and post-period. All regressions include bank fixed 
effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated 
using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to 
one, five and ten percent level of significance. 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Affected * Post −0.9337*** −0.4988*** −0.5525*** 0.0503*** 0.0124 0.0125 
 (0.1009) (0.0703) (0.0892) (0.0138) (0.0080) (0.0081) 
Foreign * Post 0.6822*** 0.2475*** 0.2866*** −0.0569*** −0.0179* −0.0212** 
 (0.1454) (0.0776) (0.0959) (0.0196) (0.0094) (0.0087) 
Government * Post 0.2332* 0.2023*** 0.2152*** −0.0195 −0.0135 −0.0123 
 (0.1177) (0.0581) (0.0543) (0.0203) (0.0094) (0.0085) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loan No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 




Exposure measures – Affected & assisted banks 
This table shows two tests on the impact of a group of foreign banks on credit rating measures. Using Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset, we also distinguish 
foreign banks where the parent received assistance in its home country (variable Affected & assisted). In columns (1) to (3), our dependent variable is Risk 
assessment. In columns (4) to (6), our dependent variable is Risk provision. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where 
the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and post-period. All regressions include bank fixed 
effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated 
using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to 
one, five and ten percent level of significance. 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Affected & assisted * Post 0.0561 0.0587 0.0064 0.0274*** 0.0281*** 0.0344*** 
 (0.0545) (0.0444) (0.0523) (0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0054) 
Affected * Post −0.9618*** −0.5291*** −0.5555*** 0.0365*** −0.0022 −0.0037 
 (0.1053) (0.0808) (0.1019) (0.0097) (0.0074) (0.0072) 
Foreign * Post 0.6821*** 0.2469*** 0.2862*** −0.0569*** −0.0182* −0.0231** 
 (0.1454) (0.0774) (0.0953) (0.0196) (0.0096) (0.0091) 
Government * Post 0.2331* 0.2001*** 0.2145*** −0.0195 −0.0146 −0.0158* 
 (0.1177) (0.0582) (0.0566) (0.0203) (0.0096) (0.0085) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loan No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 





This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on bank–firm risk relationship when conducting a placebo test with a sample period before August 2007. In 
columns (1) to (3), our dependent variable is Risk assessment. In columns (4) to (6), our dependent variable is Risk provision. In specifications (1) to (6), the sample 
period goes from 2003:Q4 to 2007:Q2, where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one starting from 2005:Q3. All regressions include bank fixed effects. 
In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using 
OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, 
five and ten percent level of significance. 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post 0.2420*** −0.1026 0.0492 −0.0310*** −0.0039 −0.0053 
 (0.0647) (0.0729) (0.0641) (0.0084) (0.0057) (0.0055) 
Government * Post 0.0176 0.0047 −0.0758 −0.0006 −0.0009 0.0061 
 (0.1355) (0.0963) (0.0791) (0.0097) (0.0060) (0.0046) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loan No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,278,584 1,278,584 1,278,584 1,278,584 1,278,584 1,278,584 




Effect of bank ownership on Lending 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on credit supply. The dependent variable is Amount. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, 
column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All 
regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten 
percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.0814 −0.0802 −0.0139 −0.0080 −0.0317 0.0136 
 (0.1346) (0.0922) (0.0886) (0.1281) (0.0973) (0.1066) 
Government * Post    0.1590 0.1017 0.0828 
    (0.1205) (0.0776) (0.0774) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loan No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 1,497,217 







Composition effect hypothesis 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on bank–firm risk relationship after controlling for the composition effect hypothesis. The dependent variable is 
Risk assessment. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with three or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign, with a 
private domestic, and with a public bank in the pre- and post-period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and 
firm fixed effects, and the other columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard 
errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.3933*** −0.3889*** −0.3623*** −0.3269*** −0.3094*** −0.3125*** 
 (0.0971) (0.0620) (0.0522) (0.1133) (0.0674) (0.0551) 
Government * Post    0.1475 0.1725*** 0.1823*** 
    (0.0919) (0.0500) (0.0527) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loan No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects         
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              614,648 614,648 614,648 614,648 614,648 614,648 










This table shows two robustness tests on the impact of foreign ownership on bank–firm risk relationship. The dependent variable is Risk assessment. In column (1) 
to (3), we restrict the sample period from 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2, instead of 2005:Q3 to 2009:Q2, in order to focus the analysis after tensions in the European interbank 
market in August 2007. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one starting from 2007:Q3. In column (4) to (6), we restrict the sample period from 2007:Q3 
to 2009:Q2, where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one starting from 2008:Q3, in order to focus the analysis after the crisis in the US. Specifications 
(1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic 
or public) in the pre- and post-period. All regressions include bank fixed effects. In addition, column (1) and (4) include time and firm fixed effects, and the other 
columns include firmXtime fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank 
level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          
 
Sample period 2006:Q3 to 2008:Q2 
Post starts in 2007:Q3 
Sample period 2007:Q3 to 2009:Q2 
Post starts in 2008:Q3 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.1837** −0.1781*** −0.1728*** −0.1435 −0.1415** −0.1650*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0472) (0.0376) (0.1135) (0.0620) (0.0539) 
Government * Post 0.1301** 0.1228*** 0.1241*** 0.0575 0.0781 0.0580 
  (0.0600) (0.0355) (0.0316) (0.1123) (0.0648) (0.0597) 
       
Bank controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Relationship controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Type of loans No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Fixed effects       
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm Yes No No Yes No No 
Firm-by-time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
        
Observations              759,668 759,668 759,668 662,942 662,942 662,942 






Appendix Table 1 
List of foreign banks 
This table shows all the foreign investors present in the sample, their country and their average total assets for the pre- 
and post-period. Using Laeven and Valencia (2012), we show whether the foreign investor is included in the group of 
countries where the international crisis started in 2007 and 2008 (column Start 2007-2008). We also show whether 
the bank received assistance back home in 2008 and 2009, using Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset. 
Foreign investor 







2009:Q2) % change Foreign 
Start  
2007–2008 Assistance 
B. Nacion Argentina Argentina              93               99      0.06  1 0 0 
B. Provincia de Buenos Aires Argentina            155             165      0.06  1 0 0 
Marsau Uruguay Holdings Bahrain        4,500         6,830      0.52  1 0 0 
Merk Bermuda            148             215      0.45  1 0 0 
Bnp Paribas France      20,300       30,500      0.50  1 1 1 
Credit Agricole France            825         1,550      0.88  1 1 1 
Societe Generale France        2,090         6,490      2.11  1 1 1 
Deutsche Bank Germany        9,630       17,500      0.82  1 1 0 
WestLB Germany        3,230         4,180      0.29  1 1 1 
Sumitomo Mitsui Japan        1,250         1,410      0.13  1 0 0 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi Japan        1,540         2,280      0.48  1 0 0 
Morelia Luxemburg        5,140         6,100      0.19  1 1 0 
ABN AMRO Netherlands    178,000     200,000      0.12  1 1 1 
Rabobank Netherlands        5,680         7,610      0.34  1 1 0 
BPN Portugal            320             481      0.50  1 1 1 
Banif Portugal        1,760         1,890      0.07  1 1 0 
Korea Development Bank South Korea            779         1,480      0.90  1 0 0 
Korea Exchange Bank South Korea              83             162      0.95  1 0 0 
Santander Spain    132,000     202,000      0.53  1 1 0 
UBS Switzerland      26,500       21,400    (0.19) 1 1 1 
Barclays UK        2,600         6,010      1.31  1 1 0 
HSBC UK      81,200     112,000      0.38  1 1 0 
Nuevo Banco Comercial Uruguay            226             271      0.20  1 0 0 
Brascan US        1,220         1,100    (0.10) 1 1 0 
Cargil US            307             554      0.80  1 1 0 
Citibank US      51,800       49,800    (0.04) 1 1 1 
Deere & Company US        2,050         2,150      0.05  1 1 0 
JP Morgan US      12,400       14,100      0.14  1 1 0 







Appendix Table 2 
List of foreign banks that received assistance in their country of origin 
This table shows all the foreign investors present in the sample that received assistance in the post-period with further details on the type and main features of the 
intervention/resolution. Data is from Laeven and Valencia bank failure dataset. 
Name of parent bank Country Date of Intervention Type and main features of Intervention / Resolution 
BNP Paribas France 20-Oct-08 
On October 20th, 2008, the French government announced it would invest €10.5 billion of capital in the form of 
hybrid-subordinated debt in six of the largest banks. This was part of the €40 billion fund available for bank 
recapitalization. A total of 2.25 billion capital funds were made available for BNP Paribas. On March 31st, 2009, 
Société de Prise de Participation de l'Etat (SPPE), a French banking plan, purchased €5.1 bn of non-voting shares 
in BNP Paribas. These shares do not bear any voting right and are not convertible into ordinary shares. 
Credit Agricole France 20-Oct-08 
French government announced it would invest €10.5 billion of capital in the form of hybrid-subordinated debt in 
six of the largest banks. This was part of the €40 billion fund available for bank recapitalization. 3 billion for 
Credit Agricole. 
Societe Generale France 20-Oct-08 
The French government announced it would invest €10.5 billion of capital in form of hybrid-subordinated debt 
in six of the largest banks. This was part of the € 40billion fund available for bank recapitalization. 1.7 billion 
for Société Génerale. 
West LB Germany 8-Feb-08 
Emergency funding through the State of North Rhine Westphalia and the savings banks, majority owners. 
Savings banks’ association extended guarantees for €3bln. Merger discussions. 
ABN Amro Bank N.V. Netherlands 29-Sep-08 
On September 29, 2008, the three Benelux government announced capital support to Fortis NV. The three 
Benelux governments to jointly invest €11.2 billion to support Fortis: The Dutch government to invest €4 billion 
in Fortis Bank Nederland Holding in exchange for a 49% stake, the Belgian government to invest €4.7 billion in 
Fortis Bank NV/SA in exchange for a 49% stake. and the Luxemburg government to invest €2.5 billion in Fortis 
Banque Luxembourg SA by way of a mandatory convertible loan. Following conversion, Luxembourg will have 
a 49% stake in Fortis Bank Luxembourg, in addition to other rights. Following the Sept 29 announcement, the 
Dutch government announced on October 3, 2008, that it had replaced the planned capital injection with the 
outright purchase of Fortis Bank Nederland, Fortis Insurance Netherlands, and Fortis's holding in ABN Amro 
Holding NV. 
BPN Portugal 11-Nov-08 
On 11 November 2008, by Lei 62-A/2008, the government nationalized the capital stock of Banco Português de 
Negócios (“BPN”), which had run up accumulated losses of €700m and was facing an imminent breakdown of 
its ability to meet payments. 
UBS Switzerland 16-Oct-08 
On 16 October 2008, the Swiss authorities took a 9.3 per cent stake in UBS with a CHF6 billion capital injection. 
Swiss National Bank will provide an 8 yr. loan of $ 54 bn to set up SPV which will acquire UBS’ illiquid assets. 
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Name of parent bank Country Date of Intervention Type and main features of Intervention / Resolution 
Citibank USA 23-Nov-08 
On November 23rd, 2008, the U.S. government announced it would provide a package of guarantees, liquidity 
access, and capital to Citigroup. The US Treasury and the FDIC would provide protection against losses on an 
asset pool of approximately $306 billion of loans and securities backed by residential and commercial real estate 
and other such assets that will remain on Citigroup's balance sheet. As a fee for this arrangement, Citigroup would 
issue $7 bn of preferred stock with an 8% dividend rate. $4 bn of preferred will be issued to Treasury and $3 bn 
would be issued to the FDIC. The Federal Reserve would stand ready to backstop residual risk in the asset pool 
through a non-recourse loan. FDIC standard loss-sharing protocol: The guarantee is in place for 10 years for 
residential assets, 5 years for non-residential assets. Institution to retain the income stream from the guaranteed 
assets. The risk weighting for assets would be 20%.  Treasury also to invest $20 billion in Citigroup from the 
TARP in exchange for preferred, non-voting stock with an 8% dividend to the Treasury. No dividends on 
common stock. Citicorp to issue warrants equal to 10% of total preferred. Citigroup to comply with enhanced 
executive compensation restrictions and implement the FDIC's mortgage modification program. On February 
27th, 2009, it was further agreed that the Treasury would convert $25 bn worth of government-held preferred 
shares it already holds in the bank to common equity, so long as private investors contribute an identical sum, in 
a move to shore up the institution’s capital base. As a result, the U.S. Treasury would own 36 percent of 
Citigroup’s common stock and existing share shareholders would own approximately 26 percent of outstanding 
shares. The arrangement does not involve additional financial assistance from the Treasury. In addition, there 
was to be a reshuffle among the Board of Directors so that a majority of the Board would be comprised of new 
independent directors and this would be done as soon as possible. 




















We investigate how the strengthening of creditor rights affected corporate debt structure, 
collateral liquidity, and collateralization rate following the 2005 bankruptcy law in Brazil. 
Using a large dataset from the Brazilian credit registry, we find that secured debt usage 
increased 13 percentage points after the reform, together with a reinforcement in the use of 
more liquid collateral agreements. We document that the law had a varying effect across groups 
of borrowers with different amounts of collateral pledged before the reform. Firms previously 
pledging amounts of collateral in excess of the value of the loan could access credit with a 
much lower collateralization rate after the introduction of the law. However, the 
collateralization rate significantly increased for firms with lower-pledge levels, imposing an 
extra cost on them. We show that a multiple banking set-up may give such borrowers an option 
out of overcollateralization, as foreign-owned banks demanded substantially less collateral 
compared with domestic-owned banks after the reform. These results are robust after 
controlling for a wide variety of possibilities. 
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1 – Introduction 
On one hand, “one of the key channels through which financial development operates is 
by lowering the demand for collateral” (Liberti and Mian, 2010). On the other hand, protecting 
creditor rights, which is also linked with financial development, is documented as increasing 
secured debt use (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Levine, 1998, and 
1999; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007). In the light of these seemingly opposing views, 
we explore the role of collateral following the reforms in creditor rights sealed by the Brazilian 
bankruptcy law in 2005. 
The reforms brought by the bankruptcy law (Law 11,101/2005) significantly 
strengthened the rights of secured creditors by giving them a higher priority when it comes to 
accessing the assets of the bankrupt firm. The law also exempted certain specific classes of 
collateral from reorganization and liquidation proceedings. Thus, it allowed banks to bypass 
the lengthy judicial process for seizing and liquidating the collateralized assets of the defaulting 
firm. Exploiting the bankruptcy law in a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate its effect on 
corporate debt structure; on the use of collateral agreements with different liquidity levels; and 
on the amount of collateral pledged  by a firm in order to access new credit. 
We have the right setting and the appropriate data for testing the effects of the Brazilian 
creditor rights reform. We use a panel data sample from the Brazilian credit registry, which 
consists of quarterly credit data for more than 790,000 firms from 2004:Q1 to 2005:Q4, where 
firms must be observed in the pre- and post-period. Overall, there are more than 5.2 million 
firm–time observations. The data allows us to identify banks, firms, loans, and collateral 
information over time. The unique quasi-natural experiment combined with the comprehensive 
dataset enables us to address the econometric identification challenges. 
Besides identification issues, any attempt to examine the link between the strengthening 
of creditor rights and collateral potentially suffers from omitted variables. We use a set of fixed 
effects (firm, time / firm–time and bank fixed effects) when defined as appropriate. We also 
include a set of time-varying firm, bank and firm-bank level controls, depending on the 
regressions. Since the residuals may be correlated across different dimensions of the data, we 
base ourselves on Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), in order to cluster standard errors 
at the appropriate level. 
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More than 80% of the total loan amount granted in Brazil was classified as unsecured 
credit in 20041. We find that Secured debt increased by an estimate of 13 percentage points 
after the reform. This goes in line with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998), Levine (1999), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), who document higher secured 
creditor rights with an increase in secured debt. Results are robust when we control for time-
varying firm characteristics. We test the robustness of our findings for sample periods of five 
and six quarters after the change in the law. The results suggest that a larger sample after the 
changed law also captures the change in collateral pledge. We also test whether the reform did 
start affecting Secured debt before the bankruptcy law’s publication, and we find evidence that 
this is the case. 
Following the increase in Secured debt, we document that the law increased the use of 
all types of security interests. By providing lenders with a higher priority in the distribution of 
credit claims, the reform allowed a broader class of assets to be pledged. Specifically, we find 
evidence that the law had a higher effect on the use of more liquid collateral agreements. We 
distinguish three groups of collateral agreements, depending on the ease with which the lender 
could repossess and sell the assets. Collateral with the least level of liquidity includes 
agreements in which the lender has only indirect possession on pledges of fixed assets. Indirect 
possession requires the bank to obtain court approval to repossess and sell the asset. In the case 
of firm liquidation, assets under this category are automatically set as part of the pool of assets 
in the bankruptcy petition and the bank can no longer exercise its rights. We find that the use 
of Collateral with indirect possession increased by one percentage point after the reform. 
A more liquid agreement for using fixed assets as collateral is achieved by transferring 
the direct possession of the asset to the lender. This form of agreement is the fiduciary lien. 
The new law exempted creditors that have taken collateral in the form of fiduciary lien from 
the bankruptcy procedure that would affect all other secured and unsecured debt. However, the 
law also restricted the repossession of assets considered as core-assets2. In this case, the judge 
would still need to set the appropriate time in order to ensure the recovery of the firm before 
                                                 
1 According to Erel (2011), the fraction of loans not collateralized in US was 25% in a sample of loan from the 
Survey of Term of Business Lending for the time period from 1987 to 2003. 
2 Core assets are essential property of a business without which a business would dissolve, since the company 
cannot carry on with its profit-making activities. The judge is the one that determines whether an asset is a core-
asset depending on the type of business. Examples could include vehicles, equipment, machinery, industrial 
plants, land, etc... 
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the bank can repossess and sell the assets. We find that the use of Collateral with direct 
possession increased by four percentage points after the reform. 
The evidence we find is a significant increase on the use of Highly liquid collateral. This 
type includes credit claims under fiduciary cession agreement of credit rights and rights over 
banking accounts (e.g. checks, fixed income investments, shares, debentures, deposits, and 
promissory notes). Because of the fiduciary feature, the bank has direct possession of credit 
claims under Highly liquid collateral. Hence, this category represents a “put option” for banks, 
which can be exercised when the borrower defaults on a loan. Moreover, the bank will not need 
to integrate the bankruptcy pool of creditors. We find that the use of Collateral with direct 
possession increased by eight percentage points after the reform. 
 Using a subsample of loans with information on Collateralization rate – the amount of 
collateral pledged divided by loan amount – we document that the Collateralization rate is 
very heterogeneous among firms in Brazil3. Additionally, banks tend to fully or over-
collateralize their credit positions. We show that a reform that strengthens secured creditor’s 
rights has a mixed effect on borrowers, depending on their previous level of collateral pledged. 
Collateral pledge significantly decreases for those borrowers who previously had to pledge 
amounts in excess of the value of the loan, and it significantly increased for those borrowers 
with a lower level of collateral pledged before the reform. We test the robustness of our 
prediction on a placebo, and confirm that the law had a standardization effect on banks’ lending 
policy. 
 Strengthening creditor rights reduces borrowing costs and thus relaxes financial 
constraints, but it can also impose an extra cost on borrowers (Vig, 2013). We show that firms 
negatively affected by the reform might be able to undo the extra burden of having to pledge 
more collateral. We find evidence that borrowers in a multiple banking setup could at least 
mitigate the effect of the reform by contracting with foreign-owned banks. Our findings are 
based on a powerful identification within borrowers in order to disentangle the bank’s demand 
for security interests from the firm’s supply of collateralizable assets. Using a differences-in-
differences methodology in an analogous manner as in Khwaja and Mian (2008), we test the 
demand of foreign banks for collateral in a sample of firms that could be harmed by the changes 
brought by the creditor rights reform. 
                                                 
3 We find that the effect of the law concerning the demand for collateral was homogeneous across groups of firms 
with different levels of default risk. 
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Next, we test the demand of foreign banks for Secured credit in the whole sample of 
firms with multiple bank relationships. Both tests confirm that foreign banks demanded less 
collateral from their borrowers than domestic banks did after the reform. We consider a number 
of robustness tests and alternative explanations that may fully or partially account for the results 
reported. As we already exclude loans involving resources other than the bank’s, we focus on 
controlling for portfolio reallocations and borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders. In all 
settings, results continue to hold, suggesting that the main findings are not driven by any of the 
raised possibilities. Results are robust to different event windows. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature that empirically tests the effect 
of the strengthening of creditor rights on collateral pledge at both the macro-level (i.e. focusing 
on corporate debt structure) as well as at the micro-level (i.e. analyzing the collateralization 
rate of new loans). We also provide the first paper in the literature that documents the effect of 
a creditor rights reform on collateral agreements with different liquidity levels. Besides Beck, 
Ioannidou and Schafer (2012), this is the only paper that properly disentangle a firm’s supply 
of collateralizable assets from bank’s demand for its security interests. With a sample of firms 
with multiple banking relationships, we are able to examine the demand of competing banks 
for collateral. Although the role of foreign banks is controversial because they might displace 
local lending, thereby tightening a firm’s overall access to credit (Bruno and Hauswald, 2014), 
our paper documents foreign banks as catalysts for financial development. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section examines the related 
literature in the field and sets our predictions. Section 3 discusses the reforms brought by the 
Brazilian bankruptcy law. Section 4 presents the dataset and the main descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 documents our empirical analysis, including the model we propose to overcome the 
current challenges, our main findings, as well as a battery of robustness tests. Finally, Section 
6 concludes with the main messages of the paper. 
 
2 – Literature review 
Credit rationing originates from the presence of informational asymmetries. Since 
collateral is expected to have a mitigating effect on informational asymmetries, collateral may 
solve the credit-rationing problem (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). One category of 
theoretical models considers collateral as a screening device, which reduces the adverse 
selection problem. In this case, collateral has a signaling role, where the willingness of the firm 
to pledge security interests positively influences the quality of the loan, as perceived by the 
112 
 
bank (Bester, 1985, 1987). From this stream of literature, it is concluded that, in equilibrium, 
low-risk borrowers would pledge more collateral than high-risk borrowers.  
Another category of theoretical models considers collateral as an incentive device, 
reducing the moral hazard problem (Boot et al. 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1994). Collateral can 
be a means of preventing high-risk firms switching from a lower to a higher risk project, or 
from making less effort to develop the project, given the possibility of losing the collateral 
pledged. Their theories predict the opposite, namely, high-risk borrowers would pledge more 
collateral than low-risk borrowers. 
Strengthening creditor rights reduces borrowing costs and thus relaxes financial 
constraints. The economic justification for stronger creditor rights is that the space for debt 
contracts can be expanded between the borrower and the lender (Vig, 2013). The reduction in 
the cost of borrowing may come from the moral hazard channel since stronger creditor rights 
mitigate borrower’s misbehavior. However, the lower cost of borrowing incentivizes firms to 
signal themselves by pledging more collateral. Thus, high-risk firms and low-risk firms would 
pledge more collateral after a creditor rights reform. This goes in line with La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Levine (1999), Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), 
who document higher secured creditor rights with an increase in secured debt. 
This leads us to our first prediction. 
Prediction 1. A reform that strengthens secured creditor rights would cause secured debt to 
increase  
Few studies explicitly make the distinction among different types of collateral. Chan and 
Kanatas (1985) distinguish between inside collateral (belonging to the business) and outside 
collateral (personal guarantees). The difference between these two types is the higher implicit 
value of personal collateral as a discipline device. The likelihood that the borrower will feel 
personal loss is higher when granting personal collateral. Liberti and Mian (2010) make a 
distinction between firm-specific (firm inventory/machinery, equipment, and account 
receivables) and non-firm-specific assets (land and Real State, bonds and shares). The authors 
find that there is a strong tendency for the composition of collateral assets to shift from firm 
specific to non-firm specific assets when loan risk increases. One of the reasons might be that 
the value of firm-specific assets diverts more between the lender and the borrower, compared 
with non-firm specific assets. 
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Vig (2013) distinguishes assets used as collateral according to their tangibility (fixed 
assets). Vig (2013) shows that strengthening secured creditor rights increases secured debt 
capacity and lowers the cost of borrowing, but it also exposes firms to the threat of being 
prematurely liquidated. Here we see a substitution effect, where a standard secured debt 
contract may lead to inefficient liquidations when firms value continuation. For this reason, 
firms that value continuation will have a higher implicit value for core assets (more associated 
with fixed assets) compared with non-core assets (more associated with liquid assets). 
Ceteris paribus, firms will prefer to pledge non-core assets, given the threat of being 
prematurely liquidated. On the other hand, if banks can mitigate moral hazard by using any 
asset as collateral, they will prefer to demand liquid assets, in order to recover as smoothly as 
possible any loss from debtor default. If non-core assets are liquid assets with a market value 
accepted by both parties (no implicit value), the use of such assets would constitute a Pareto 
improvement, as it makes none of the parties worse off. Firms would be able to access credit 
pledging collateral with assets that do not compromise its profit-making activities, and banks 
could mitigate moral hazard with assets easy to repossess and sell at market value. This brings 
us to our second prediction. 
Prediction 2. Better protection of creditor rights increases the demand for collateralizable 
assets, in particular for the more liquid types of security interests. 
The empirical work seems to confirm that collateral plays a disciplinary role in the 
behavior of borrowers (Berger and Udell, 1995; Brick and Palia, 2007), thus solving the moral 
hazard problem. In contrast, Lehmann and Neuberger (2001) and Jimenez et al. (2006) suggest 
a signaling value of collateral, which would solve the adverse selection problem. Nevertheless, 
Cressy and Toivanen (2001) find no significant relationship between risk and the pledging of 
collateral. One explanation for the inconsistency of these empirical researches might be the 
endogeneity issue of collateral and risk, since borrowers who provide more guarantees receive 
a better rating (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009).  
Strengthening creditor rights reduces borrowing costs and thus relaxes financial 
constraints, but it can also impose an extra cost on certain borrowers (Vig, 2013). In analyzing 
the effect of a reform in creditor rights, instead of distinguishing borrowers by their risk4, given 
                                                 
4 Following the literature that analyses collateral pledge for firms with different risk levels, we tested predictions 
(1) and (3) by differentiating groups of firms with opposing default risk probabilities. In one sample we select 
Low-risk firms, which have an average rating equal or above the 75th percentile among all lenders before 
2005:Q1 and zero otherwise. In the other sample, we select High-risk firms, which have an average rating equal 
or below the 25th percentile among all lenders before 2005:Q1 and zero otherwise. By running our specifications 
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the endogeneity problems, firms could be differentiated according to the amount of collateral 
pledged before the reform. A firm can pledge a certain level of collateral (high or low) in a 
disciplinary and in a signaling role. Such an approach would aim at comparing the level of 
collateral pledged by the same firm, before and after a reform, and would allow for both moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems to coexist. 
If banks value collateral more, they may standardize a level of collateral. This can create 
an extra cost that would be enforced on those firms that had a lower level of collateral pledged 
before the reform. Borrowers who were signaling with lower levels of collateral will incur an 
extra cost to signal their quality to the bank, while borrowers who were pledging lower levels 
of collateral as a disciplinary measure will bear an extra cost simply to comply with their 
original agreement.  
This leads us to our third prediction. 
Prediction 3. A reform that strengthens secured creditor rights has a mixed effect on borrowers, 
depending on their previous level of collateral pledged. Collateral pledge would decrease for 
those borrowers who previously had to pledge collateral that exceeded the value of the loan 
(firms that are better off); and it would increase for those borrowers with a lower level of 
pledged collateral before the reform (firms possibly worse off and then facing additional cost). 
The truth is that firms are not eager to pledge collateral. First, there is the risk of losing 
the collateral pledged in the case of default. Second, firms incur other costs, such as making 
additional reports to financial institutions, or agreeing on more restrictive asset usage (Coco, 
2000). Third, the entrepreneur incurs a loss of welfare due to restrictions on selling the asset. 
Forth, pledging collateral limits the firms’ ability to obtain future loans from other lenders. In 
this last drawback, the lending bank is put in a position of power (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 
2009).  
Banks can also ask for more collateral than necessary, in an effort to build a ‘quasi-
monopoly’ position with each borrower. This strategy works as a barrier-to-entry for other 
banks (Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). For firms with multiple bank relationships that feel 
threatened by a reform in creditor rights (e.g. the main bank demands a higher amount/degree 
of collateral in order to extract rents), one alternative in order to maintain the balance between 
                                                 
for Low-risk firms and High-risk firms, we find that the impact of the law was homogeneous between these two 
groups of firms. We also differentiate Low-risk firms and High-risk firms by the median of the average rating of 
the firm with all lenders before 2005:Q1, but results continue to hold. 
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credit supply and the demand for collateral might be found within their own multiple banking 
setup. 
Bank ownership is one dimension that might differentiate a bank with regard to its 
lending techniques and loan pricing models. Using a sample of Bolivian firms that borrow from 
domestic and foreign banks, Beck, Ioannidou and Schafer (2012) show that foreign banks grant 
loans with lower interest rates and shorter maturity and are more likely to demand collateral 
than domestic banks. According to the authors, foreign banks have a more transaction-based 
lending technique, basing their prices on credit ratings and collateral pledges. Domestic banks 
have a more relationship-based lending technique, pricing according to length, depth and 
breadth of the relationship with the borrower. 
This brings us to prediction 4. 
Prediction 4: For firms that value multiple relationships and could be made worse off by a 
strengthening of creditor rights, domestically-owned banks could be a strategic alternative to 
circumvent the extra cost imposed by the higher demand for collateral. 
 
3 – Creditor rights reform 
3.1 – Pre-reform 
 The old legislation regulating the Brazilian bankruptcy procedures, prescribing both 
reorganization and liquidation, was ineffective in maintaining the value of a firm’s assets and 
protecting creditors’ rights in liquidation.  
Concerning the reorganization process (the old term is concordata), creditors and debtor 
should be unanimous in the decisions regarding the restructuring procedures. In most cases, 
there were serious issues of collective enforcement problems arising from coordination 
failures. Additionally, creditors could not remove the debtor manager from office, which would 
not incentivize creditors to provide additional financing to potentially viable firms. The old law 
only postponed debt payments and with time, a firm’s restructuring plans would be turned into 
a bankruptcy liquidation. 
 Liquidation procedures were typically lengthy and costly. On average, resolving an 
insolvency case would take up to 10 years, mainly because of procedural inefficiency and lack 
of transparency. Figure 1 illustrates this dimension of inefficiency, comparing Brazil with 
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seven other groups of countries5. The figure shows that the average time to close a business in 
Brazil was more than twice the average for Latin America (Araujo et al., 2012).  As a result, 
assets would often be devalued over the course of the procedures. 
 The government attempted to improve creditor rights in 20046, allowing banks to 
repossess and sell assets under fiduciary lien7. In particular, we highlight the fiduciary cession 
agreement of credit rights and rights over banking accounts (defined in our paper as Highly 
liquid collateral), and fiduciary assignments on equipment, vehicles, real estate, and other asset 
claims (Collateral with direct possession). However, due to political uncertainty, the banking 
system was skeptical about the implementation of the law. There was considerable uncertainty 
about the ability of the court system to operationalize the law and whether assets under 
fiduciary lien agreements would be part of the pool of assets of the bankruptcy petition. 
Moreover, due to successor liability, which implied that in liquidation the debts of a 
firm were passed on to the new equity holders, firm assets were more likely to be sold 
piecemeal than jointly. This further reduced the proceeds from the liquidation. Furthermore, 
the bankruptcy priority rule was very punitive to secured creditors8. The old law specified the 
following order: first, labor claims; second, tax claims; third, secured creditors’ claims; and 
finally unsecured creditors’ claims and trade debts. 
 The inefficiencies that characterized the former bankruptcy procedures lead to 
significantly lower secured credit recovery values. The average recovery rate – expressed in 
cents per claim dollar that creditors are able to recover from an insolvent firm – was 0.2 cents 
on the dollar in Brazil before the new bankruptcy law (World Bank, 2005). Since this fact was 
known to creditors ex-ante, collateral was undervalued. Banks would either supply unsecured 
                                                 
5 Groups of countries include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), South Asia (SAS), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
6 Law 10.931 enacted in August 2, 2004. 
7 Under the fiduciary lien, the direct and indirect possession of the asset stays with the lender, and repossession 
could take place without the need of judicial court procedures (Araujo et al., 2014). 
8 The seminal paper by La Porta et al. (1998), titled “Law and Finance” ranked Brazil low in terms of creditor 
rights. Using an index that varies from zero to four, with higher scores, higher creditor rights, Brazil attained 
the score of one. The index is formed by “adding one when (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured 
creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a 
bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 





credit, substituting collateral by higher interest rates and lower maturity, or would supply 
secured credit, by demanding collateral in excess of the loan’s value. 
 
3.2 – Post-reform 
The new bankruptcy law (Law 11,101) was published in February 2005 and came into 
force in June of the same year. It was inspired by chapters 7 and 11 of the US bankruptcy code. 
It sealed the creditor rights reform that started in 2004 and increased the chance of viable 
businesses being restructured. 
The new law introduced a new reorganization procedure where the firm could enter into 
an extrajudicial reorganization, an out-of-court process close to the “pre-packaged bankruptcy” 
under the US code. A reorganization plan can be approved by the majority of creditors (60% 
of each class or group of creditors), instead of the need for the unanimous decision of all players 
involved. It is also possible for the firm to enter into a judicial reorganization, based on the US 
chapter 11, where creditors may remove the debtor manager from office and demand the 
appointment of new managers by the court. In order to give creditors incentives to provide 
additional financing for the reorganization of businesses, post-petition credits have priority 
over the assets in the debtor’s pre-petition estate. 
In the worst-case scenario, where the firm’s restructuring plan does not receive enough 
support from the creditors, a judicial reorganization is turned into a bankruptcy liquidation. 
With the new law, legislators aimed to foster the distress market and removed successor 
liability. Thus, claims remain as liabilities of the debtor and are no longer passed to the 
purchasers. This increases the value of distressed firms when sold in full or by business units 
(Ponticelli, 2014). 
In case of a bankruptcy procedure, secured creditors are now given a higher priority. The 
new law still prioritizes labor claims, but now it sets limits on the amount to be paid to labor 
debt, with the introduction of a cap of 150 times the monthly minimum wage9. Additionally, 
tax authorities lost their priority in relation to secured credit claims up to the limit of the 
encumbered amounts. The higher priority accorded to secured creditors increased their 
protection in exercising their creditor rights. 
                                                 
9 In 2005, the monthly minimum wage was R$300, which corresponds approximately at the time to US$100. 
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The law had a clear rule for assets under fiduciary lien. Both fiduciary cession agreement 
of credit rights and rights over banking accounts (defined in our paper as Highly liquid 
collateral), as well as fiduciary assignments on equipment, vehicles, real estate, and other asset 
claims (Collateral with direct possession) would be excluded from the pool of assets under the 
bankruptcy petition. In other words, the law exempted from the bankruptcy procedure that 
would affect all other secured and unsecured debt creditors that had taken collateral in the form 
of fiduciary lien. This was a novel provision of the law, which gave banks an extra incentive 
to use these types of guarantees. However, the law restricted the repossession of assets 
considered as core-assets10 under Collateral with direct possession. In this case, the judge 
would need to set an appropriate time to allow the recovery of the firm, before the bank could 
repossess and sell the assets. 
With the changes brought by the new bankruptcy law, banks could increase their 
recovery rate in the case of financial distress, and could evaluate ex-ante their likely recovery 
on each loan. Figure 2 illustrates the increase in the recovery rate after 2005, reaching 12 
percent at the end of that year11. In addition, the average time to close a business in Brazil has 
fallen from 10 to 4 years, reducing the depreciation of assets. The significant boost in the rights 
of secured creditors affected the use of collateral in the country. Banks increased their demand 
for secured credit, especially for more liquid types of collateral, and decreased the variation in 
collateral pledged by firms. 
 
4 – Data and descriptive statistics 
The primary database employed in this study is the credit registry from the Central Bank 
of Brazil, which contains specific information on bank–firm credit relationships. The dataset 
covers the period from 2004:Q1 to 2005:Q4, where we are able to follow loans, firms, and 
banks over time. Loans that each borrower has with banks operating in Brazil are registered 
above a threshold of 5,000 Brazilian Real (around 2,500 USD in December 2012). Data is 
available at quarterly frequency and is of very high quality since the total outstanding loan 
amount at the credit registry must match the bank’s quarterly accounting figures for credit loan. 
                                                 
10 Core assets are essential property of a business without which a business would dissolve, since the company 
cannot carry on with its profit-making activities. The judge is the one that determines whether an asset is a core-
asset depending on the type of business. Examples could include vehicles, equipment, machinery, industrial 
plants, land, etc... 




Central Bank ensures the quality of the data, and intermediaries use the credit registry as a 
screening and monitoring device for borrowers. 
In addition, we use collateral information on financial contracts also extracted from the 
credit registry. The benefit of a credit registry is that it allows creditors’ claims in secured assets 
to be easily verifiable by third parties. Secured assets need to be registered with a notary and, 
in most cases, cannot be pledged for different loan contracts. Banks are asked to send 
information on whether the loan is secured or unsecured at each quarter. In the case that a loan 
is secured, we have information on both the type of the security and its market value.  
Some drawbacks of the collateral database include the presence of a few gaps for banks 
that did not send all the quarterly collateral files. Moreover, banks might register just part of 
their secured portfolio in specific quarters. And furthermore, the information on the market 
value of the assets pledged by the banks as collateral is not always reliable. In order to mitigate 
these issues we perform several tests to detect absence of collateral information. Gaps on 
collateral information are seldom and more prominent in smaller institutions12. We employ a 
strategy where we consider a loan as secured if the loan is registered in the credit register as 
“secured” in any quarter of the whole dataset13. Finally, in order to study the amount of 
collateral pledged by the firm, we consider a sample of secured loans, where we keep just the 
first observation of each loan contract. 
We also obtained from Central Bank consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheet data 
with quarterly frequency of all the banks operating in Brazil. In addition, we have bank 
ownership and conglomerate information. After several checkups to ensure that the data is of 
high quality, we merge these different datasets using the public bank identification number.  
We keep all non-financial and private firms with outstanding credit in the credit registry. 
We exclude firms that do not appear throughout the sample period that goes from 2004:Q1 
until 2005:Q4. The sample of banks includes commercial banks and multiple banks with a 
commercial portfolio14. Furthermore, banks should appear in the pre- and in the post-periods. 
This partially controls for mergers and acquisitions among banks. We further control for M&A 
                                                 
12 Results are robust to dropping such institutions. 
13 Results are robust to considering loans secured only at the quarter we merge the loan files with the collateral 
files. 
14 The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is excluded from the sample given its particular objectives and 
operational differences, especially in its cost of funding and its long-term assets. 
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and rebalancing of the bank’s loan portfolio, since we can track whether each loan was initiated 
by the bank itself, or whether there is a new relationship with the acquirer bank. 
Table 1 shows the definitions of the variables used in testing each of the predictions. 
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
4.1 – Sample and variables for Prediction 1 
We select a sample of firms with outstanding loan amount before and after the reform of 
creditor rights. We keep firm observations if the firm appears in the pre-period for at least three 
out of the four possible quarters. The same applies for the post-period. Therefore, we keep the 
firm if there is a 75% minimum appearance throughout the sample period.  Results are robust 
to the loosening of such restriction.  
Loan amounts are aggregated at firm and quarter level. In this setting, we have 5,252,939 
firm–time observations for 796,582 firms. The dependent variable is Secured debt, defined as 
the ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by any type of collateral from borrower i in 
quarter t.  Table 2 – Panel A shows the summary statistics of Secured debt and all other 
variables used to test prediction 1. A firm’s debt structure was composed on average of 17% 
of secured debt before the law. After the law, the ratio of secured debt increased to 27% (0.10 
in the “Diff” column of Table 2 – Panel A). This is an economic and statistically significant 
change, as we can observe from the p-value of the T-test column.  
 
– Insert Table 2 here – 
 
From the overall sample, one can notice that the average firm debt was around USD 
17.000. Additionally, most of the firms had just one bank relationship. The participation of 
overdraft loans was around 40%, factoring 13%, term loans 9%, and leasing and export loans 
around 0.1%. The omitted category is regular loan. From the standard deviation measures, one 
can notice that there is extreme variability in the firm variables. Such firm differences can be 
correlated with the pledge of collateral, so we formally control for these variables in the 
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regressions analysis. It is important to recall that systematic differences across firms are 
controlled in the regressions by firm fixed effects. 
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of secured debt in the eight quarters of our analysis. At a 
first glance, the creditor rights reforms that started in August 2004 with the Fiduciary law and 
were sealed in February 2005 with the Bankruptcy law have increased the use of secured debt. 
It may be the case that collateral law matters more for credit market development than 
bankruptcy law (Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2008). Although the figure shows a high increase 
of secured debt by the third quarter of 2004, for the purpose of this paper we do not take a 
position on which law had a greater effect on the supply and demand for collateral. We rather 
analyze the complementary effect of both laws in the usage of collateral. 
 
– Insert Figure 3 here – 
 
4.2 – Sample and variables for Prediction 2 
The same sample selected for prediction 1 is used to test prediction 2. The three 
dependent variables in this setting are: 
 Highly liquid collateral, defined as the ratio of outstanding debt amount 
guaranteed by highly liquid collateral. Security interests in this category include 
checks, fixed income investments, shares, debentures, deposits, promissory 
notes, and other credit claims under fiduciary cession agreement of credit rights 
and rights over banking accounts; 
 Collateral with direct possession, defined as the ratio of outstanding debt amount 
guaranteed by collateral with the direct and the indirect possession of the lender. 
Security interests in this category include fiduciary assignments on equipment, 
vehicles, real estate, and other asset claims; 
 Collateral with indirect possession, defined as the ratio of outstanding debt 
amount guaranteed by collateral with the indirect possession of the lender. 
Security interests in this category include pledge on equipment, vehicles, real 
estate, mortgages of real properties and other asset claims. 
From Table 2 – Panel B we can see that a firm’s debt structure before the change in the 
law was composed, on average, by 8% of debt secured by Highly liquid collateral, 7% of debt 
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secured by Collateral with direct possession, and 1% of debt secured by Collateral with 
indirect possession. After the law was introduced, debt secured by Highly liquid collateral 
increased to 14%, Collateral with direct possession increased to 10%, and debt secured by 
Collateral with indirect possession increased to 2%. Figure 4 shows the dynamics of secured 
debt guaranteed by different types of collateral in the 8 quarters of our analysis. 
 
– Insert Figure 4 here – 
 
4.3 – Sample and variables for Prediction 3 
In order to test prediction 3, we select a sample of firms with secured loans before and 
after the reform in creditor rights. Since the information on the market value of the assets 
pledged by the banks as collateral is not always reliable, we consider only the first observation 
of each loan. Collateral value must be greater than zero, as we aim to test the intensive margin 
effect of the amount of collateral pledged by the same firm, before and after the reform. A loan 
is defined as a single firm–bank relationship. If a firm takes out several loans from the same 
bank at a given quarter, we aggregate all loans for this firm–bank pair. Additionally, each loan 
must have information on the following: loan amount, maturity, interest rate, credit rating, and 
type. The controls for loan type are the percentages of loans that are classified as overdraft, 
factoring, term loans, leasing, and export loans (Schnabl, 2012). The omitted category is 
regular loan. 
We differentiate firms depending on the amount of collateral they pledged before the 
reform15. We define the two groups of borrowers according to their previous Collateralization 
rate compared with the sample median Collateralization rate before the reform. The median 
Collateralization rate before the reform is one. Low-pledge firms are defined using a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if firm Collateralization rate before the law is equal or below 
one, and zero otherwise. High-pledge firms are defined using a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if firm Collateralization rate before the law is above one, and zero otherwise.  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of Collateralization rate and all other variables of 
both groups of firms used to test prediction 3. We can notice that the mean Collateralization 
                                                 
15 A firm can pledge a certain level of collateral (high or low) in a disciplinary and in a signaling role. As our 
approach aims at comparing the level of collateral pledged by the same firm, before and after a reform, it allows 
for both moral hazard and adverse selection problems to coexist. 
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rate for Low-pledge firms before the reform was 0.95. After the reform, the rate increased to 
1.09. High-pledge firms, on the contrary, had an extremely high Collateralization rate of 8.52 
before the reform. This rate came down to 5.85 after the reform.  
 
– Insert Table 3 here – 
 
Figure 5 shows the Kernel density estimate for Collateralization rate before and after the 
reform. For the purpose of a better visualization of the difference in distributions, we winsorize 
Collateralization rate at 95%. One can notice that the collateral pledged after the reform had a 
clear tendency to be concentrated. We confirm the non-equality of the distributions of 
Collateralization rate before and after the reform using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for equality of distribution functions. We interpret this as a first indication that the law had 
a standardization effect on the amount expected to be pledged by firms in order for a bank to 
grant a new loan. 
 
– Insert Figure 5 here – 
 
4.4 – Sample and variables for Prediction 4 
In order to test for prediction 4, we first use a subsample used to test prediction 3. 
Specifically we focus on Low-pledge firms since they that might have an extra cost in pledging 
more collateral after the reform. Specifically, we investigate the impact on the intensive margin 
on the same firm, at the same point in time, for foreign banks versus domestic banks. First, in 
a sample of Low-pledge firms, we test whether the demand of foreign banks for collateral 
increased more compared with domestic banks after the changes brought by the creditor rights 
reform. Next, in the whole sample of firms with multiple bank relationship, we test whether 
the demand of foreign banks for Secured credit increased more compared with domestic banks 
after the reform. 
In the analyses for Collateralization rate, we track 7,795 loans. Table 4 – Panel A shows 
descriptive statistics of Collateralization rate and all other variables for each group of banks, 
according to their ownership. Before the reform, the Collateralization rate was 0.98 for foreign 
banks, 0.89 for government banks and 0.78 for private domestic banks. After the reform, 
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Collateralization rate increased to 1.01 for foreign banks, 1.13 for government banks and 1.22 
with private domestic banks. 
 
– Insert Table 4 here – 
 
However, the validity of the identification strategy depends on a similar trend in the pre-
period of the variable Collateralization rate from foreign banks and other banks, conditional 
on all controls. The requirement for a similar trend only applies to how much foreign banks, 
private domestic banks, and government banks depart from their time-invariant component in 
the pre- and post-period. Data do not allow us to run ex-ante placebo tests. 
Figure 6 shows the Collateralization rate by bank ownership for Low-pledge firms. We 
can note that the change in the law had a greater effect on those with relationships with 
domestic banks. Before the law reform, collateral pledge with domestic banks was lower than 
that for foreign and government-owned banks, but after the law reform, this situation turned in 
the opposite direction, with domestic banks demanding higher levels of collateral compared 
with foreign banks.  It is interesting to note that for Low-pledge firms the lending policy of 
foreign banks remained constant after the reform. In any case, we document the preference of 
banks to fully or over-collateralize their credit positions after the reform. 
 
– Insert Figure 6 here – 
 
In the analyses for Secured credit, we track 5,252,939 loans. Table 4 – Panel B shows 
descriptive statistics of Secured credit and all other variables for each group of banks, 
depending on their ownership. Before the reform, the Secured credit was 0.29 for foreign 
banks, 0.14 for government banks and 0.33 with private domestic banks. After the reform, 
Secured credit increased to 0.35 for foreign banks, 0.24 for government banks and 0.51 for 
private domestic banks. Figure 7 shows the level of Secured credit by bank ownership. Again, 
domestic banks detach from foreign banks after the creditor rights reform. 
 




The differences in the means of Collateralization rate of government banks compared 
with foreign or with private domestic banks are statistically significant. The same applies to 
the means of Secured credit. The difference in means of relationship controls and bank balance 
sheet variables among foreign, private domestic, and government banks is statistically 
significant. For this reason, the need to include them as controls in the regression analysis. 
It is possible that both subsamples used to test prediction 4 are not representative of the 
population intended to be analyzed. As we select firms with multiple banking relationships, 
these firms are expected to be larger firms. As we do not know the public identity of the firm, 
their location, nor their industry, it is difficult for us to give an account of the importance and 
the direction of the selection bias. To the extent that medium and large firms represent almost 
65% of the Brazilian GDP in 200416, and that the non-exclusivity in banking relationship is the 
most controversial in the literature, the selection bias may actually be beneficial for our 
analysis. These are the situations where the firm may have a choice in deciding which bank to 
contract to, which is exactly what we want to capture in terms of collateral pledge. 
 
5 – Empirical analysis 
In this section, we empirically analyze the theoretical predictions laid out in Section 2. 
However, identifying a causal effect on collateral in the change to creditor rights poses 
important challenges. 
First, there is a lack of a common identification system for loans, their guarantees, and 
borrowers, making the matching of large samples difficult. We overcome this difficulty thanks 
to the richness of the dataset that allows us to identify banks, firms, loans, and collateral 
information over time. Given also the several loan characteristics the dataset possesses, we are 
able to observe the dynamics of each loan, whether it is secured or not, and the type of security 
interests pledged by the banks, among several other variables. Given the size of the overall 
sample, inferences are robust enough to enlighten our knowledge regarding collateral pledge.  
Second, any attempt to examine the link between the strengthening of creditor rights and 
collateral potentially suffers from omitted variables. We use a set of fixed effects (firm, time, 
firm–time, and bank fixed effects) when appropriate. Each of the fixed effects enables us to 
                                                 
16 Estimates are from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
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control for a dimension of unobserved heterogeneity that affects the dynamics of the collateral 
pledged. Moreover, we include time-varying firm, bank, and firm-bank level controls, 
depending on the regressions. These controls enable one to check the robustness of the findings, 
in particular whether the inclusion of other covariates reduces the estimated impact of the 
reform in the baseline model. Last, but not least, since the residuals may be correlated across 
different dimensions of the data, we base ourselves on Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 
(2004), in order to cluster standard errors at the appropriate level. 
Table 5 is the one that best captures the main identification strategies. We collapse the 
data into a single data point (based on averages) both before and after the reform. This results 
in two data points per unit of observation, one data point for the pre-reform regime and one 
point for the post-reform regime. This time-collapsing of the data ensures that the standard 
errors are robust to Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique17. 
 
– Insert Table 5 here – 
 
In Panel A, we report the before-after results for the variable Secured debt. As can be 
seen, Secured debt increased 9 percentage points after the reform. In Panel B, the dependent 
variables are Highly liquid collateral, Collateral with direct possession, and Collateral with 
indirect possession. As we can see, all classes of collateral agreements increased, in 
particularly, Highly liquid collateral with 6 percentages points. In Panel C, we report the 
opposite before–after results of the variable Collateralization rate for Low-Pledge firms and 
High-Pledge firms. In Panel D, we show that Collateralization rate for Low-Pledge firms after 
the reform changed less for foreign banks, with minus 14 percentage points in comparison to 
domestic banks (Government and private domestic banks). In Panel E, we show that Secured 
credit for firms with multiple banking relationships after the reform changed less for foreign 




                                                 
17 The Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) critique relates to serial correlation – the tendency for one 
observation to be correlated with those that have gone before – especially in differences-in-differences models. 
The simplest and most widely applied approach is simply to time-collapse the data. We believe that our number 
of bank clusters (>50 banks) does not cause biased standard errors or misleading estimates. 
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5.1 – Effect of the reform on corporate debt structure 
We begin with prediction 1, which states that a reform that strengthens secured creditor 
rights would cause secured debt to increase. The dependent variable is 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡, 
defined as the ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by any type of collateral of borrower 
i in quarter t. 
We then estimate the following regression: 
  
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
 
where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4 and zero 
otherwise. The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. We include firm and time 
fixed effects, respectively 𝛼𝑖, and 𝛼𝑡, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at each of both 
dimensions. 𝑖,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term. Since the residuals may be correlated across 
firms and across time, we cluster standard errors at the firm–time level. Vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 controls for 
a set of observable characteristics of firm i at time t, including the size of the debt, the number 
of lenders, and the weighted average rating. Vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 controls for loan type as percentages of 
loans that are classified as overdraft, factoring, term loans, leasing and export loans (Schnabl, 
2012). The omitted category is regular loan. In order to check whether the inclusion of 
covariates reduces the impact estimated for the reform in the baseline model, we also show 
estimates of equation (1) without vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 and without vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑡. 
Table 6 provides the main results of the baseline model, where we regress Secured debt 
on the reform of creditor rights. Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of the dummy Post on 
Secured debt in the period from 2004:Q1 to 2005:Q4. In column (1), we present the results of 
equation (1) suggesting that the reform had a strong effect on collateral pledge. The estimate 
of  Post  is positive, statistically significant and economically meaningful. The reform increased 
Secured debt by an estimate of 14 percentage points. Here, we include firm and time fixed 
effects, but do not control for time-varying firm characteristics.  
 




Results are also robust when we control for time-varying firm characteristics, as one 
can observe in column (2). Even when we control for loan type characteristics, results remain 
statistically and economically significant. The reform increased Secured debt by an estimate of 
13 percentage points. Regarding our firm controls, the higher the debt size the higher Secured 
debt will be, with an estimate of four to six percentage points – columns (2) and (3), 
respectively. However, an additional lender is estimated to have a negative effect of around 
three to four percentage points in Secured debt, whereas a change to a higher category in the 
credit rating scale has a negative effect of one percentage point. Concerning the type of loans, 
there is considerable heterogeneity on the estimated effect, relative to regular loans, on Secured 
debt. Term loans appear to be the most significant type of loan to positively influence Secured 
debt, with an estimate of 32 percentage points – column (3). 
We consider a number of robustness tests and alternative explanations that may fully or 
partially account for the results reported in Table 6. One argument could be that the sample 
period of four quarters in the pre-period and four other quarters in the post-period is not 
appropriate to understanding the long-run effect of reform. To address this concern, we test 
equation (1) for sample periods of five and of six quarters after the law changed. The results 
suggest that a larger sample after the change also captures the change in collateral pledge. 
Another argument, as discussed by Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2008), it that collateral 
law may matter more for credit market development than bankruptcy law. In our case, there 
are two laws in place. The Fiduciary law of August 2004 and the Bankruptcy law of February 
2005 that we consider as having a complementary effect. To address the concern that the effect 
of the first reform is the main cause of the increase in Secured debt, we test equation (1) where 
the reform takes place in 2004:Q3, with two quarters in the pre-period and two quarters in the 
post-period. Results suggest that this might be the case. Moreover, the exact content of the 
Bankruptcy law could hardly be anticipated before its publication, because of conflict of 
interest between the fiscal authority and the banking sector on the priority of credit claims and 
the several passages through the congress and the senate (Ponticelli, 2014). 
 
5.2 – Effect of the reform on collateral type 
In the case that a loan is secured, banks are asked to send information on what type of 
the security interest is being used as collateral. We group collateral agreements in three 
categories of liquidity, depending on the degree to which the assets can be possessed and sold. 
We define Highly liquid collateral, as the ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by 
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highly liquid collateral. Security interests in this category include checks, fixed income 
investments, shares and debentures, deposits, promissory notes, and other credit claims under 
fiduciary cession agreement of credit rights and rights over banking accounts. 
The second most liquid category of collateral agreements is Collateral with direct 
possession, defined as the ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by collateral under the 
direct and the indirect possession of the lender. Security interests in this category include 
fiduciary assignments on equipment, vehicles, real estate, and other asset claims. The least 
liquid type of collateral agreements includes Collateral with indirect possession, defined as the 
ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by collateral under the indirect possession of the 
lender. Security interests in this category include pledge on equipment, vehicles, real estate, 
mortgages of real properties, and other asset claims. 
As discussed in the Section 3, the law had a clear rule for assets under fiduciary lien. 
Assets under Highly liquid collateral and under Collateral with direct possession would be 
excluded from the pool of assets under the bankruptcy petition. This gave banks an extra 
incentive to use these types of guarantees, in special of Highly liquid collateral, because of the 
absence of repossession restrictions in case of firm liquidation. We run equation (1) for these 
three different dependent variables. All the controls are kept the same for prediction 2. 
Table 7 decomposes the impact of the Brazilian creditor rights reform on secured debt, 
depending on the lender’s ability to repossess and sell the collateralizable assets. The dependent 
variable is Highly liquid collateral in columns (1) to (3); Collateral with direct possession in 
columns (4) to (6); and Collateral with indirect possession in columns (7) to (9). The reform 
increased the use of Highly liquid collateral by an estimate of eight percentage points. Columns 
(4) to (6) shows that the reform increased the use of Collateral with direct possession by an 
estimate of four percentage points. The last three columns of Table 7 show that the reform 
increased the use of Collateral with indirect possession by an estimate of one percentage point. 
 
– Insert Table 7 here – 
 
The differences in estimates between each combination of the results in columns (3), (6) 
and (9) are statistically significant. The law had an effect on the use of security interests, in 
particular on more liquid collateral agreements.  
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5.3 – Effect of the reform on collateralization rate 
Prediction 3 states that a reform that strengthens a secured creditor’s rights has a mixed 
effect on borrowers, depending on their previous level of pledged collateral. Collateral pledge 
would decrease for those borrowers who previously had to pledge extremely large amounts of 
collateral (firms better off); and it would increase for those borrowers with a lower level of 
pledged collateral before the reform (firms possibly worse off then having an extra cost after 
the reform). 
As banks value collateral more, they may standardize the level of collateral demanded. 
This can create an extra cost that would be enforced on firms that had a lower level of collateral 
pledged before the reform. Borrowers who were signaling with lower levels of collateral will 
have an extra cost in signaling their quality to the bank, and those borrowers who were pledging 
lower levels of collateral as a disciplinary measure will incur an extra cost simply to comply 
with their original agreement. 
The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 which is the value of the 
collateral to contract amount, winsorized on 98%/2% level of borrower i in quarter t. As 
discussed in Section 4, we define the two groups of firms according to their previous 
Collateralization rate. Low-pledge firms are firms who, before the reform, pledged, on average, 
an amount of collateral equal to or below the loan amount they received. High-pledge firms, 
on the other hand, are firms who, before the reform, pledged amounts of collateral that 
exceeded the loan amounts they received. 
The most saturated specification for Low-pledge firms and for High-pledge firms is: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 
            (2) 
 
where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4 and zero 
otherwise. The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. We also include firm–
time and bank fixed effects, respectively 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛼𝑏, controlling for unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity at firm level and unobserved time-invariant bank heterogeneity. 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. Since the residuals may be correlated across banks and across time, 
we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
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Vector 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 controls for a set of observable characteristics of firm i with bank b at time 
t, including the loan amount, loan maturity, loan spread, and loan rating. Vector 𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 controls 
for loan type as percentages of loans that are classified as overdraft, factoring, term loans, 
leasing, and export loans (Schnabl, 2012). The omitted category is regular loan. In order to 
check whether the inclusion of covariates reduces the impact estimated for the reform, we also 
show estimates of equation (2) without vector 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 and without vector 𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡. 
By using vectors 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡, instead of assuming that collateral is exogenous, our 
approach endogenizes for collateral using the jointness of several loan characteristics. Thus, 
we recognize that lenders do not consider each contractual agreement as an isolated debt 
contract feature. Instead, banks may simultaneously consider the whole contract features they 
can rely on. Brick and Palia (2007), and Cressy and Toivanen (2001) also consider this 
possibility. Our paper adds to this literature by applying firm and bank fixed effects, as we use 
a panel sample were we can trace the new loans of the same bank–firm combination over time. 
Therefore, we recognize important interrelated debt contract features including intrinsic 
characteristics of the relationship of the borrower with the lender. 
Table 8 shows the impact of the Brazilian creditor rights reform on Collateralization 
rate. Specifications (1) to (3) account for Low-pledge firms – Collateralization rate equal or 
below one in the pre-period (Post=0). In column (1), the estimate of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is positive, 
statistically significant and economically meaningful, showing that the change to the law 
increased the demand for collateral of Low-pledge firms by 17 percentage points. Here, we 
include bank, and firm–time fixed effects, but do not control for time-varying bank–firm 
characteristics. Results are also robust when we control for time-varying bank–firm 
characteristics, as one can observe in column (2). A conservative estimate of the effect of the 
law on Collateralization rate for Low-pledge firms is an increase of 12 percentage points, as it 
can be found in column (3), after we add controls for the type of loans.  
 
– Insert Table 8 here – 
 
Specifications (4) to (6) account for High-pledge firms – Collateralization rate above 
one in the pre-period (Post=0). For these firms, we document an opposite effect of the law 
reform that seems to have significantly decreased the Collateralization rate for firms that had 
been pledging amounts of collateral that exceeded the value of their loans. In column (4) the 
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estimate of 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is negative, decreasing the demand for collateral of High-pledge firms by 40 
percentage points. By adding time-varying bank–firm characteristics – column (5) – and type 
of loans – column (6), one can observe that the estimate of the law becomes more conservative, 
with an estimate of 36 and 25 percentage points, respectively. 
In order to test whether the results are biased because of the econometric design (e.g. 
focusing on the tails of the distribution before and after the law reform), we test prediction 3 in 
a placebo using a sample before the reform. The sample period goes from 2004:Q1 to 2004:Q4, 
where Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2004:Q3 to 2004:Q4, and zero 
otherwise. Although one can argue that there is a natural tendency of the data to move to the 
median of the sample from one period to the next, we do not find evidence in this direction.  
The economic significance of the estimates we find in Table 8 is strong and reinforce the effect 
of the strengthening of creditor rights on a bank´s lending policy standardization. 
Following the literature that analyses collateral pledge for firms with different risk levels, 
we tested predictions 1 and 3 by differentiating groups of firms with opposing default risk 
probabilities. We expected to find a heterogeneous effect of the change in the law on the 
different groups of firms, but we did not find evidence in this direction. Formally, we selected 
Low-risk firms that before 2005:Q1 had an average rating above the 75th percentile among all 
lenders. In the other sample, we selected High-risk firms, which before 2005:Q1 had an average 
rating equal to or below the 25th percentile among all lenders. By running specifications (1) 
and (2) for Low-risk firms and High-risk firms, we found that the estimates of Post are not 
economically and statistically significant between these two groups of firms. Results are similar 
when we test whether the estimates of Post for both groups of firms are different when setting 
Low-risk firms and High-risk firms by the median of the average rating of the firm with all 
lenders before 2005:Q1.  
 
5.4 – Effect of bank ownership on collateral pledge 
 
We begin testing prediction 4 by focusing on 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 for Low-
pledge firms. It may be the case that these firms in particular feel themselves in a worse off 
situation, given the extra cost in having to pledge more collateral after the reforms. Here we 
ask the question whether a certain bank-ownership type could be a strategic alternative to 
circumvent the extra cost imposed by the higher demand of collateral. 
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One challenge is the simultaneous nature of the bank and the firm behavior regarding 
securities interests. We completely capture any change in the supply of collateralizable assets 
at the firm level by using firm–time fixed effects controls, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡. This comes at the cost that one 
needs to constrain one’s analysis to those firms with multiple bank relationships at the same 
time. In our case, we constrain our analysis to firms having a relationship with one foreign and 
one domestic bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and post-period. We follow the 
intuition that domestic banks have an informational advantage over foreign banks, and in case 
of a legal change, foreign-owned banks would respond more strongly than domestic banks 
(Buch, 2003; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2009). The most saturated specification is: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 +
𝛾2𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡         (3) 
 
where vector 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 and vector 𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 continue being defined as in equation (2) and vector 𝐵𝑏,𝑡 
controls for a set of observable characteristics of bank b at time t, including size of the bank, 
ratio of credit assets, equity to total assets, and return over assets (Roa). Therefore, we are able 
to control for further bank and bank–firm specific determinants of collateral pledge not 
captured by the specified fixed effects. In order to check whether the inclusion of other bank 
and bank–firm covariates reduces the impact estimated in the baseline model, we also show 
estimates of equation (3) without vector 𝐵𝑏,𝑡 and without vectors 𝑊𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑏,𝑡. Last, but not 
least, since the residuals may be correlated across banks and across time (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004), we cluster standard errors at the bank level. 
 Given the market share of Brazilian government banks and their countercyclical 
behavior at given moments (IMF, 2012; Coleman and Feler, 2014), one hypothesis is that 
government banks behave in a more detached way, compared with private domestic banks. 
Therefore, we also estimate the following: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +




The coefficient of interest continues to be 𝛽1. In a difference-in-differences approach, 𝛽1 
captures the change in the demand for collateral, from the pre-treatment to the post-treatment 
period, for the treatment group (foreign banks) relative to the control group (private domestic 
and government banks in equation (3) and private domestic banks in equation (4)). A positive 
coefficient 𝛽1 would imply, all else equal, that foreign banks increased their demand for 
collateral compared with other banks. The numerical estimate of 𝛽1 captures the difference in 
the change of the demand for collateral between the pre- and the post-period induced by moving 
from the control group to the treatment group. 
The sample period is 2004:Q1 until 2005:Q4 (quarterly data). The quarter we split the 
sample is 2005:Q1, which takes into account the date the new bankruptcy law was published 
(February 2005). Therefore, we have four quarters before the exogenous event and four 
quarters after it. Nonetheless, we also formally test the models for a sample period of five and 
six quarters after the change in the law and the results do not change. The same applies when 
we test for the possibility that the enforcement of the law in June 2005 is the start of the post-
period. 
This is a powerful identification within borrowers which is used to disentangle the bank’s 
demand for security interests from the firm’s supply of collateralizable assets. The within-firm 
comparison fully absorbs firm-specific changes in the supply of collateralizable assets, 
enabling us to defend that the estimated difference in Collateralization rate can be attributed 
to differences in a bank’s demand for collateral. In order to reduce the risk that there is 
borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders (i.e. borrowers who borrow from a historically 
weak domestic bank try to compensate with a stronger foreign bank), we keep firm–bank 
relationship if it appears in the pre-period for at least three out of the four possible quarters. 
The same applies for the post period. Therefore, we keep the bank–firm relationship if there is 
a 75% minimum appearance throughout the sample period. Results are robust to the loosening 
of such restriction. 
In a summary, we identify the impact of the bankruptcy law on the demand for collateral 
by comparing the pre- and the post-patterns of Collateralization rate applied to the same firm 
by two or more banks, where the firm must have a relationship with one foreign and with 
another bank (private domestic or public). By using bank and firm–time fixed effects, bank and 
bank–firm level controls, the estimated difference in Collateralization rate can be plausibly 
attributed to differences in bank behavior, depending on their ownership. 
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Table 9 provides the first results of prediction 4. Columns (1) to (3) show the effect of 
the dummy Foreign interacted with Post on the demand for collateral. In column (1), we 
present the results of equation (3). The estimate of 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is negative, statistically 
significant and economically meaningful, showing that foreign banks demanded less collateral 
after the law when compared with domestic banks operating in the country. Here, we include 
bank, and firm–time fixed effects, but do not control for time-varying bank or bank–firm 
characteristics. Column (2) focuses on this comparison between foreign banks and domestic 
banks and estimates are increased from 15 percentage points in column (1) to 23 in column (2). 
In column (3), we include time-varying bank controls and results remain statistically and 
economically significant.  
 
– Insert Table 9 here – 
 
In columns (4) to (6), we include the estimates of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  and we still 
observe the more “passive” behavior of foreign banks in the post period compared now to the 
private domestic banks. Column (6) in Table 9 presents the preferred estimation providing an 
unbiased estimate of the demand of foreign banks for collateral. Ceteris paribus, the demand 
of foreign banks for security interests decreased by 24 percentage points compared with private 
domestic banks after the reform. Because specification (6) includes saturated fixed effects, and 
time-varying bank and bank–firm controls, it is unlikely that the results are driven by 
unobservable time-varying differences in borrower demand and quality. Neither are results 
driven by time-invariant bank heterogeneity, time-varying differences in bank’s structure, 
behavior or risk appetite; nor by time-varying differences in bank–firm relationship. 
We run equations (3) and (4) on the full sample of 80,035 loan observations for Low-
pledge firms and results continue to hold. The same applies when we test equations (3) and (4) 
for the full sample of 160,067 loans, including both Low-pledge firms and High-pledge firms. 
Another exercise we performed was to test whether the reform had a heterogeneous effect on 
the demand for different types of collateral by banks with different ownership. Using the 
dependent variables used to test prediction 2, we include the interaction of Post with Foreign 
and Post with Government. Results do not show statistically significant differences on the use 
of collateral agreements, with different liquidity levels across banks with different ownership. 
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We then test whether the reform that strengthens secured creditor rights causes secured 
credit to increase in a heterogeneous way, depending on bank ownership. To do this, we use 
the dependent variable 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑏,𝑡, defined as the ratio of outstanding credit amount 
guaranteed by any type of collateral of borrower i with bank b in quarter t. We formally estimate 
the following regression: 
  
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑏,𝑡 +
𝑖,𝑏,𝑡            (5) 
 
where vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 and vector 𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 maintain the same definition as in equation (1), but now as 
firm-bank-quarter level, and vector 𝐵𝑏,𝑡 controls for a set of observable characteristics of bank 
b at time t, including size of the bank, ratio of credit assets, equity to total assets and Roa. Given 
the presence of government banks, we also estimate the following: 
 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +
𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑌𝑖,𝑏,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐵𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑏,𝑡        (6) 
 
Table 10 provides the main results of specifications (5) and (6). Columns (1) to (3) show 
the effect of the dummy Foreign interacted with Post on the demand for Secured credit. The 
estimate of 7 percentage points for 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is strong evidence that foreign banks 
demanded less collateral after the law reform when compared with domestic banks. In columns 
(4) to (6), we include the estimates of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑏 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡, presenting our preferred 
estimations, which provide an unbiased estimate of the demand of foreign banks for Secured 
credit. Ceteris paribus, the demand of foreign banks for Secured credit decreased by 10 
percentage points compared with private domestic banks after the reform.  
 
– Insert Table 10 here – 
 
 Results may be driven by portfolio re-allocations, including the partial or full 
divestment of credit portfolios by smaller and weaker banks to bigger and stronger institutions. 
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As we are able to observe whether loans were acquired but not initiated by the bank itself, we 
are able to control for mergers and acquisitions among banks, including rebalancing of the 
bank’s loan portfolio. Results are robust to credit portfolio movements among banks. 
According to Central Bank’s financial stability reports, the major acquisition of a foreign bank 
was the purchase of the private-domestic bank Banespa by the Spanish bank Santander in June 
2004. We do not find evidence that the estimates for foreign banks are driven by the activity of 
these two banks. 
Another possible concern regarding the results is that there might be a borrower-
induced choice of multiple lenders (i.e. borrowers who borrow from a historically weak 
domestic bank, try to compensate with a stronger foreign bank). In order to reduce this 
possibility, we keep firm–bank relationship if it appears in the pre-period for at least three out 
of the four possible quarters. The same applies for the post-period. However, in order to test it 
in a stricter sense, we account for firms with three or more bank relationships, where the firm 
must have a relationship with one foreign, with a private domestic bank, and with a public bank 
in the pre- and post-period. Even in such a setting, results continue to hold, suggesting that the 
main findings are not driven by the possibility of borrower-induced choice of multiple lenders. 
Another possible issue is that there may be problems associated with using ratios as 
dependent variables in regressions, which may lead to incorrect or misleading inferences 
(Kronmal, 1993). In our case, the coefficients of Foreign and Government should be seen as 
measuring the joint effect of varying the secured loan amount and the total loan amount at the 
same time, on the same borrower, in comparison with private domestic banks. Collateralization 
rate and Secured credit in this case are the proxies we use to measure the demand for collateral. 
Therefore, we focus the analysis on a level variable, more specifically on the supply of credit 
instead of the demand for collateral. To this aim, we create the dependent variable Total 
lending, which is the natural logarithm of total loan amount of borrower i at bank b in quarter 
t. We find that the law had a homogeneous effect on lending from groups of banks with 
different ownership. Total credit is estimated to have increased 17% after the reform. 
Results suggest that a firm’s financial decisions about the allocation of security interests 
among creditors is strongly affected by the bank’s demand for those securities. In a possible 
strategy to mitigate risk by increasing the liquidation value of debt contracts, after the change 
to the law private domestic banks tended towards retaining more collateral. Foreign banks 
remained as an alternative for firms that wanted to maintain part of their debt structure as 
unsecured.   
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6 – Concluding remarks 
Lowering the collateral cost of capital may foster financial development. However, 
empowering creditors to enforce their right on collateralized assets is documented as increasing 
the demand for collateral. In this paper, we exploit the Brazilian bankruptcy law in a quasi-
natural experiment, and investigate its effects on three aspects of collateral. Namely, we focus 
on corporate debt structure (macro-level), on the use of collateral agreements with different 
liquidity levels, and on the amount of collateral pledged in order for a firm to access new credit 
(micro-level). 
We find that Secured debt increased by an estimate of 13 percentage points after the 
reform. Moreover, we document that the law increased the use of all types of security interests. 
In particular, we find evidence that the law had a bigger effect on the use of more liquid 
collateral agreements. Banks demand more liquid collateral because it may represent a “put 
option” for them, which can be exercised when the borrower defaults on a loan, with no need 
for the bank to integrate the bankruptcy pool of creditors. We also show that a reform that 
strengthens secured creditor rights has a mixed effect on borrowers, depending on their 
previous level of collateral pledged. Collateral pledge significantly decreases for those 
borrowers who previously had to pledge collateral in excess of the value of the loan, and it 
significantly increased for those borrowers with a lower level of collateral pledged before the 
reform. 
We show that firms negatively affected by the reform might be able to lighten the extra 
burden of having to pledge more collateral. We find evidence that borrowers in a multiple 
banking setup could at least mitigate the effect of the reform by contracting with foreign-owned 
banks. Our findings are based on a careful classification of borrowers in order to disentangle 
the bank’s demand for security interests from the firm’s supply of collateralizable assets. 
Although the role of foreign banks is controversial, our paper documents foreign banks as 
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Figure 1: Average length of insolvency procedures 
 




Figure 2: Creditor’s recovery rate 
 



















































The table presents the definition of variables used in the paper for each prediction. We use credit registry data, bank 
ownership data, and quarterly accounting information provided by the Central Bank of Brazil. 
Variable name Definition 
Panel A: Variables for prediction 1 – aggregated at firm level (borrower i in quarter t), unless otherwise specified 
Secured debt Ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by any type of collateral 
Post Dummy variable that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4, and zero otherwise 
Debt amount Log of outstanding debt amount, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Number of lenders Number of active lenders 
Overall rating Weighted credit rating, which varies from 10 (lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk). 
Overdraft Ratio of amount that is classified as overdraft 
Factoring Ratio of amount that is classified as factoring 
Term loans Ratio of amount that is classified as term loans 
Leasing Ratio of amount that is classified as leasing 
Export loan  Ratio of amount that is classified as export loans 
Panel B: Variables for prediction 2  – aggregated at firm level (borrower i in quarter t) 
Highly liquid collateral 
Ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by claims under fiduciary cession agreement of credit 
rights and rights over banking accounts 
Collateral with direct 
possession  
Ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by collateral with the direct and the indirect possession 
of the lender. 
Collateral with indirect 
possession 
Ratio of outstanding debt amount guaranteed by collateral with the indirect possession of the lender.  
Panel C: Variables for prediction 3 – aggregated at loan level (bank b with borrower i in quarter t), where we only consider the 
first observation of each contract 
Collateralization rate Ratio of the value of the collateral to contract amount, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Loan amount Log of contract amount, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Loan maturity Maturity of contract in number of days, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Loan spread Annual spread of loan contract (Interest rate – Selic target rate), winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Loan rating Rating assigned by the bank to the loan contract, which varies from 10 (lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk). 
Panel D: Variables for prediction 4 – aggregated at bank-firm level (bank b with borrower i in quarter t), unless otherwise specified 
Foreign Dummy variable that takes the value one if ownership control of bank in Brazil is from a foreign 
country, and zero otherwise 
Government Dummy variable that takes the value one if bank is public, and zero otherwise 
Low-pledge firms 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if firm Collateralization rate before the law is equal or below 
the sample median Collateralization rate, and zero otherwise 
High-pledge firms 
Dummy variable that takes the value one if firm Collateralization rate before the law is above the 
sample median Collateralization rate, and zero otherwise 
Secured credit Ratio of outstanding credit amount guaranteed by any type of collateral 
Credit amount Log of outstanding credit amount, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Bank rating Weighted credit rating, which varies from 10 (lowest risk) to 2 (highest risk). 
Oldest 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank b is the oldest bank of borrower i, and zero 
otherwise 
Size Log of total assets of the bank, adjusted by official inflation index, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Credit assets Ratio of credit assets to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 
Equity Ratio of equity to total assets, winsorized on 98%/2% level 




Descriptive statistics for prediction 1 and 2 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper for prediction 1 and 2. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period 
(Post=0) is the same as the mean of the post-period (Post=1). 
 Overall sample Mean 




Panel A: Variables for prediction 1 
 
Secured debt 5,252,939 0.22 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.10 0.00 
Post 5,252,939    0.51 1 0.50 0 1    
Debt amount 5,252,939    10.46 10.30 1.52 6.95 14.28 10.43 0.06 0.00 
Number of lenders    5,252,939  1.61 1 1.11 1 27 1.58 0.06 0.00 
Overall rating    5,252,939  8.07 8.5 1.77 2.00 10.00 8.27 −0.40 0.00 
Overdraft    5,252,939  0.40 0.30 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.02 0.00 
Factoring    5,252,939  0.13 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.13 −0.01 0.00 
Term loans    5,252,939  0.09 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Leasing    5,252,939  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export loan     5,252,939  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 
 
Panel B: Variables for prediction 2 
 
Highly liquid collateral    5,252,939  0.11 0.00 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.06 0.00 
Collateral with  direct possession     5,252,939  0.09 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.03 0.00 
Collateral with indirect 
possession 
   5,252,939  0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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Descriptive statistics for prediction 3 
This table presents the variables used for prediction 3 for both groups of firms (low-pledge firms and high-pledge 
firms). We show the mean before the reform and the additional difference after the reform. The t-test is used to test 
whether the mean of the pre-period (Post=0) is the same as the mean of the post-period (Post=1). 
 Low-pledge firms High-pledge firms 






Collateralization rate 0.95 0.14 0.00 8.25 −2.41 0.00 
Loan amount 10.57 0.13 0.00 10.79 0.13 0.00 
Loan maturity 147.18 6.53 0.00 162.35 25.10 0.00 
Loan spread 25.76 −5.10 0.00 35.72 −10.60 0.00 
Loan rating 8.20 −0.04 0.00 8.17 −0.04 0.00 
Overdraft 0.17 −0.09 0.00 0.41 −0.23 0.00 
Factoring 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.00 
Term loans 0.14 −0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.72 
Leasing - - - 0.00 0.00 0.32 
Export loan  0.00 -0.00 0.90 0.00 −0.00 0.51 
N. of observations 80,035 80,032 
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This table presents the variables used for prediction 4 for each group of banks. We show the mean before the reform 
and the additional difference after the reform. The t-test is used to test whether the mean of the pre-period (Post=0) is 
the same as the mean of the post-period (Post=1). 
 Foreign banks Government banks Domestic banks 









Panel A: Collateralization rate for banks 
Collateralization rate 0.98 0.03 0.00 0.89 0.24 0.00 0.78 0.44 0.00 
Loan amount 11.21 0.08 0.05 10.26 −0.10 0.15 11.21 0.10 0.05 
Loan maturity 150.00 −12.08 0.07 208.00 16.70 0.14 80.09 122.66 0.00 
Loan spread 19.14 −0.75 0.03 28.09 0.12 0.86 49.18 −23.51 0.00 
Loan rating 8.22 −0.03 0.25 7.19 0.08 0.31 8.04 0.29 0.00 
Size 24.49 0.02 0.47 24.45 0.01 0.58 24.67 0.54 0.00 
Credit assets 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.33 −0.01 0.00 
Equity 0.15 −0.02 0.00 0.07 −0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.42 
Roa 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.19 0.27 0.00 0.36 0.18 0.00 
Overdraft 0.09 −0.02 0.00 0.13 −0.07 0.00 0.80 −0.60 0.00 
Factoring 0.13 −0.03 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.48 0.03 0.37 0.00 
Term loans 0.13 −0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.36 0.02 0.04 0.00 
Leasing - - - - - - - - - 
Export loan  0.00 −0.00 0.19 0.00 −0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.30 
N. of observations 4,341 674 2,780 
Panel B: Secured credit for banks 
Secured credit 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.33 0.18 0.00 
Credit amount 11.42 0.06 0.00 11.19 −0.01 0.03 11.54 0.11 0.00 
Bank rating 8.67 −0.58 0.00 8.24 −0.52 0.00 8.54 −0.70 0.00 
Oldest 0.29 0.01 0.00 0.32 −0.00 0.05 0.32 0.01 0.00 
Size 24.43 0.18 0.00 25.94 0.03 0.00 25.12 0.15 0.00 
Credit assets 0.30 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.00 
Equity 0.12 −0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.08 
Roa 0.29 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 
Overdraft 0.41 −0.06 0.00 0.34 0.04 0.00 0.47 −0.03 0.00 
Factoring 0.11 −0.05 0.00 0.28 −0.02 0.00 0.19 −0.04 0.00 
Term loans 0.11 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11 −0.01 0.00 
Leasing 0.01 −0.00 0.53 0.00 −0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export loan  0.02 −0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.00 0.33 0.02 −0.00 0.00 

















































































































































This table introduces the basic empirical strategy for each of the predictions. Before refers to quarters from 2004:Q1 
to 2004:Q4 and after refers to quarters from 2005:Q1 to 2005: Q4. We next collapse the data into a single data point 
(based on averages) both before and after. This results in two data points per unit of observation, one data point for 
the pre-reform regime and one point for the post-reform regime. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 











Panel A: Prediction 1 (Unit of observation: Firm) 
          Secured debt 0.1663 0.2586 0.0923*** 1,593,032 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)  
Panel B: Prediction 2 (Unit of observation: Firm) 
          Highly liquid collateral 0.0758 0.1330 0.0572***  1,593,032 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)  
          Collateral with direct possession  0.0733 0.1027 0.0294*** 1,593,032 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)  
          Collateral with indirect possession 0.0075 0.0121 0.0046*** 1,593,032 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)  
Panel C: Prediction 3 (Unit of observation: Firm-bank) 
          Collateralization rate for Low-Pledge firms 0.9692 1.0852 0.1160*** 42,724 
 (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0020)  
          Collateralization rate for High-Pledge firms 1.6448 1.5636 −0.0812*** 45,232 
 (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0063)  
Panel D: Prediction 4 Collateralization rate for Low-Pledge firms (Unit of observation: Firm–bank) 
          Foreign banks 1.0066 1.0360 0.0291*** 2,026 
 (0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0055)  
          Government banks 1.1925 1.3124 0.1200*** 444 
 (0.0097) (0.0173) (0.0198)  
          Private-domestic banks 1.1349 1.3207 0.1858*** 1,532 
 (0.0097) (0.0134) (0.0165)  
          Difference (Foreign–Domestic)   −0.1419***  
   (0.0137)  
Panel E: Prediction 4 Secured credit for all firms with multiple banking relationships (Unit of observation: Firm–bank) 
          Foreign banks 0.2909 0.3438 0.0529*** 122,134 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020)  
          Government banks 0.1362 0.2257 0.0895*** 78,280 
 (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0019)  
          Private-domestic banks 0.3317 0.5108 0.1791*** 105,700 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0023)  
          Difference (Foreign – Domestic)   −0.0919***  




Effect of the reform on corporate debt structure 
This table shows the impact of the Brazilian creditor rights reform on Secured debt. The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. Post is a dummy variable that takes 
the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4 and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) to (3) account for all firms, where the firm must be present in the pre and in post sample period. All 
regressions include firm and time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on firmXtime level. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) 
Post 0.1434*** 0.1332*** 0.1294*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Firm controls    
          Debt size  0.0428*** 0.0593*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) 
          Number of lenders  −0.0321*** −0.0493*** 
                           (0.0002) (0.0002) 
          Firm rating  −0.0117*** −0.0092*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Type of loans    
          Overdraft   0.0343*** 
                            (0.0005) 
          Factoring   −0.2109*** 
   (0.0007) 
          Term loans   0.3187*** 
   (0.0012) 
          Leasing   −0.0572*** 
   (0.0055) 
          Export loan   −0.2036*** 
   (0.0072) 
Fixed effects      
          Time Yes Yes Yes 
          Firm Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations              5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 






Effect of the reform on collateral type 
This table decomposes the impact of the Brazilian creditor rights reform on secured debt, depending on the lender’s ability to repossess and sell the collateralizable assets. The 
dependent variable is Highly liquid collateral in column (1) to (3); Collateral with direct possession in columns (4) to (6), and; Collateral with indirect possession in column (7) to 
(9). The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) 
to (9) account for all firms, where the firm must be present in the pre- and post- sample period. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using 
OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on firmXtime level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten 
percent level of significance. 
                          
 
Highly liquid collateral 
 
 
Collateral with direct possession 
 
 
Collateral with indirect possession 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Post 0.0871*** 0.0845*** 0.0830*** 0.0468*** 0.0410*** 0.0389*** 0.0075*** 0.0062*** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Firm controls          
          Debt size  0.0203*** 0.0351***  0.0178*** 0.0174***  0.0028*** 0.0038*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          Number of lenders  −0.0235*** −0.0307***  −0.0084*** −0.0170***  0.0012*** 0.0006*** 
                           (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          Firm rating  −0.0039*** −0.0015***  −0.0062*** −0.0065***  −0.0010*** −0.0008*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Type of loans          
          Overdraft   0.0266***   0.0051***   0.0019*** 
                            (0.0004)   (0.0003)   (0.0001) 
          Factoring   −0.1276***   −0.0595***   −0.0096*** 
   (0.0006)   (0.0004)   (0.0001) 
          Term loans   −0.1192***   0.4337***   −0.0021*** 
   (0.0007)   (0.0010)   (0.0001) 
          Leasing   −0.0947***   0.0432***   −0.0020** 
   (0.0034)   (0.0045)   (0.0009) 
          Export loan   −0.1426***   −0.0428***   −0.0153*** 
   (0.0058)   (0.0039)   (0.0012) 
Fixed effects          
          Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations              5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 5,252,939 






Effect of the reform on collateralization rate 
This table shows the impact of the Brazilian creditor rights reform on Collateralization rate. The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. Post is a dummy variable 
that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) to (3) account for Low-pledge firms defined by firm Collateralization rate equal or below 
the sample median in the pre-period (Post=0). Specifications (4) to (6) account for High-pledge firms defined by firm Collateralization rate above the sample median in the pre-
period (Post=0). Specification (1) to (6) accounts for loans, where the relationship of the firm and the bank must be present in the pre- and post-sample period. All regressions include 
bank and firm-by-time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant, and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors 
appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance.  






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 0.1673*** 0.1405*** 0.1222*** −0.4045*** −0.3579*** −0.2472*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0586) (0.0673) (0.0670) 
Relationship controls       
          Loan amount  −0.0992*** −0.1069***  −0.5716*** −0.5552*** 
   (0.0170) (0.0188)  (0.0353) (0.0350) 
          Loan maturity  0.0002*** 0.0003***  0.0010*** 0.0016*** 
                           (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
          Loan spread  −0.0064*** −0.0075***  −0.0012* −0.0062*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0007)  (0.0007) (0.0009) 
          Loan rating  0.0031 0.0305***  0.3279*** 0.2946*** 
  (0.0053) (0.0056)  (0.0286) (0.0286) 
Type of loans       
          Overdraft   −0.0801   0.9807*** 
                            (0.0599)   (0.0648) 
          Factoring   −0.3488***   0.7462*** 
   (0.0332)   (0.1459) 
          Term loans   −0.1832***   −0.2824*** 
   (0.0390)   (0.0825) 
          Leasing   0.0000   −1.4818*** 
   (.)   (0.2800) 
          Export loan   −0.1434***   0.0697 
   (0.0488)   (0.6241) 
Fixed effects       
          Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Firm-by-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations              80,035 80,035 80,035 80,032 80,032 80,032 





Effect of bank ownership on collateralization rate for Low-pledge firms 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on Collateralization rate for firms with a Collateralization rate before the law reform equal or below the sample median. The 
sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) to (6) 
account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and post- 
period. All regressions include bank and firm-by-time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on 
bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.1521** −0.2339*** −0.1969*** −0.1529* −0.2685*** −0.2380*** 
 (0.0668) (0.0405) (0.0348) (0.0874) (0.0504) (0.0318) 
Government * Post    −0.0039 −0.1169** −0.1297*** 
    (0.0922) (0.0543) (0.0427) 
Relationship controls       
          Loan amount  −0.0354*** −0.0339***  −0.0355*** −0.0341*** 
  (0.0072) (0.0074)  (0.0071) (0.0073) 
          Loan maturity  0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
          Loan spread  −0.0016** −0.0015***  −0.0015** −0.0014*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0005)  (0.0006) (0.0005) 
          Loan rating  0.0105 0.0119  0.0102 0.0110 
  (0.0093) (0.0099)  (0.0095) (0.0099) 
Type of loans       
          Overdraft  0.0242 0.0337  0.0338 0.0435 
                           (0.0381) (0.0367)  (0.0340) (0.0343) 
          Factoring  −0.3829*** −0.3612***  −0.3895*** −0.3674*** 
  (0.0477) (0.0367)  (0.0499) (0.0381) 
          Term loans  −0.0502 -0.0423  −0.0490 −0.0403 
  (0.0307) (0.0270)  (0.0307) (0.0273) 
          Export loan  −0.0419 −0.0814  −0.0479 −0.0875 
  (0.0839) (0.1004)  (0.0845) (0.1002) 
Bank controls       
          Size   −0.4334*   −0.4804** 
    (0.2291)   (0.2297) 
          Credit assets   −0.6265   −0.5413 
                            (0.5599)   (0.5357) 
          Equity   0.7104   0.4190 
    (0.5017)   (0.5879) 
          Roa   −0.0760***   −0.0721*** 
   (0.0126)   (0.0128) 
Fixed effects       
          Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          Firm-by-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations              7,795 7,795 7,795 7,795 7,795 7,795 




Effect of bank ownership on secured credit 
This table shows the impact of foreign ownership on Secured credit. The sample period starts in 2004:Q1 and ends in 2005:Q4. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value one 
from 2005:Q1 to 2005:Q4, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) to (6) account for firms with two or more bank relationships, where the firm must have a relationship with a foreign 
and with another bank (private domestic or public) in the pre- and post-period. All regressions include bank and firm-by-time fixed effects. All regressions are estimated using OLS. 
All regressions include a constant and standard errors are clustered on bank level. Standard errors appear in parentheses and ***, **, * correspond to one, five and ten percent level 
of significance. 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign * Post −0.0747** −0.0834** −0.0733** −0.1132** −0.1172** −0.1038** 
 (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0344) (0.0511) (0.0512) (0.0488) 
Government * Post    −0.0890* −0.0786 -0.0719 
    (0.0529) (0.0521) (0.0506) 
Relationship controls       
          Credit amount  0.0661*** 0.0664***  0.0658*** 0.0662*** 
  (0.0057) (0.0056)  (0.0057) (0.0056) 
          Bank rating  −0.0041 −0.0039  −0.0037 −0.0036 
  (0.0040) (0.0040)  (0.0041) (0.0040) 
          Oldest  0.0025 0.0023  0.0024 0.0024 
  (0.0037) (0.0037)  (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Type of loans       
          Overdraft  0.0041 0.0061  0.0070 0.0083 
                           (0.0277) (0.0271)  (0.0274) (0.0269) 
          Factoring  −0.3709*** −0.3691***  −0.3683*** −0.3669*** 
  (0.0428) (0.0423)  (0.0427) (0.0422) 
          Term loans  0.2721*** 0.2735***  0.2746*** 0.2752*** 
  (0.0747) (0.0744)  (0.0742) (0.0740) 
          Leasing  −0.1506* −0.1516*  −0.1499* −0.1506* 
  (0.0856) (0.0864)  (0.0856) (0.0862) 
          Export loan  −0.2785*** −0.2773***  −0.2759*** −0.2753*** 
  (0.0515) (0.0511)  (0.0504) (0.0502) 
Bank controls       
          Size   0.0515   0.0260 
    (0.0569)   (0.0562) 
          Credit assets   −0.5356**   −0.4070** 
                            (0.2189)   (0.1818) 
          Equity   1.3449***   1.1742*** 
    (0.3488)   (0.3723) 
          Roa   0.0205   0.0227 
       
Fixed effects       
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-by-time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations              1,149,418 1,149,418 1,149,418 1,149,418 1,149,418 1,149,418 
R-squared                 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.32 
 
